On the concept of religion in Walter Benjamin's critical theory by Kuhnle, Lee Christian
On The Concept of Religion in Walter Benjamin's Critical Theory 
Lee Christian Kuhnle 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 




© Lee Christian Kuhnle, 2012 
ii 
Abstract 
In this dissertation I explore the concept of religion in the philosophy that underlies 
Walter Benjamin's critical theory. This analysis leads me to suggest two related 
conclusions: 1) contrary to secularist discourses, Benjamin regards the modern social as 
being religiously constituted and, 2) Benjamin develops a philosophy of experience, a 
"phenomenology," in which the religious is an inalienable aspect of experience itself. In 
developing these two arguments, I challenge the assumption of much of the secondary 
literature on Benjamin, which maintains that while the religious characterizes aspects of 
his early works, it is replaced by a Marxian-materialist paradigm in his later writings. 
Contrary to this gloss, I suggest that Benjamin's writings represent an attempt to 
synthesize a religious and a Marxian-materialist paradigm. 
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Introduction 
I - Benjamin's Religious Marxism? 
Walter Benjamin's philosophy and social criticism can be read as challenging a basic 
assumption ostensibly embedded within the onto-epistemology of historical materialism, 
namely, that the religious is a fundamentally illusory representation of real objective 
conditions, that it is essentially "false consciousness." Although Benjamin emphasizes 
the Marxian dimension in his cultural analysis, especially in his later works, he 
nonetheless seems to disrupt the underlying logic upon which historical materialism is 
predicated, when he introduces concepts, motifs and themes derived from both biblical 
and pagan religious traditions. 1 Benjamin's reliance on religious language to articulate a 
critical theory of culture is more than a rhetorical strategy, more than simple metal?hor. 
Instead, Benjamin's philosophy, whatever else we might deem it to be, also represents an 
attempt to merge elements of a Marxian materialism with a religious imaginary. 
According to Irving Wohlfarth, "Benjamin's attempt to recast theology into historical 
1 See, Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter 
Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (New York: Columbia University, 2003). Jacobson 
convincingly argues that Benjamin's early work is more closely associated with the 
Anarchist rather than the Marxian tradition. However, for the purposes of the present 
study, historical materialism, defined as the philosophical underpinnings of Marxism, 
expresses more clearly the underlying tensions with the religious. This tension also exists 
in the most Anarchist traditions, which, like Marxism, tend to be based upon a materialist 
philosophy. See, for example, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Bakunin, God and the State 
(New York: Mother Earth Publications 1880). Since there is no great distinction 
between the underlying logic that accounts for the hostility towards the religious within 
both the Marxian and Anarchist traditions, historical materialism is used as a convenient 
abridgment of all left-wing radical philosophico-political positions informed by a rigorous 
materialism. That is, even though the following discussion is couched almost exclusively 
in the language of Marxism, I maintain that the broad outlines of this argument apply 
equally well to Anarchism. 
2 
materialism was his way of coming to terms with his formative intellectual 
experiences," and represents "a 'third' way which re-fused the alternative, posed by his 
competing friends (Brecht, Schol em and, more 'dialectically,' Adorno) [ .... ]"2 In 1931, 
Benjamin hints at this attempted merger in a letter to his friend, the editor of the Neue 
schweizer Rundschau, Max Rychner, explicitly referencing both a historical materialist 
and theological method of inquiry, writing: 
Of those [solutions], the one most familiar to me would be to see in me not a 
representative of dialectical materialism as a dogma, but a scholar to whom the 
stance of the materialist seems scientifically and humanely more productive in 
everything that moves us than does that of the idealist. If I might express it in brief: 
I have never been able to do research and think in any sense other than, if you will, 
a theological one, namely, in accordance with the Talmudic teaching about the 
forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage of Torah. That is, in my experience, 
the most trite Communist platitude possesses more hierarchies of meaning than 
does contemporary bourgeois profundity, which has only one meaning, that of an 
apologetic. (Correspondences, 373) 
Although Benjamin's writings are marked by the conspicuous coexistence of 
themes derived from both the religious and historical materialist philosophies, especially 
evident in the essays "Karl Kraus," and "The Author as Producer," the plea for their 
2 Irving Wohlfarth, "Re-Fusing Theology. Some First Responses to Walter Benjamin's 
Arcades Project," New German Critique 39 (1986): 10. 
3 
merger is perhaps nowhere more explicitly formulated than in the first aphorism of his 
"Theses on the Concept of History." Benjamin writes: 
There was once, we know, an automaton constructed in such a way that it could 
respond to every move by a chess player with a countermove that would ensure the 
winning of the game. A puppet wearing Turkish attire and with a hookah in its 
mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created 
the illusion that this table was transparent on all sides. Actually, a hunchbacked 
dwarf- a master at chess - sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of 
strings. One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this apparatus. The puppet, 
called "historical materialism," is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for 
anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is small and 
ugly and has to keep out of sight. (SW 4, 389; GSJ, 693)3 
I take as significant the fact that Benjamin encloses historical materialism in quotation 
marks. With this punctuation Benjamin is signaling the need to suspend our judgment 
regarding the content of a real historical materialism. In this thought-image, what is 
3 Bekanntlich soll es einen Automaten gegeben haben, der so konstruiert gewesen sei, daft 
er jede Zug eines Schachspielers mit einem Gegenzug erwidert habe, der ihm den Gewin 
der Partie sicherte. Eine Puppe in turkischer Tracht, eine Wasserpfeife im Munde, saj3 
vor dem Brett, das auf einem geraumigen Tisch aufruhte. Durch ein System von Spiegeln 
wurde die Illusion erweckt, dieser Tisch sei von alien Seiten durchsichtig. Jn Wahrheit 
saj3 ein buckliger Zwerg darin, der ein Meister im Schachspiel war und die Hand der 
Puppe an Schnuren lenkte. Zu dieser Apparatur kann man sich ein Gegenstuck in der 
Philosophie vorstellen. Gewinnen soll immer die Puppe, die man 'historishen 
Materialismus' nennt. Sie kann es ohne weiteres mit jedem aufnehmen, wenn sie die 
Theologie in ihren Dienst nimmt, die heute bekanntlich klein und haj3lich ist und sich 
ohnehin nicht darf blicken !assen. 
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generally understood under the notion of historical materialism, is the external casing of 
a tradition that is animated by something else, the theological. 
The convergence, or clash, in Benjamin's work of the religious and a certain 
"historical materialism" expresses in a truncated manner the broader and still open 
question within Marxian philosophy as to the status of ideology in relation to the real, or, 
put still more generally, to the role of the "superstructure," or the "ideal," in the real. 
Benjamin's acquaintance, Karl Korsch, whom he met in 1929 through Berthold Brecht, 
points the way, when he suggests that, "The key problem to settle here is how in general 
to approach the relationship of consciousness to its object."4 The origin of this open 
question, to which Benjamin's oeuvre could be read,as a long meditative answer, can be 
traced to a degree of ambiguity in Karl Marx's own works in which he vacillates between 
a definition of ideology as fundamentally illusory on the one hand, and a dialectical 
definition, more subtle and nuanced, on the other. An example of the former 
characterization is provided by Louis Althusser who notes that for the Marx of German 
Ideology: 
Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e., as nothingness. All 
reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction 
whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before 
Freud. For these writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i.e., null [ .... ]5 
4 Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. Fred Halliday (New York: Modern 
Reader, 1970), 83. 
5 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy: And other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2001 ), 108. 
Althusser continues: 
Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage ( bricolage ), a pure dream, 
empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive 
reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially 
producing their existence.6 
It has long since become a cliche to reiterate Marx's assertion that he turned 
5 
G. W .F. Hegel back on his feet, that he replaced the ideal elements of the Hegelian 
dialectic with the concrete historical. Not Hegel's "world Spirit," but the working class is 
for Marx the engine of history. Marx formulates this point in the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, writing that, "It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness." The reductive materialism that can be inferred from 
this and other similar statements, and so succinctly articulated by Althusser above, is 
already present in the left-Hegelianism of Ludwig Feuerbach, which informs an entire 
lineage of Marxian thought. Starting perhaps already with Marx and certainly traceable 
to the works of Friedrich Engels and Eduard Bernstein, this reductive Marxian 
materialism came into full expression in the theories of the Second Worker's 
International, and devolved into the philosophical cul de sac of Soviet "Diamat." For this 
6 Ibid. 
6 
lineage of Marxian philosophy, the concrete material dimension circumscribes the 
horizon of the real. Cultural forms, especially the religious, are thought to represent the 
less essential moment, a reflection, an epiphenomenon of actual social relations. If, as 
Marx's criticism of Hegel's idealism suggests, the horizon of the real is coterminous with 
the horizon of objective material conditions, it could be argued that the super-structural 
dimensions of human existence, the ideal realm, has a certain concomitant unreality. Of 
all the dimensions of the ideal realm, perhaps none is regarded by many Marxian 
materialists as being further removed from representing any real objective relations than 
the religious. "Communism," Marx states in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844, "begins from the outset with atheism[ .... ]"7 The religious, however, is precisely 
what Benjamin strives to re-introduce into a Marxian discourse. Seen from the 
perspective of this reductive materialism, Benjamin seems to violate flagrantly the "rules 
of the game" when he attempts to perform a materialist social theory couched in the 
language of biblical metaphysics. 
However, Benjamin's project of attempting to supplement historical materialism 
with concepts derived from the religious, need not necessarily be dismissed out of hand. 
As suggested above, there is a degree of ambiguity in Marx's texts, some of which, 
especially his later works, suggest that the ideal moment, if not necessarily the 
specifically religious, needs to be included as a constitutive part of a properly materialist 
explanation of the social. Perhaps the most succinct repudiation of what Marx refers to as 
7 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed. and trans. Martin 
Milligan (New York: Dover Publications), 103. 
7 
"vulgar," or "mechanical materialism" is found in A Contribution to the Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, where he seems to de-emphasize the distinction between a 
material and ideal realm, writing that "[ ... ] theory also becomes a material force as soon 
as it has gripped the masses." To that text might be added Marx's "Theses on 
Feuerbach." All eleven of its aphorisms assert the need to include the ideal moment, 
often excluded by more reductive materialist philosophies. 
These more nuanced reflections by Marx - the above examples of which do not 
represent an exhaustive list - have given rise to a different type of Marxian philosophy 
which diverges significantly from the reductive materialism(s) described by Althusser 
regarding the status of the ideal in the real. Thinkers such as the afore mentioned Korsch, 
as well as Georg Lukacs and Alfred Sohn-Rethel, are early lights in this lineage which 
Max Horkheimer later christened critical theory. In what follows, critical theory will 
serve as an umbrella term for a group of historical materialists whose thoughts are 
characterized by a different, a more substantive and nuanced approach to the onto-
epistemological status of the ideal moment than that of "vulgar" materialism( s ). Korsch 
emphasizes the fault line separating the position of critical theory from a reductive 
materialist approach, writing,"[ ... ] many vulgar-Marxists to this day have never, even in 
theory, admitted that intellectual life and forms of social consciousness are comparable 
realities,"8 and that, "The major weakness of vulgar socialism is that, in Marxist terms it 
clings quite unscientifically to a naive realism [ .... ]"9 
8 Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 82. 
9 Ibid., 86. 
8 
If critical theory can be thought of as a more or less coherent stream of 
"western" Marxian thought, in the language of Perry Anderson, 10 one which attempts to 
supplement the thoughts of Marx with Max Weber and Sigmund Freud, one which is 
further characterized by its attempt to theorize culture dialectically, one in which the ideal 
moment is regarded as a semi-independent causal factor, that is, a theory which resists 
reducing everything to a reflection of the material substratum, then perhaps Moishe 
Postone can be read as describing its general approach with respect to the ideal moment, 
to the status of meaning. According to Po stone, Marxian theory: 
[ ... ]treats meaning neither in a reductive materialist manner, as an epiphenomena! 
reflex of a physical material base, nor in an idealist manner, as a self-grounding and 
completely autonomous sphere. Rather, it seeks to grasp social life with categories 
that allow it to treat the structure of meaning as an intrinsic movement of the 
constituted and constituting structure of social relations. 11 
Benjamin makes Postone's point somewhat more succinctly, writing in the Arcades 
Project that, "It is not the economic origins of cultures that will be presented, but the 
expression of the economy in its culture"12 [Nla,6; emphasis added.] 
The reader may be forgiven for wondering why this old debate within Marxian 
philosophy needs to be rehearsed here, were it not for the fact that the critiques supplied 
10See for example, Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: New 
Left Review, 1976). 
11 Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's 
Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 225. 
12 
"Nicht die wirtschaftliche Entstehung der Kultur sondern der Ausdruck der Wirtschaft 
in ihrer Kultur ist darzustellen." 
9 
by the reductive materialists regarding the ideal moment reappear within critical theory 
with respect to religion. The different philosophical positions separating mechanical 
Marxian materialisms from the more dialectically inspired critical theories may seem 
clear enough. However, the lines become somewhat blurry again when the question 
turns specifically to the religious. Clearly, those more mechanically inclined theorists 
dismiss the religious, as they tend to dismiss other moments of the ideal. Whereas many 
critical theorists and western Marxists who are otherwise well-disposed to include the 
ideal moment in their philosophies, they nonetheless seem all to ready to regress to an 
almost reactionary, mechanical materialist position when faced with the suggestion that 
the religious too could provide categories that can elucidate the form of the social. 
A little differentiation is clearly called for here. In point of fact, critical theory is 
not one tradition, and with respect to the status of the religious in the theories of the 
various thinkers that might be deemed to adhere to this "tradition," there are many 
different approaches. Ernst Bloch, like Benjamin did not accept the dismissal of the 
religious common within Marxian philosophies. Even Engels, who is often regarded as 
the grandfather of a certain reductive Marxian materialism, showed an interest in the role 
of the religious, which went beyond dismissing the phenomenon as merely reactionary .13 
There are many other examples that could be appended here as well. The claim being 
suggested here then has more the character of a general tendency. On the whole, works 
by Marxian social theorists, even critical theorists, evince an attitude towards the religious 
13 Michael Lowy, "Friedrich Engels on Religion and Class Struggle," Science and Society 
62, no.1 (Spring 1998): 79. 
10 
that can be located somewhere between condescending dismissal and outright hostility. 
This position is summarized by Michael Lowy when he writes, "The well-known phrase 
'religion is the opium of the people' is considered as the quintessence of the Marxist 
conception of the religious phenomenon by most of its supporters and opponents." 14 I 
will argue that there are internal logical grounds why this position is philosophically 
unwarranted as well as historical grounds for the continued intransigence of this stance. 
The often implicit argument seems to be that even if some aspects of culture such as 
philosophy, art or science can be repatriated into a dialectical materialist analysis, other 
aspects are simply too far removed from expressing anything real, making their status 
really analogous to that of the dream before Freud. However, the underlying logic of the 
dialectic which legitimates the inclusion of other idea~ moments is the same logic that 
should open the way for the inclusion of the religious as a positive constitutive factor, 
necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the social. However, even in critical theory, 
the religious is often viewed negatively, deemed mere false consciousness. I maintain 
that this repudiation of the religious by the majority of Marxian theorists derives 
ultimately from the uncritical acceptance in critical theory of bourgeois social categories. 
Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that this resistance to the religious has the 
character of a defense mechanism. Arguments often marshaled in support of secularism 
seem to have the status of a symptom, gesturing to a cultural repression, necessary for the 
upkeep of a certain bourgeois self-identity. 
14 Ibid., 79. 
11 
There is evidence in Marx's writings that, just as he regarded the ideal in 
general as unreal, he thought that the religious in particular was essentially illusory. The 
dismissal of the religious in Marx's writings helps account for this anti-religion prejudice 
encoded in historical materialism. In the Grundrisse, for example, Marx foreshadows the 
Weberian question by asking whether a religiously inspired encounter with the world 
might continue even after technical mastery over nature obviates the need for "irrational" 
beliefs. 15 Marx asks: 
Is the view of nature and of social relations on which the Greek imagination and 
hence Greek [mythology] is based possible with self-acting mule spindles and 
railways and locomotives and electrical telegraphs? What chances has Vulcan 
against Roberts & Co., Jupiter against the lightning-rod and Hermes against the 
Credit Mobilier? 16 
Let us immediately focus the emphasis of this question away from the specifically Greek 
context - that is, whether a classical-mythological experience might persist - to the 
more general query regarding the potential continuation of the religious in modernity. 
Although Marx's views on the status of religion are more nuanced than suggested by the 
trite maxim "religion is the opium of the masses," he does seem to argue that the religious 
would not persist in technocratic modemity. 17 "All mythology," Marx writes 
15 Michael Lowy, "Weber Against Marx? The Polemic with Historical Materialism in 
the Protestant Ethic," Science and Society 53, no. 1(Spring1989): 71-83. 
16 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. 
Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), 110. 
17 See, John Molyneux, "More than Opium: Marxism and Religion," International 
Socialism 119 (Summer 2008). 
12 
immediately after the passage just cited, "overcomes and dominates and shapes the 
forces of nature in the imagination and by the imagination; it therefore vanishes with the 
advent of real mastery over them" (emphasis added.) 18 Marx's formulation captures the 
sense in which critical theory on the whole has tended to side with this "Weberian" 
conclusion that, as modern life is "rationalized," religion wanes and eventually disappears 
from the domain of the social. The critical tradition's supposition that modernity's telos 
is non-religious is succinctly stated by Horkheimer when he claims that, "Mankind loses 
religion as it moves through modernity, but the loss leaves its mark." 19 
Benjamin, however, provides a compelling interpretation of the status of the 
religious in modernity which is in stark contrast to most Marxian philosophies, which 
tend to retain the liberal assumption that religion disappears in proportion to humanity's 
increased technical mastery over nature. For Benjamin, modernity remains 
fundamentally saturated by the religious. In fact, in his mammoth Arcades Project, he 
suggests that the appearance of technology, rather than being a sign of religion's decline 
in the social, can instead be read as the index of the continued existence of the modern' s 
mythic imaginary [N2a,l]. Another example from Benjamin's oeuvre which gestures 
towards the continued presence of the religious, can be found in his fragment of 1925, in 
which he speaks of modern Capitai2° as itself a religion (SWJ, 288; GS4, 100.) 
18 Marx, Grundrisse, 110. 
19 Max Horkheimer, "Thoughts on Religion," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. 
J. O'Connel and others (New York: Continuum, 2002), 131. 
20 Throughout this study I refer to capitalism as Capital. This precedent was set by Marx 
in his three volume analysis, Capital. According to the Uno-school, the term Capital 
gestures towards the fact that it appears in the social as a self-moving subject. It will be 
13 
Benjamin's texts are peppered with religious concepts, including: the Messiah, hell, 
the angle of history, aura, and doctrine. The religious, for Benjamin, does not vanishes in 
d . . d . h .f.". 21 mo ern1ty, mstea , 1t c anges 1orm. 
It is true, of course, that for Benjamin, as for Marx and the critical theorists more 
generally, the goal of theory is to provoke an awakening from the "mythic dream," from 
the false consciousness of "fetishized" social relationships that mask the true nature of 
exploitation in Capital. However, in the critical tradition influenced especially by Weber 
argued throughout this study that as long as capitalism is experienced as an objective 
force beyond the self-conscious control of subjects working collectively, it is Capital, not 
capitalism. 
21 Benjamin's biography, too, provides many examples that he did not accept the notion 
that the religious represents an essentially erroneous representation of the real, but that it 
is a critical resource in its own right, and hence worth bringing into a constellation with a 
revolutionary political theory. There are his well-known friendships and fruitful 
intellectual exchanges with Bloch and Gershom Scholem, who, in their own way were 
working on the convergence of a radical politic with a theological imaginary, Bloch in the 
Marxian tradition, and Scholem in the Anarchist one. In this context, Lowy's suggestion 
is insightful. Lowy maintains that Benjamin, together with Bloch and Scholem are all 
part of a broader "romantic" anti-capitalist critique of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in which some continental European Jews attempted a theoretical synthesis 
between a biblical messianism and radical politics. According to Lowy, other well-
known thinkers who belong to this movement included Gustav Landuaer, Bernard Lazare, 
Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Lukacs. This merger, however, did not only occur 
on the left, nor was it only instigated by Jewish intellectuals. An example from the other 
end of the political and religious spectrum is the Catholic legal and p0litical scholar, Carl 
Schmitt, who similarly argued for a certain affinity between the "secular" and the 
theological state. Benjamin held Schmitt in high esteem. This list represents only the 
most prominent of Benjamin's intellectual relationships anchored by questions of the 
continued role of religion in modernity. Beyond these friendships, Benjamin published in 
the journal Blatter fur religiOsen Sozialismus (Pages for [a] Religious Socialism), and he 
was a casual member of the College de Sociologie, which often theorized the religious 
and in which his some-time friend and colleague Georges Bataille, who himself worked 
on a critical sociology of religion, was a pivotal figure. 
14 
- and therefore aptly christened "W eberian Marxism"22 by Maurice Merleau-Ponty -
there exists a conflation of the sense in which becoming aware of the mystification of 
social relationships is related to a movement away from the experience of the religious. 
This move, however, is much more difficult to justify philosophically or sociologically 
than is generally recognized. I argue that it actually represents a liberal teleological 
vestige, a liberal ideological moment within critical theory .23 Here I agree with Richard 
Wolin who notes that for Benjamin "orthodox Marxism had itself succumbed to a host of 
economic and scientific prejudices" that resulted in "rendering Marxism itself 
'bourgeois. "'24 These liberal vestiges are most evident with respect to the religious in the 
more mechanistic versions of Marxian theory where a positivist sociology represents the 
social as moving through stages of psycho-cultural evolution. Korsch notes the 
subterranean connection between the philosophical justification of liberalism and some 
"orthodox" materialists, when he writes that "vulgar Marxism is the rightful heir of 
positivism." I would suggest, however, that when it comes to the question of the 
ontological status of the religious, this distinctly liberal ideological moment reappears 
even in more dialectical Marxisms, such as critical theory. It is based on a myopic 
reading of history, where a brief moment of seeming irreligiousity is turned into a general 
2~ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 29. Also see, Michael Lowy, "Figures of 
Weberian Marxism," Theory and Society 25, no. 3 (Jun. 1996): 431-446. 
23 I do not mean to suggest thereby that Weber himself is a liberal. Rather, I intend to 
show that aspects of Weber's theory of religion, especially the implication that religion 
disappears from the modem social, justifies a certain moment of liberal ideology. 
24 Richard Wolin, "Walter Benjamin's Failed Messianism: One-Way Street," The New 
Republic 222 (Jan. 2000): 37. 
15 
principle thought to express the underlying historical trajectory of humanity, or at least 
"western" (that is, European) culture. 
Benjamin, by contrast, suggests that a non-mystified relation to the social does not 
escape the orbit of religion: There is no "outside" of the religious, and, consequently no 
matter which way society develops or "progresses," there can be no movement away from 
it. Whereas the mythic for Benjamin represents mystification in the Marxian sense, 
apprehension of the real occurs under the sign of theology, not under a rationalized, de-
mythologized secularism. Many of Benjamin's writings, especially those pieces 
dedicated to a critique of Capital, are structured around an organizing binary distinction 
between myth-as-illusion versus the theological-as-the-real de-mystified, de-fetishized 
experience of the social. Benjamin rejects the positivist supposition, implicit in liberal 
teleological readings of history in which a rationalized, bureaucratized social provides the 
foundation for a non-symbolic, non-mediated discourse of "truth" replacing the "false 
consciousness" of the religious; a supposition, I argue, that tends to structure even the 
critical tradition's discourse regarding religion. By contrast, Benjamin suggests that the 
"symbolic systems"25 of the religious remain operative even in European "secular" 
modernity. Modernity, according to Benjamin, is "filled in," is structured by a 
"symbolic" matrix, its cultural-historical "text." Despite all appearances to the contrary, 
in rejecting the liberal-cum-positivist teleological supposition in critical theory, 
25 Benjamin has a strong aversion to the concept of "symbol." This aversion stems from 
his theory of the symbol as implicated in the logic of a totalizing epistemology. 
However, the notion of a "symbolic system," which will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter One, is a sociological category close to Benjamin's theory that the social is 
structurally similar to a "text," and should not confused with Benjamin's critique. 
Benjamin's work can be read as more in tune with the underlying logic of historical 
materialism than a great many of his anti-religious "historical materialist" readers have 
recognized. 
II - Benjamin's Religious Phenomenology of the Experience of Capital 
16 
Examining the role of the religious in his work leads me to proffer the claim that 
Benjamin develops a philosophy of experience in which experience is at all times 
saturated by one or the other dimension of the religious: experience is always either 
mythic or theological. In a sense, Benjamin's philosophy is a phenomenological 
description of the experiential encounter with a social shaped by Capital. If Benjamin's 
philosophy of the experience of Capital has a phenomenological dimension, this 
phenomenology needs to be understood in the idiosyncratic manner in which he 
developed it. We can follow Dermot Moran in defining phenomenology as being: 
[ ... ] a radical way of doing philosophy, a practice rather than a system. 
Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of 
philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth of matters, to 
describe phenomena in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in 
which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experiencer. 
As such, phenomenology's first step is to seek to avoid all misconstructions and 
impositions placed on experience in advance, whether these are drawn from 
religious or cultural traditions, from everyday coffimon sense, or indeed, from 
17 
science itself. Explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have 
been understood from within. 26 
Much of this description can be applied to Benjamin's philosophy. Benjamin is certainly 
a philosophical radical and it was perhaps this radicalism that barred his entrance to the 
academy. Benjamin's philosophy can also be regarded more as a practice.than a system 
in the Enlightenment sense typified, for example, by Immanuel Kant and Hegel. His 
seemingly antediluvian insistence that there is such a thing as truth, that truth exists, is 
explored with respect to a detailed analysis of material objects. "Every feeling," writes 
Benjamin, "is bound to an a priori object, and the representation of this object is its 
phenomenology" (Tragic Drama, 139; GSJ; 319.)27 As Theodor W. Adorno understood: 
For Benjamin everything habitually excluded by the norms of experience ought to 
become part of experience to the extent that it adheres to its own concreteness 
instead of dissipating this, its immortal aspect, by subordinating it to the schema of 
the abstract universal. Benjamin thereby placed himself in stark opposition to all 
modem philosophy with the possible exception of the peerless Hegel who knew that 
to establish a limit always also means to overstep it- and made it easy for those 
26 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2001 ), 4. 
27 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum 
International, 2005). "Jedes Gefuhl ist gebunden an einen apriorischen Gegenstand und 
dessen Darstellung ist seine Phanomenologie." 
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who dispute the rigor of his thought to dismiss it as scattered insights, as merely 
subjective, merely aesthetic, or as merely a metaphysical world view.28 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno further notes that: 
This is why the method is called phenomenological, in passive relation to 
phenomena. As Hegel applied it, it was already what Benjamin would later call 
'dialectics at a standstill' far advanced beyond whatever would appear as 
phenomenology a hundred years later.29 
In his essay "Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition," Howard 
Caygill suggests that Benjamin's oeuvre can be read as a life-long critical engagement 
with aspects of Martin Heidegger's phenomenology. 30 The differences in their work are 
substantial and should not be ignored for the sake of an interesting comparison. 
Nonetheless, Benjamin's underlying move to focus on the concept of experience together 
with his rejection of the positivist tradition, at times brings his thought close to that of 
Heidegger and the other phenomenologists. Benjamin's dislike for Heidegger's work is 
well known. In a letter written in 1931, for example, Benjamin tells his good friend 
Gershom Scholem that he and Brecht were planning a reading group whose purpose it 
would be to "annihilate Heidegger," whose Being and Time had been published a few 
years earlier (SW2, 841; Correspondences, 365). Perhaps this vitriol taken together with 
28 Theodor A. Adorno, "Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften," in On Walter Benjamin: 
Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1988), 4. 
29 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 156-57. 
30 Howard Cay gill, "Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition," in Walter 
Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. Andrew Benjamin and Peter 
Osborne (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000). 
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his reference to Edmund Husserl's philosophy as simply incomprehensible, could be 
read in the context of someone trying to distance himself from precisely those with whom 
he had, intellectually speaking, a great deal in common. 
However, one part of Moran's definition does not quite apply. As I will argue, 
Benjamin insists that experience, especially the experience of Capital, is shaped by a 
cultural-symbolic text that cannot be excluded a priori from the analysis. Benjamin's 
phenomenology is a philosophy of experience in which experience is shaped, 
conditioned, and suffused with meaning by always already being "linguistic." Indeed, as I 
will argue below, much of Benjamin's work consists in re-establishing the centrality of 
meaning against the attempt in positivism to eliminate the subjective dimension from the 
encounter with the real. The "linguistic," "textual," or "meaning-making" dimension of 
experience accounts for the centrality of myth and theology in his philosophy. Thus, 
despite any possible convergences with Heidegger and other phenomenologists, the 
present study will examine Benjamin's religious philosophy of experience, his 
"phenomenology" on its own terms. Since, by Benjamin's own admission, Heidegger 
represents, if anything, a purely negative influence, this study will not include Heidegger 
as part of the analysis. By contrast, Henri Bergson, whose theories Benjamin relied upon 
to develop his notion of experience in relation to memory, is brought into the analysis. 
With respect to Bergson, Detlev Schottker suggests that there are echoes of the thoughts 
of Maurice Halbwachs in Benjamin's work. Halbwachs spent much of his career 
attempting to merge Bergson's "phenomenological theory of memory," with a notion of a 
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collective (un)conscious developed by Emile Durkheim.31 However, since this study is 
an inquiry into the nature ofreligion in Benjamin's work, and not into how much or in 
which way Benjamin is a member of the phenomenological tradition, the works of other 
phenomenologists from Husserl to Halbwachs, Heidegger to Emmnauel Levinas remain 
absent from this analysis. Not the phenomenologists, but Plato, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, 
the Marburg Neokantians and other critical theorists are some of the thinkers who are 
brought into a constellation with Benjamin's thought in order to provide a more 
illuminating exegesis of his texts with respect to the status of the religious. 
III - Benjamin's Critique of the Positivist Moment 
The focus on Benjamin's philosophy of experience, on what I am calling his 
"religious phenomenology of the encounter with Capital," leads me to theorize the role 
that religious concepts play in his analysis of the social. Essentially, I argue that 
Benjamin's deployment of religious concepts allows his theory to capture aspects of the 
social that are missed in secular social theory. That is to say, because Benjamin focuses 
on how the social is actually experienced, rather than on prescriptive notions of how it 
should be experienced, it becomes evident that the religious needs to be retained as a 
31 Detlev Schottker, "Erinnem," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz and 
Erdmund Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 277. In this regard see also, 
Maurice Halbwachs, Sources of Religious Sentiment, trans. John A. Spaulding (The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1962), in which the author notes his reliance on Dtirkheim's theory of 
religion, writing "The work here offered to the reader is as exact, even literal, a summary 
of these [Durkheim's] ideas as possible [ .... ]" 
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necessary explanatory element. The leitmotif of the present study is aptly formulated 
by Lowy, when he asks: 
A century after August Comte, sociology continues to borrow its conceptual 
terminology from physics or biology. Is it not time to break away from this 
positivist tradition and to draw upon a spiritual and cultural heritage that is broader, 
richer in meaning and closer to the very texture of social facts? Why not use the 
vast semantic field of religions, myths, literature and even esoteric traditions to 
enrich the language of the social sciences?32 
As Alfred North Whitehead explains, it is precisely that factor which gives the sciences 
their explanatory power in the domain of nature that makes their methodology and their 
concepts so unsuitable for elucidating the realm of human sociality. In the early modern 
scientific paradigm that can be seen informing the works of Isaac Newton and Galileo 
Galilei, for example, which eventually furnishes the underlying logic of positivism and 
the scientistic ideology of liberalism, the physical universe is conceived as being 
composed of dead matter, without meaning or agency. "This," Whitehead notes, "is the 
grand doctrine of nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless complex of facts. "33 He 
continues: 
32 Michael Lowy, Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central 
Europe: A study in Elective Affinity, trans. Hope Heaney (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1988), 6. 
33 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Free· Press, 1968), 132. 
Cf. Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of 
Economy and Government, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2011). Noteworthy for the subsequent argument is that Agamben loc·ates the intellectual 
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The origin of this persuasion is the dualism which gradually developed in 
European thought in respect to mind and nature. At the beginning of the modern 
period Descartes expressed this dualism with the utmost distinctness. For him, 
there are material substances with spatial relations, and mental substances. The 
mental substances are external to the material substances. Neither type requires the 
other type for the completion of its essence. 34 
The explanatory power of this method for the natural sciences is not being disputed here. 
However, the problem that Whitehead identifies is that the ontology of the natural 
sciences rests on a conception of nature that is both dead and meaningless, the exact 
opposite of what is at issue in the social realm. Concepts such as life, consciousness and 
purpose are necessary categories for an explanation of the social. "Newton's 
methodology for physics was an overwhelming success. But the forces which he 
introduced left nature still without meaning or value."35 "Newton," continues Whitehead, 
"thus illustrated a great philosophical truth, that a dead nature can give no reasons. All 
ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value [sic]. A dead nature aims at nothing."36 The 
philosophical underpinnings of positivist sociology is an ontology in which the social is 
conceived as basically equivalent to the status of matter in physics, that is as meaningless 
and dead, interacting in the vacuum of space, governed by natural laws, not by agency or 
origins of the mind-body divide roughly a thousand years before Descartes, in the 
doctrinal disputes over Trinitarian theology. 
34 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 149. 
35 Ibid., 134. 
36 Ibid., 135. 
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purpose. Not human agency and free will, but social laws that function much as 
natural laws do, are thought to determine human life. 
A "science" of the social predicated on an ontology in which meaning is excluded 
a priori from the analysis is a contradiction; it is liberal ideology. This ideological 
reduction of the ontological needs to be replaced by a conception of the real in which 
mind is drawn into the social, in which the ideal realm, meaning, is recognized as intrinsic 
to the real of the social. Whitehead notes that, "The sharp-cut scientific classifications are 
essential for scientific method. But they are dangerous for philosophy."37 Indeed, "All 
explanations of the sociological functionings of mankind include aim as an essential 
factor in explanation."38 Whitehead's solution to the illegitimate use of categories drawn 
from the natural sciences to elucidate the social also highlights what I consider important 
for understanding Benjamin's general philosophical approach: 
The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical nature nor life can be 
understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the composition of 
"really real" things whose interconnections and individual characters constitute the 
universe. 39 
Exactly this, I claim, is what Benjamin does within the general framework of 
Marxian social theory. This approach also dovetails with Lowy's suggestion that 
categories which come to us from human history are more adequate to expressing what is 
at issue in the social than positivist categories drawn from the natural sciences. 
37 Ibid., 157. 
38 Ibid., 155. 
39 Ibid., 150. 
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According to Liselotte Wiesenthal, it is precisely "art, mythology, theology and 
metaphysics" that for Benjamin are the spheres in which a certain truth, the idea, can be 
represented.40 Benjamin re-introduces the vast semiotic domain of Europe's non-
positivist tradition into his critical theory of culture, which for him also includes the 
religious. 
Throughout his oeuvre, there are certain intellectual "enemies" with whom 
Benjamin feels the need to do battle. Although these enemies are varied, Benjamin 
believes them to be united by a common mistake. In his essays he takes aim at 
"bourgeois" linguistics and historiography, as well as the aesthetic theories of vulgar 
Marxists and traditionalists. Of course, Benjamin is a virulent critic of fascism, while at 
the same time highly skeptical of Social Democratic policies vis-a-vis the German 
working class, as well as of Stalinism. Benjamin himself noted his unwillingness to form 
any sort of alliances, writing in "Berlin Chronicle," that his habit of walking half a step 
behind his mother signaled his "stubborn refusal under any circumstances to form a 
united front, be it even with my own mother" (SW2, 600; GS4, 471.)41 Philosophically, 
Benjamin's thought is similarly hard to categorize. He seems to share important ideas 
40 Liselotte Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Athenaum Verlag, 1973), 204. "Kunst, Mythologie, Theologie und Metaphysik haben 
dabei die Funktion, diejenige Sphare zu bi/den, in der Entwurfe der Wahrheit, Jdeen, vor 
aller wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis dargestellt werden konnen." My translation: "Art, 
mythology, theology and metaphysics have thereby the function of building that sphere in 
which the delineation of truth, the idea, can be represented for all modes of knowledge." 
41 The full German sentence reads: "Vielleicht, daft man die gleiche Sabotage des 
wirklichen gesellschaftlichen Daseins noch spater, in der geschilderten Verhaltungsweise 
bei den Gangen durch die City wiederfindet in Gest/at des eigensinnigen Vorbehalts, in 
keinem Falle eine Front, und sei es mit der eignen Mutter, zu bi/den." 
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with the phenomenologists who were his contemporaries, and at t~e same time 
dismisses much of their thought out of hand. He was both attracted to the Neokantians 
and simultaneously repelled by large swaths of their philosophy. Benjamin's enemies 
seem to surround him on all sides, from the political far left to the political far right, from 
the philosophically adventurous to the intellectually conservative. His disagreement with 
these "enemies" can be generalized as expressing his underlying suspicion of any thought 
that arises from an atomistic ontology; it is a critique of a certain positivist moment. 
Benjamin, however, is less concerned with the positivist tradition as such than 
with positivist elements that inform or, perhaps, infect a great many social theories, 
political programs and philosophical schools that were dominant at the time he was 
writing. As Whitehead notes: 
The state of modem thought is that every single item in this general [positivist] 
doctrine is denied but that the general conclusions from the doctrine as a whole are 
tenaciously retained. The result is a complete muddle in scientific thought, in 
philosophical cosmology. 42 
That is, even when social theories and the philosophies which inform them do not openly 
subscribe to positivism, elements of the positivist outlook can, nonetheless, remain part of 
a general set of philosophical presuppositions. This applies to the status of August 
Comte's theory of religion within many contemporary approaches to religion. Although 
for most theorists, especially in the critical tradition, Comte's work represents little more 
than a historical curiosity, his general notion of psychic stages of evolution that move 
42 Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 132. 
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humanity through various religious epochs has been tenaciously retained. Indeed, it 
may be useful in this regard to take recourse to the notion of "zombie ideas." This 
whimsical formulation references the fact that certain ideas seem to persi~t as self-evident 
background assumptions even though there is no longer a credible theoretical basis to 
support them. Zombie ideas are ideas that should be dead, but continue to roam our 
ideational landscape.43 
Since Benjamin is less interested in the positivists per se than in the persistence of 
positivist notions, he does not engage in a critique of Rudolf Carnap, for example, but 
rather of the scientism that underlies the Kantian concept of experience. Although he 
mentions Herbert Spencer in passing, he does not directly critique him, nor does he tackle 
Comte's notion that the human social moves through various stages of psycho-cultural 
"evolution." Nonetheless, he is severely critical when this pseudo-evolutionary theory 
appears in the German Social Democratic Party's assertion that objective historical 
conditions are continuously improving, or when this is made part of a "bourgeois" theory 
of history. For Benjamin, then, it is less the tradition of positivism itself that is the object 
of his critique, but rather the positivist assumption that the social is essentially similar to 
matter in physics, dead, meaningless, and without agency. 
Benjamin's approach also informs the method of this present study. Throughout, 
Benjamin's thought will be presented as a critique of the positivist elements in social 
theory and philosophy. As in the case of the phenomenologists, I will not be presenting 
43 See John Quiggin, Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk among Us (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
Benjamin vis-a-vis major representatives of the positivist tradition, not the Vienna 
school nor the Anglo-American traditions. The term positivist is here, as it is in 
Benjamin's work, a stand-in for the more general insistence that a scientific discourse 
defines the ontological horizon of social theory, a discourse from which human 
subjectivity and agency is eliminated as much as possible. 
IV - Benjamin's Critical Onto-Epistemology 
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Part of the reason Benjamin considers the modem social as informed by the 
religious is that his philosophy is predicated on an ontology of internal relations. 
Benjamin makes this point in a wonderfully charming example, characteristically relying 
on an impressionistic rather than positivist description. Benjamin writes: 
I had to clear a way for myself to the farthest comer. There I would come upon my 
socks, which lay piled in traditional fashion - that is to say, rolled up and turned 
inside out, so that every pair had the appearance of a little pocket. For me, nothing 
surpassed the pleasure of thrusting my hand as deeply as possible into the pocket's 
interior. I did not do this simply for the sake of its woolly warmth. It was "the little 
present" rolled up inside that I always held in my hand and that in this way drew me 
into the depths. When I had closed my fist around it and, so far as I was able, made 
certain that I possessed the stretchable woolen mass, there began the second phase 
of that game, which brought with it the momentous unveiling. For now I went on to 
unwrap ''the present," to tease it out of its woolen pocket. I drew it ever nearer to 
me until something rather disconcerting was accomplished: "the present" was 
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wholly wrested from its pocket, but the latter itself was no longer around. I 
could not put this enigmatic truth to the test often enough: the truth, namely, that 
form and content, veil and veiled, "the present" and the pocket, were one. They 
were one - and, to be sure, a third thing too: the sock into which they had both 
been transformed. (SW3, 401; GS4, 284; emphasis added)44 
As Herbert Marcuse demonstrates in Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise 
of Social Theory, the ontology of internal relations is the fundamental frame ofreference 
that accounts for the critical moment in critical theory.45 From this perspective, subject 
and object are not regarded as two irreconcilable moments, but are constituted through 
continuous co-mediation. By contrast, the underlying ontology of much of liberal social 
theory, including parts of Weber's sociology of religion, and evident in the allergic 
reaction of many Weberian-Marxists to the religious, is to some informed by the positivist 
outlook. It is based on a view of the social universe as governed by the law of human 
psychic evolution, in which the religious is eventually left behind. 
44 
"Ich muftte mir Bahn bis in den hinteren Winkel machen; dann stieft ich auf meine 
Strumpfe, welche da gahiiuft und in althergebrachter Art, gerollt und eingeschlagen, 
ruhten, so daft jedes Paar das Aussehen einer kleinen Tasche hatte. Nichts ging mir uber 
das Vergnugen, meine Hand so tief wie moglich in ihr lnneres zu versenken. Und nicht 
nur ihrer wolligen Wiirme wegen. Es war 'Das Mitgebrachte, 'das ich immer im 
eingerollten Jnnern in der Hand hielt und das mich derart in die Tiefe' zog. Wenn ich es 
mit der Faust umspannt und mich nach Kriiften in dem Besitz der weichen, wollenen 
Masse bestiitigt hatte, fing der zweite Tei/ des Spiels an, der die atemraubende 
Enthullung brachte. Denn nun ging ich daran, 'Das Mitgebrachte' seiner Tasche ganz 
entwunden, jedoch sie selbts nich mehr vorhanden war. Nich oft genug konnte ich so die 
Probe aufjene riitselhafte Wahreit machen: daft Form und lnhalt, Hu/le und Verhulltes, 
'Das Mitgebrachte' und die Tasche eins waren." 
45 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1941 ). 
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Like most critical theorists arguing against "vulgar materialism," Benjamin too 
believes that the real is not simply an existent independent of the subject but is mediated 
by the subject as the subject is by the real. This onto-epistemic assumption allows 
Benjamin to situate the "symbolic dimension" within the social. What distinguishes 
Benjamin's approach from that of other critical theorists is that he extends this insight to 
encompass the religious as well. For Benjamin the religious is constitutive of the social 
as experienced by embodied human subjects. A loose homology to Hegel's critique of 
Kant's idealism might be drawn on here so as to articulate what is salient in Benjamin's 
assumption. Kant suggested that the "pure intuitions" of time and space are not found in 
the noumenal dimension of the real, in the real that is hypothesized to exist somewhere 
beyond the subject, but are attributed to the real by the subject. The real is never 
experienced without these intuitions: one could argue therefore, as Hegel did, that what is 
meant by the real necessarily includes time and space, even if these categories are in 
themselves ideal, that is, contributed to the experience of the real by subjectivity. At the 
ontological level, Hegel's critique of Kant is directed at the latter's atomism from the 
perspective ofreality constituted relationally. For Kant, there is a real beyond the subject, 
whereas for Hegel the real is that which is constituted with the subject. 
Benjamin pursues the same strategy against mechanical materialist readings of the 
social, against the positivist moment in social theory. For Benjamin, the social is 
constituted in part by the psychic life of the subject, which includes the religious cultural 
text. It is this "text" that provides the categories which are drawn on to mediate and, 
simultaneously, constitute the experience of the real. Even if the religious is not part of 
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an ontic reality existing in some autarkic isolation beyond the subject, it remains part 
of the real as constituted by subjectivity. This, after all, is how the real is defined from 
the perspective of an ontology of internal relations. The notion that religious 
representations and experiences are left behind once the ideal moment is recognized as a 
contribution made by subjectivity, strikes me as equivalent to arguing that once the 
Kantian categories of time and space are understood for what they are, they too can be 
subtracted from the experience of the real. The resistance to Benjamin's inclusion of 
these concepts, especially by his more reductive Marxian materialist readers, results, I 
claim, from this unacknowledged positivism within some less self-reflective historical 
materialist theories. 
Benjamin's attentive readers will no doubt have noticed that many of his essays 
are structured around key conceptual dichotomies. Often he juxtaposes two seemingly 
similar concepts, such as law and justice, in order to demonstrate that they are by no 
means synonymous, but actually spring from two fundamentally different ways of 
encountering the world. Indeed, these conceptual distinctions gesture towards two 
elemental but opposed onto-epistemic positions: one inscribes the possibility of freedom 
while the other encodes a psychic bondage. Benjamin's strategy in each of these works is 
the same: move the reader to recognize the fundamental distinction between the two 
seemingly similar, or mutually dependent concepts, by recognizing the essential 
difference in the world views from which these concepts arise. For Benjamin, law, for 
example, does not provide justice, but brings merely the semblance of justice. His 
formulation in the "Karl Kraus" essay, in which he suggests that Kraus identified the 
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"high treason oflaw against justice," (SW2, 444; GS2, 348)46 indicates that Benjamin 
believes these concepts to be entirely distinct. The notion that for X crime Y punishment 
should be meted out binds humanity to a prearranged fate that does not fulfill the biblical 
conception of radical freedom; a notion shared by some Anarcho-Marxist traditions. 
Although the notion of law seems to be deployed in order to attain justice, Benjamin 
claims it actually produces the opposite: it gives rise to injustice. 
In Benjamin's work, these conceptual dichotomies are re-duplicated in various 
theoretical registers, or at various philosophical "levels." In each of these registers the 
same fundamental distinction is at issue. For example, in his Origin of the German 
Tragic Drama, Benjamin structures his arguments around the opposition of symbol to 
allegory. As in the "Karl Kraus" piece the main distinction in "Critique of Violence," is 
between law and justice, to which is added the distinction between fate and history. In 
"The Mimetic Faculty," it is the category of mimesis that is shown to be distinct from 
play. In "The Storyteller," it is between "short experience" and "long experience." Each 
time it is the second term, in this admittedly adumbrated list, which points towards an 
onto-epistemology of freedom whereas the first is predicated on a foundation of psychic 
servitude. 
In point of fact, however, this schema is a little too simplistic. While Benjamin 
often structures his essays around a simple binary opposition, a closer reading suggests 
that these binaries are not always mutually exclusive, but could also be thought to occupy 
different ends of a continuum. Indeed, they also include a moment of relation. One 
46 
"Sie lautet auf Hochverrat des Rechtes an der Gerechtigkeit." 
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example will suffice. Benjamin understands mimesis as the faculty that binds 
subjectivity to the natural, to the mythic, to bondage. Its opposing category is the 
freedom inherent in play. However, some of his essays, such as "Berlin Childhood 
around 1900," and the 1936 version of his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of its 
Technological Reproducibility," suggest that mimesis is intimately related to play. 
Mimesis, while utterly distinct from play when seen from one perspective, is also shown 
to be related to play when seen from another. Keeping the relational moment in mind, I 
maintain that there remains a certain logic to reading Benjamin as constructing binary 
oppositions, especially since the most fundamental opposition in his thought establishes 
the logic that informs all the other binaries in his philosophy. 
All these dichotomies, I suggest, reproduce at their respective philosophical 
"levels" the most all encompassing onto-epistemic dichotomy, that between myth and 
theology. The mythic might not in fact appear as the opposite of the theological. Indeed, 
from a contemporary sociological perspective, one might be tempted to include the 
mythic and the theological under the general notion of religion, as I do in Chapter One. 
However, Benjamin's opposition has its origins in biblical theology. The myth-theology 
distinction can already be noted in the first biblical creation story in Genesis 1. A close 
reading suggests that the authors of the first creation story attempted to distance the 
biblical tradition from the Babylonian creation myth to which the Genesis account is 
clearly philologically indebted. This is textually marked by not naming the sun and moon 
directly as objects of creation, a conspicuous deviation from the text as it is narrated up to 
that point. However, since in many ancient languages related to the bible, the concepts 
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sun and moon were simultaneously the names of the pagan gods for those phenomena, 
the authors replaced these designators with the rather awkward "God made the two great 
lights - the greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night[ .... ]"47 This 
substitution has been read as indicating that the biblical authors did not want to evoke the 
notion of other deities. 
As I argue in Chapter Two, God has often been equated with truth, especially in 
many biblical religio-philosophic traditions. For Benjamin, the myth-theology distinction 
has great significance, since it describes the most fundamental relationship to reality. 
God as Whitehead's "really real" can be encountered theologically, that is correctly, or 
mythically, that is erroneously. In a curiously traditional reading given Benjamin's 
Marxian politics, he takes the biblical tradition seriously by suggesting that a theological 
relationship to the real is one that establishes a totally free subjectivity. From this 
fundamental position follow the secondary tropes of freedom. In a sense, there is a re-
doubling or perhaps a repetition of the mythic-theological dichotomy at each "level" of 
human existence. In that sense, it could be argued that this elemental opposition is 
translated into each dimension of the social. 
The notion that everything can be translated, and that simultaneously every 
translation also misses what is essential, is a central theoretical proposition as well as 
methodological approach that defines a great deal of Benjamin's philosophy, and 
simultaneously also accounts for why his work is sometimes so difficult to interpret. 
47 Gen.1.1 Cf. "The Epic of Creation," in Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, The 
Flood, Gilgamesh, and others, trans. and ed. Stephanie Dalley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 228-277. 
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Since Benjamin's theory oflanguage will be analyzed in Chapter Three, at present I 
simply want to indicate the centrality to his work of the notion of translation as a 
philosophical method. Perhaps the Arcades Project is the text where this logic of 
translating concepts between philosophical registers is most apparent. Benjamin will 
often make the same point in various discursive idioms. For example, Benjamin 
expresses the difference between the mythic and the theological, that is, the difference 
between experiencing the appearances and the essence of capitalist modernity, with the 
psychoanalytic concepts of dream and awakening. The essential structure however is 
identical, but expressed in a different register. This method of "translating" between 
idioms is derived from Johann Georg Hamann, whose notion of "metaschematizing," was 
a methodological approach in which relations rather than definitions are emphasized. 48 In 
the Arcades the logic of translation, or metaschematizing, is expanded to include certain 
"Benjaminian archetypes." The figures of the revolutionary, the historian, the art critic 
and the biblical exegete all occupy an essentially homologous position with respect to 
interpretation. The art critic is to interpret the work of art the way the historian is to 
interpret history. Both relate to their objects of interpretation in essentially the same way 
as the revolutionary relates to the social. Like with the mythic and theological 
dichotomy, it is the biblical exegete whose relationship to the Holy Book provides the 
paradigmatic relation to the "really real" that informs all the "secondary" conceptual 
oppositions. 
48 See for example, Georg Johann Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, trans. 
and ed. Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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The myth-theology dichotomy in Benjamin's work expresses the divergent 
onto-epistemic positions encoded in an (liberal positivist) atomistic universe on the one 
hand, and the Marxian dialectic, that is, an ontology of internal relations, of mind. fused 
with physical matter, on the other. For Benjamin, an ontology of internal relations is the 
conceptual starting point that must be established, if liberation from the psychic bondage 
imposed by the forms and appearances of Capital is to be accomplished. While Marx 
theorized the objective conditions that keep the working class in servitude, Benjamin 
analyzes how these forces impact experience in a way that encodes a world-view contrary 
to one needed to effect change. This is the ideological status of science in liberalism, or 
the positivist moment in social theory. If the social domain is seen as an extension of the 
natural domain, as a world in which meaning is illusory and human beings are not free 
but determined by natural laws, then it follows that there is no real agency in the social 
realm. This view encapsulates the onto-epistemic position Benjamin references as myth 
as well as second order mythic concepts such as, fate, pagan, pagan gods and the like. 
V - The Reception 
The uncritically accepted liberal assumption in much of Marxian social theory, 
which suggests that the religious is a false representation of the real, and the recognition 
of the essential falseness of religion is a sign of cultural maturity, what Wiesenthal has 
referred to as a "hostility to theology" (Theologie-Feindlichckeit)49 has meant that many 
of Benjamin's readers have noted a contradiction at the heart of his attempt to wed 
49 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 194. 
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theology and Marxism. The attempt to mitigate this ostensible contradiction has 
characterized a great deal of the scholarship dedicated to the question of Benjamin and 
the religious. Since it is generally taken for granted in this literature that the modem 
social is not really religious, or, on the philosophical level, that materialism (especially a 
Marxian materialism) necessarily resists a religious metaphysic, one aspect of Benjamin's 
thought tends to be valorized while another is suppressed. This exegetical approach in 
the secondary literature is noted by Pierre Missac's who writes: 
Faced with the complexity of Benjamin's personality and the difficulty of 
classifying his oeuvre, exegetes readily fall back on the theme of opposites. They 
portray their author as either 'seated between two chairs' (zwischen den Stiihlen) or 
as oscillating between atheism and theology. One such interpreter underscores the 
contradictions in Baudelaire studies, while another, in an analysis and explanation 
based on oxymoron, characterizes Benjamin as a mystic or a Marxist rabbi - as a 
sort of hermetic socialist. 50 
Scholem provides one example of this either-or reading when he suggests that 
there is an "authentic" and an "inauthentic" Benjamin, the latter being the one who uses 
"communist phraseology." In a letter written to Benjamin in March of 1931, Schol em 
writes: 
[ ... ] it seems to me that it would be clear to any impartial reader of your writings 
that in the last few years you have been trying - forgive me for saying so, but 
so Pierre Missac, "Walter Benjamin: From Rupture to Shipwreck," in On Walter 
Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, 211-12. 
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desperately trying - to present your insights, which are in part far-reaching, in 
phraseology that is conceptually close to Communist phraseology. It also seems 
clear, however- and to me this is what seems important- that there is a 
disconcerting alienation and disjuncture between your true and alleged way of 
thinking. That is, you do not attain your insights through the strict application of a 
materialistic method, but entirely independently of it (in the best case) or (in the 
worst case, as in some of the essays of the last two years) by playing with the 
ambiguities and interference phenomena of this method. As you yourself quite 
aptly write Mr. Rychner, your own solid knowledge grows out of, to be brief, the 
metaphysics of language. This is the most appropriate subject in which you, having 
achieved undistorted clarity, could be a highly significant figure in the history of 
critical thought, the legitimate heir of the most productive and most genuine 
traditions of Hamann and Humboldt. On the other hand, your ostensible attempt to 
harness these results in a framework in which they suddenly present themselves as 
the apparent result of materialistic considerations introduces an entirely alien 
element from which any intelligent reader can easily distance himself. 
(Correspondences, 374) 
Another approach that de-emphasizes the co-existence of religious and Marxian 
themes, one echoed in much of the secondary literature, was first articulated by Adorno 
and his students, especially Hermann Schwepenhauser and Jiirgen Habermas. Adorno 
and company attempt to overcome this ostensible contradiction by dividing Benjamin's 
38 
life into an early metaphysical phase and a later historical materialist one. 51 Habermas 
summarizes this reading when he writes: 
No interpretation[ ... ] can dismiss Benjamin's break with esotericism. In the face 
of the rise of fascism, political insight forced Benjamin to break with that 
esotericism of the true for which the young Benjamin had reserved the dogmatic 
concept of doctrine.52 
Wiesenthal suggests that One-Way Street, perhaps finished sometime in 1926, represents 
the work in which the transition to his later period becomes visible. In this division, 
Tragic Drama would still be counted as an "early" piece. 53 Alternatively, the fateful talks 
Benjamin had with Adorno and Horkheimer in 1927, which have since come to be known 
as the "Konigstein conversations,"54 in which the latter reportedly impressed upon 
Benjamin the importance of Marxian theories often serves as another pivotal event 
marking his break from "esotericism," and a tum to "historical materialism." 
What Habermas sees as a "break" and what Scholem regards as "inauthentic," is, 
as Scholem noted in his letter, signaled in Benjamin's oeuvre by the emergence of 
historical materialist terminology, especially in texts stemming from the 1930s. 
Benjamin himself attests to his late discovery of Marx, and it is clear from even a cursory 
glance that he increasingly uses Marxian concepts, especially after beginning his 
friendship with Brecht in the late 1920s. Yet, these readings which see in this lexical shift 
51 Ibid., 210-11. 
52 Jiirgen Habermas, "Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique," in On Walter 
Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections, 109. 
53 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 2. 
54 See "Chronology 1929 - 1934" in SW2, 834. 
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a "break" with his "metaphysical" interests strike me as somewhat forced.55 Indeed, in 
this respect I would go so far as to agree with Wiesenthal, when she suggests that for a 
thorough understanding of Benjamin's thought it is vital to maintain a certain distance 
from Adorno and his students' interpretation of his works. 56 Contrary to Habermas' s 
suggestion, for example, there is abundant textual evidence that Benjamin worked 
towards a theoretical synthesis of religious and materialist paradigms. Beyond the 
already mentioned works of "Karl Kraus," "The Author as Producer," and the "Theses," 
there is the towering Arcades Project, his early fragment "Capitalism as Religion," 
among many others. For the present analysis it is important to note that Benjamin's 
synthesis does not only take place at the rhetorical level, as Schol em's comments seem to 
imply. Rather, Benjamin's synthesis fuses Marxism and religion at the philosophical 
level. As will be demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three especially, even when 
Benjamin does not rely explicitly on religious concepts, his thoughts, his method of 
inquiry, and his manner of presentation remain suffused with the religious. 
With respect to the theory that there exists an early and a late Benjamin, it strikes 
me as no small irony that his own works should be read in precisely the way he argued 
55 See, for example, Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 57 - 70. As 
·wiesenthal notes, even here the supposed break between Benjamin's "life periods" can be 
exaggerated. Wiesenthal suggests that the dialectical-image is a later terminological 
reference for what in earlier texts was the notion of the extreme. It is quite possible, 
therefore, that the break between an early and later Benjamin is more apparent than real. 
56 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 188. "Eine Distanz zu 
Adornos und seiner Schuler Interpretation istfur das Versttindnis der Gedanken Walter 
Benjamins unerltifilich" My translation: "Foµn understanding of Walter Benjamin's 
thought it is indispensible to maintain a distance from the interpretations of Adorno and 
his students." 
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history should not be interpreted, namely in a teleological and linear manner. History, 
for him, is not the progress of thought from error to truth. This liberal or, what Benjamin 
called "bourgeois" view of history, simply justifies the present as a necessary and 
expected outcome. It strikes me as remarkable that with Benjamin and the religious this 
view of history is at play in a double-sense. The liberal representation of the social as one 
in which the religious has been overcome is at least in part the cause for the resistance to 
the co-existence of these themes in his philosophy. At the same time, the solution to the 
problem generated by this liberal presupposition is a teleological reading of Benjamin's 
own work, in which his ideas move (like the social supposedly does) from an early 
metaphysics to a later atheistic materialism. 
By contrast, I suggest that we not engage in a chronological reading of Benjamin's 
oeuvre, nor deny that he attempted a synthesis of these modes of thought. Rather, I 
propose we read Benjamin's texts as his theory seems to imply they be read, namely, in 
the manner of biblical exegesis and commentary, perhaps even typologically, in which the 
emphasis is placed not on a linear progression but on the re-occurrence of themes that are 
expressed in various registers and in his various pieces of writing. Reading Benjamin's 
works typologically is to metaschematize. It is, I suggest, to read Benjamin the way he 
himself reads texts. 
The present analysis takes a simpler approach to the question of religion in 
Benjamin's philosophy than do the glosses provided by much of the secondary literature. 
I suggest we take Benjamin at his word, namely, that his work represents an attempt to 
merge a Marxian materialism with a religious imaginary. I propose that instead of 
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beginning with the a priori assumption that this cannot be accomplished, as Scholem 
and Habermas seem to, we ask rather, in what way can it be accomplished? I suggest that 
we read Benjamin as issuing a challenge to Marxian philosophy regarding the relation of 
the real and the ideal, specifically regarding the metaphysical status of the religious in 
relation to the material. In what way can a religious-cum-metaphysical world view be 
brought fruitfully into conversation with a Marxian materialism? At the outset, of course, 
this theoretical reorientation does not pre-empt the conclusion. It is still possible, even 
with this new question, that the answer might result in a simple negative, that is that there 
is no way in which a Marxian materialism can be fruitfully combined with a religious 
metaphysic. I will argue throughout the present study, that there are coherent logical and 
historical arguments suggesting that this merger can, in fact, succeed, and, indeed, that by 
re-introducing precisely the religious within a Marxian discourse, Benjamin makes 
critical theory more critical. Benjamin's use of the religious challenges a core liberal 
assumption, based on an inherently liberal teleology, one which I suggest is echoed even 
in many versions of historical materialist philosophies, including much of critical theory. 
I claim, however, that Benjamin's inclusion of the religious does not necessitate him 
having to jettison the underlying materialist assumptions of Marxian philosophy. The 
key, I argue, is to be found in how the concept of religion is theorized. 
In Chapter One, I argue that the hegemonic influence of Weber's theories of 
religion on critical theory, especially as it is characterized in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, has resulted in what I take to be a misreading of the role of religion· 
in Benjamin's philosophy. The arguments in the Protestant Ethic encode a certain liberal 
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teleological view of history already present in Comte, in which the religious is left 
behind as European culture becomes more technologically advanced and the social ever 
more rationalized and bureaucratized. Contrary to the view presented in much of the 
secondary literature on Benjamin and religion, the question of whether the modern 
European social was ever free of the religious is a highly contestable point. What strikes 
me as incontrovertible, however, is that this approach to the social is not operative in 
Benjamin's analysis. Although he occasionally uses the concept secularism, his entire 
oeuvre is based on the theory that the modem is infused with the deleterious illusions of 
myth, and that the only solution is a theological one. I suggest that it is, therefore, 
dubious to accept uncritically a Weberian formulation of the religious as being suitable 
for interpreting Benjamin's philosophy. Thus, the present study begins by problematizing 
the concept of religion itself, an approach that to my knowledge has so far remained 
largely untested by the secondary literature. 
To some extent, I would agree with Margret Kohlenbach, when she writes that: 
More often than not the literature on Benjamin combines a superficial empathy for 
his work with a lack of clarity about its character [ .... ] The lack of clarity is perhaps 
most evident in the confused use of such words a 'theory,' 'philosophy,' 
'experience,' 'theology,' or 'secularization. "'57 
Surprisingly, however, given the title of her book, Walter Benjamin: Self-Reference and 
Religiosity, and after opening with such a strong condemnation of the secondary 
57 Margarete Kohlenbach, Walter Benjamin: Self-reference and Religiosity (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), ix. 
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literature, the author herself makes almost no effort to theorize adequately the concept 
of religion. Kohlenbach is not alone. She is representative of the very problem she 
identifies, one which is almost ubiquitous in the scholarly literature on Benjamin and 
religion. 
Instead of theorizing the concept of religion in the abstract, studies dedicated to 
Benjamin's inclusion of the religious have tended to focus on more concrete instantiations 
of the general notion. For example, Benjamin's relationship to Judaism in general, or his 
knowledge of Kabbala in particular represent themes commonly broached in the 
secondary literature.58 Eric Jacobson's Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political 
Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem is exemplary of this line of 
analysis. 59 Similarly, the role of specific religious concepts, such as the auratic, are made 
topics of inquiry. More recently, concepts that appear to negate the religious, such as the 
profane and the secular have been brought into a constellation with Benjamin's thought.60 
It is true that many of the studies dedicated to examining specific concepts, including 
religiously inspired ones, are excellent and do not need to be improved upon. Benjamins 
Begriffe, a two-volume analysis of key concepts in Benjamin's oeuvre is perhaps the 
paragon of this method of inquiry. However, themes such as Judaism, and religiously 
58 Cf. Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 116. The disproportionate 
interest in Benjamin's Judaism represented in the secondary literature is somewhat 
curious given the fact that he frequently confessed to knowing almost nothing about it, 
especially about the Kabbala. 
59 Jacobson, Metaphysics of the Profane. 
60 See, for example, Sigrid Weigel, Walter Benjamin: Die Kreatur, das Heilige, die Bilder 
(Frankfurt, a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008); Daniel Weidner, ed., Profanes 
Leben: Walter Benjamins Dialektik der Sakularisierung (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010). 
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inspired concepts, such as the messianic, can be subsumed under the more general 
concept of religion, or perhaps the religious, which will be used interchangeably 
throughout this study.61 The reason for pursuing this broader concept is that Benjamin 
frequently makes reference to Jewish as well as Christian themes, especially themes 
derived from Christian Neoplatonism. Benjamin also frequently relies on motifs and 
concepts from Greek and Roman paganism. When he turns to the Bible, it is not as a 
pious interpreter of tradition, but as an exegetical radical, not easily subsumed under the 
aegis of any denomination of Christianity or Judaism. Since Benjamin does not rely on 
one religious tradition, but introduces concepts, themes and motifs from various European 
religious and religiously inspired philosophical traditions, the present study is dedicated 
to examining the more abstract notion of religion. By exploring how the abstract notion 
of the religious operates in and informs his philosophy and social theory, I am taking an 
approach to the concept that has not been thoroughly pursued in the secondary literature. 
Indeed, it is by formulating the question in a more abstract manner, by asking about the 
religious as such, instead of examining more concrete instantiations of the religious, that 
61 Cf. Kohlenbach, Walter Benjamin: Self-reference and Religiosity, x. I take 
Kohlenbach's distinction between what she terms "religion" and "religiosity" as 
symptomatic of her lack of clarity about her central concept. Kohlenbach writes, "My 
central claim is that in his writing he pursued irreducibly religious objectives and did so, 
moreover, independently of any existing religious institution or positive religious belief. 
The latter qualification explains why in my title I speak of Benjamin's religiosity rather 
than of his religion." According to Kohlenbach, religion seems to be the concept which 
refers to institutional religion and its dogma. However, as the arguments in Chapter One 
demonstrate, the notion that the institution of religion is to a large extent independent of a 
broader religious phenomenon is a misunderstanding engendered by a culturally 
particularistic reading that presupposes that European biblical monotheism and its social 
history expresses the essence of religion as such. 
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the question can be seen as couched within the larger problematic in historical 
materialism regarding the relation of the real to the ideal. In doing so, I also suggest that 
the over-reliance on Weber's sociology ofreligion in critical theory also becomes visible. 
However, the drawback of examining the abstract notion of religion, and then 
examining this in relation to Benjamin's entire oeuvre, entails achieving a certain breadth 
at the expense of more depth. The present study, therefore, does not make claims to 
completeness. The approach taken is to examine the religious in the various domains of 
Benjamin's philosophy, in his epistemo-critica] theory (Chapter Two), in his "linguistic" 
phenomenology of experience (Chapter Three) and in his manner of presenting history 
(Chapter Four.) The purpose is to trace how the religious informs or functions in his 
philosophy. Thus, in my discussion of language, in Chapter Three, for example, I make 
no pretensions of presenting Benjamin's theory oflanguage in its entirety. There is little 
need to do this, since many excellent studies, such as those by Jacques Derrida or Paul De 
Man, have already appeared detailing its various aspects. Instead, my question is how the 
specifically religious informs his theory of language. Therefore, I will examine 
Benjamin's theory of language only where it relates directly to the religious. The same 
approach is taken with the presentation of other aspects of his philosophy. 
Even here there are limits however. Tracing the intellectual history of even one 
religiously inspired notion in Benjamin's work, such as origin (Ursprung), would easily 
provide enough material for a study of this length. However, as I have suggested, studies 
of this sort are legion and are often well researched and well presented. Missing from the 
secondary literature is an overview, the larger picture that can help put some of these 
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detailed studies into a more systematic interpretive schema. For example, while I do 
not generally disagree with the many painstaking philological studies examining the 
genealogy of this or that concept in Benjamin's work, the underlying assumptions that 
this represents an aberration from the onto-epistemology of the Marxian dialectic, or that· 
Benjamin was a radical amongst radicals for trying to synthesize two mutually exclusive 
modes of thought, is based on not adequately problematizing the theoretical context that 
inform these presuppositions. 
The secondary literature has also shaped what aspects of the religious I choose to 
investigate. A large proportion of the literature dedicated to Benjamin and the religious 
focuses on his relationship to Judaism, the religious influence of the German Romantics, 
or religion in relation to aesthetics. I do not deny that Benjamin was attracted to aspects 
of Judaism, nor that the Romantics had a formidable influence on his views, nor that 
aesthetic theory is importantly related to how the notion of religion is deployed in his 
philosophy. However, other equally pressing relations in the context of Benjamin and the 
religious have not received equal attention, especially in English language scholarship. 
Beyond examining the concept of religion from a Durkheimian perspective, which, I 
believe, itself represents a novel approach to the problem of religion in Benjaminian 
studies, I feel that the question of Benjamin's use ofreligious categories in a social 
scientific analysis has not received the attention it merits. Most Benjamin scholars, 
especially in the English speaking world, work within one of the disciplines in the 
Humanities. Proportionally, aesthetic theorists, theorists of translation studies, and 
literary theorists have tended to comprise the bulk of scholarly output. With a few 
notable exceptions such as the Italian editor of Benjamin's works Giorgio Agamben, 
the American social theorist Susan Buck-Morss, the radical anthropologist Michael 
Taussig, and political theorists such as Uwe Steiner, Werner Hamacher and Samuel 
Weber, social scientists have tended to ignore Benjamin's theories. In this context, the 
present study is again responding to a lacuna in the secondary literature, the absence of 
critical theorists of religion examining Benjamin's merger of Marx and religion. 
VI - Notes on Text Selection, Language and Translations 
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The approach of the present analysis is to engage in a close reading of Benjamin's 
texts. Instead of dividing Benjamin's life into periods marked by an interest in 
metaphysics or materialism, or other chronological readings, I rely upon representative 
texts that I believe illuminate the role of the religious in his thought. I am aware of the 
artificiality of this approach. Benjamin's works are treated as if his thought remained 
almost static, de-emphasizing any intellectual development. For example, I read the 
"Theses on the Concept of History," which was written in 1940 together with "Capitalism 
as Religion," which was written much earlier, probably around 1925. However, I suggest 
this approach is worth pursuing, especially in light of how much of the secondary 
literature has tended to present his ideas as developing chronologically. 
While I draw upon many of Benjamin's works, there are several pieces that are of 
special importance. The selection of texts is guided by the fact that I am especially 
interested in determi~ing the place of the religious in relation to the philosophy that forms 
the basis of his social analysis and critique of Capital. This means that I rely far less on 
- ---- - - ----------------.----~--------------.,-
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his newspaper articles, radio addresses and other publications written in part to 
supplement his meager income during the 1930s. Instead, with respect to his later 
writings, I rely primarily on the Arcades Project and the "Theses on the Concept of 
History." With respect to his earlier writings, I look to works that explicitly develop 
philosophical themes, such as the infamous "Prologue" to his Tragic Drama. In Chapter 
One, Benjamin's early fragment, "Capitalism as Religion," occupies the central position, 
as I relate his thought to elements in Durkheim's theory of religion. In Chapter Two, in 
which I relate the "God-concept" in Benjamin's work to his notion of truth, I rely 
primarily on his early work "On the Coming Philosophy," the Tragic Drama as well as 
essays that focus on the role of experiences, such as "The Storyteller," "Karl Kraus," and 
his writings on Baudelaire. In Chapter Three, I investigate his theory of language, 
relating it to his philosophy of experience. Here I refer to the canonical texts on 
language, such as, "On the Language of Man and on Language as Such," "The Task of 
the Translator," and to a lesser degree "The Mimetic Faculty." The final chapter argues 
that the Arcades Project represents the culmination of Benjamin's entire religiously 
inspired phenomenology of experience of Capital in modernity. The Arcades Project is, 
above all, dominant here, but is supplemented with fragments from the "Theses on the 
Concept of History." Throughout, I also refer to many other works by Benjamin in order 
to help situate his thought. 
The present study also represents an attempt to bridge the linguistic silos that have 
come to define, even handicap Benjaminian studies. A great deal of excellent work is 
being conducted almost independently in the German and English speaking realms. The 
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works of many leading German Benjamin researchers remain untranslated. Wiesenthal 
is one example of an author whose work, though excellent, is still untranslated and 
perhaps because of this, is absent from many English studies. By the same token, many 
excellent English scholars, such as Susan Buck-Morss are missing from German 
secondary texts. I would also suggest that English-language scholarship has not always 
kept pace with developments in Germany. For example, the notion of "saving," or 
"rescue of the phenomenon," which is a central methodological device in Benjamin's 
philosophy has received almost no attention in English scholarship, while it is frequently 
referenced in German sources. In light of this, the present study tries to put these two 
linguistic continents into a useful conversation with each other. 
I have chosen to cite Benjamin in both German and English, since many of the 
English translations, excellent as they are, remain hampered, as all translations are, by the 
fact that certain German words do not easily lend themselves to being rendered 
unambiguously in English. The original German of Benjamin's citations are given in the 
footnotes so as not to disrupt the flow of the text. The book and page references for the 
location of both the English and German citations are given in parenthetical citations in 
the main body of this work for ease of reference. When terminology is central to the 
discussion this is also dealt with in the main body of the work. All the German citations 
come from the collected volumes of Benjamin's works Gesammelte Schriften and are 
abbreviated in the parenthetical citations as GS, followed by the volume number and page 
number. The exception to this are citations which come from the Arcades Project, where 
I follow the precedent set by the Arcades text as well as most secondary works on 
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Benjamin, where the pagination is given in square brackets without volume or page 
number. For English citations, I tend to rely upon the translations given in the f:Iarvard 
edition of Walter Benjamin's: Selected Writings, abbreviated in the parentheses as simply 
SW, followed by volume and page number. The Harvard edition of Benjamin's Selected 
Writings is not complete, lacking his major opus, Arcades Project, his major early text, 
Origin of the German Tragic Drama, some of his early essays, as well as his copious 
notes and comments, all found in the German volumes. I have, therefore, supplemented 
the Harvard edition with John Osborne's translation of Origin of the German Tragic 
Drama,62 Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin's translation of Arcades Project,63 as 
well as Eiland's translation of Benjamin's early essays.64 Occasionally, I have found the 
need to modify these, or to rely on alternative translations, such as those provided by 
Harry Zorn in Illuminations. I have also had to translate a few sections myself, since the 
Nachlass, Benjamin's volumes of notes, has not yet appeared in English. I will indicate 
in the main body of this work anytime I make modifications to the published translations, 
or where I provide my own translations. For sake of consistency with the English 
citations, I have chosen to use the English titles of Benjamin's works, preferring, say, 
Origin of the German Tragic Drama to Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiel and Arcades 
Project to Passagen-Werk. 
62 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborn (London: 
Verso). 
63 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Howard Eiland and 
Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2002). 
64 Walter Benjamin, Early Writings 1910-1917, trans. Howard Eiland (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press, 2011 ). 
51 
I do not provide the German or other primary source language for any of the 
other thinkers I rely upon. Although Kant, Hegel, Marx and Adorno are frequently cited, 
I do not perform a close reading of their work. My use of their philosophies is 
expository, rather than novel, and is predicated on a well established tradition of English 
language scholarship. As for the German secondary literature on Benjamin which 
remains un-translated into English, I tend to paraphrase rather than provide direct 
quotations. If needed, I provide the original German in the footnotes. All scriptural 
references come from the New Revised Standard Version of the Holy Bible, which, while 
less eloquent than the King James version, is regarded by scholars of Christianity as the 
least doctrinally specific edition and therefore most suitable for academic use. Lastly, I 
have chosen to provide all citations not directly from Benjamin's oeuvre in the footnotes 
for ease of reading. 
Chapter One - Mammon Rising: A First Sketch of Benjamin's Anthropological 
Materialist Theory of Religion in Modernity 
Benjamin already suggests that modernity remains bound to the religious in the 1925 
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fragment "Capitalism as Religion," (SWJ, 288; GS4, 100.) This text furnishes clues as to 
how the religious can be situated within Benjamin's larger oeuvre, and as such provides 
an excellent starting point for the investigation into the role of religion in Benjamin's 
work. Contrary to the standard exegesis, I maintain that in the "Capitalism" fragment, 
Benjamin explicitly distances himself from a Weberian theory of religion and, more 
specifically, that Benjamin's work resists a Weberian inspired Marxist reading of the role 
of the religious. Instead, I argue that a determination of the concept of religion espoused 
by Durkheim, the other founder of the sociology and anthropology of religion, provides a 
more helpful paradigm through which to interpret Benjamin's critical theory. I suggest 
that on the question of religion we read Benjamin along a "Durkheimian-Marxian axis" 
rather than a "Weberian-Marxian" one. 
Reading Benjamin on religion through a "Durkheimian lens" can mitigate some of 
the tensions that purportedly exist between Benjamin's commitment to a materialist 
ontology on the one hand and his commitment to a religious metaphysic on the other. In 
light of Durkheim's theory of religion, the "Capitalism" fragment proves to be a 
significant departure from how the religious often tends to be interpreted in Benjamin's 
work. Weber's theories ofreligion have become the hegemonic paradigm through which 
to understand the phenomenon, and represent a dominant tendency in the secondary 
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literature devoted to Benjamin's incorporation of the religious.65 Benjamin's texts 
evince compelling correspondences to Durkheim's theories on religion. Despite this fact, 
the affinities between Benjamin's and Durkheim's theories has received comparatively 
little attention in the scholarly literature. By reading Benjamin with Durkheim on 
religion, Benjamin's thought can be repatriated within a (non-Weberian but nonetheless 
Marxian-) materialist paradigm without overt violenc·e to his theory. In doing so, we 
approach what in the "Surrealism," essay, and in the Arcades Project Benjamin referres 
to as an "anthropological materialism" (Anthropologisches Materialismus) (SW2, 209; 
GS2, 297; [Also see: U12,4; W8,1; al,1; p2,4; p2a,l.])66 In what follows I suggest that 
this anthropological materialist theory of religion points towards approaches to religion 
that overcome the reductive dualisms generally posited as self-evident. By following 
Durkheim on religion we may come to agree with Adorno' s ostensibly paradoxical 
insight, that, albeit quoted here slightly out of context, "At its most materialistic, 
materialism comes to agree with theology."67 
In what follows I am not suggesting that Benjamin is a Durkheimian theorist.68 
Rather, I maintain there are useful correspondences, "elective affinities" as it were, 
65 See for example, Samuel Weber, Benjamin's -abilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008); Michael Lowey, "Capitalism as Religion: Walter Benjamin and 
Max Weber," Historical Materialism 17, (2009): 60-73. 
66 Noteworthy is that Benjamin places anthropological materialism in a constellation with 
religion. 
67 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 207. 
68 See Schottker, "Erinnern," 277. Benjamin's biography indicates that he may very well 
have been influenced by a Durkheimian conception of the religious. One suggestive 
biographical instance in this regard is his association with Georges Bataille and his 
attendance at Bataille's College de Sociologie. Bataille, it will be recalled was a student 
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between Durkheim's theory and Benjamin's overall project. It will not do, however, to 
downplay unduly any influence Weber might have had on Benjamin's intellectual 
formation. After all, Benjamin cites Weber in the "Capitalism" fragment, and as Uwe 
Steiner convincingly demonstrates, Weber influenced Benjamin's "Dialog on the 
Religiosity of the Present" (Early Writings, 62-84; GS2, 16-34.) Concepts clearly 
inherited from Weberian sociology find their way into many of Benjamin's major works. 
His notion of "homogeneous empty time," for example, which Benjamin already hints at 
in his Tragic Drama, seems at least in part indebted to Weber's arguments in the 
Protestant Ethic regarding the de-spiritualization of the cosmos. It is also a matter of 
historical record that Bloch, whom some Benjaminian exegetes cite as having been a 
formidable influence, was Weber's student and frequently attended his reading group. 
Weber's in-house seminars were also attended by Lukacs, whose influence on Benjamin 
can hardly be overstated. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine that the giant and 
founder of sociology did not have a considerable impact on Benjamin's own 
philosophy. 69 
of Durkheim's nephew and occasional co-author Marcel Mauss. Mauss had elaborated 
on Durkheim's theory of the sacred, which became a focal issue for Bataille and the 
members of the College. In 1973, Bataille published his own work on religion entitled, 
appropriately enough, Theory of Religion, which espouses a theory of religion that builds 
on Durkheim's. Another significant connection with Durkheim is noted by Detlev 
Schottker, who detects an influence of Halbwachs in Benjamin's writings. Halbwachs 
was engaged in combining the phenomenological insights of Henri Bergson with the 
structural sociology of Durkheim. 
69 For a more complete discussion of Weber's in-house seminars, see, Lowy, "Figures of 
W eberian Marxism." 
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Nonetheless, if the inquiry is circumscribed by the question of religion in 
Benjamin's work, a Durkheimian concept is more useful for theorizing with Benjamin 
than Weber's concept of the religious. Specifically Benjamin seems to echo two central 
conclusions of Durkheim's theory ofreligion which Weber's would deny: (i) Benjamin 
regards modernity as remaining fundamentally structured by the religious, and (ii) that 
this "new" religion of modernity is defined primarily by praxis rather than dogma. 
Perhaps part of the reason why Durkheim has not been placed in a constellation 
with Benjamin's thought is the fact that, as Anne Wakefield Rawls suggests, Durkheim 
has consistently been misconstrued as a positivist. 70 Even careful ~eaders from divergent 
theoretical perspectives, such as Adorno and John Milbank, place Durkheim into this 
tradition. 71 That Adorno regards Durkheim as a positivist is noteworthy since it is from 
Adorno and his students Rolf Tiedemann, and the aforementioned Schwepenauser and 
Habermas that we first inherited many of Benjamin's posthumously published texts, and 
to whom we are indebted for a wealth of significant early studies of Benjamin's thought, 
which, of course, shaped the discourse that followed. Perhaps some Adornian biases have 
remained in the Benjamin reception? It will be remembered, of course, that like 
Benjamin himself, Adorno and the researchers of the Frankfurt School militated against 
positivist social theory, their efforts eventually culminating in Der Positivismusstreit. 
70 Anne Warfield Rawls, Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim's The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. 
71 See for example, Adorno, Negative, 326, "Among the positivists it was Emile 
Durkheim's doctrine of collective spirit[ ... ]" (emphasis added); John Milbank, Theology 
and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 51. 
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However, as Rawls demonstrates, interpreting Durkheim as a positivist is a 
misreading, although one admittedly attributable to the convoluted manner in which 
Durkheim himself presents his information. His arguments, especially on religion, are 
often obscured by massive amounts of field data. An indication of Durkheim's ostensible 
positivism, so Rawls, is evinced by his explicit insistence that religion is fit to be 
investigated "scientifically" because it rests on measurable "social facts," such as "moral 
forces."72 The seemingly uncritical acceptance of the Newtonian paradigm as also 
applicable to a social scientific investigation has appeared too reductive for many 
theorists to accept. However, "The emphasis on social facts, generally interpreted as 
positivist, changes its character when it is understood that for Durkheim the 
recognizability and validity of social facts are produced only in and through participation 
in social practices."73 This changed character of social facts becomes clearer in the light 
of Durkheim's epistemology. According to Rawls, Durkheim's The Elementary Forms is 
a careful analysis of religion and, at the same time, an epistemic theory intended to 
account for the origins of human reason, which Durkheim claims is inextricably linked to 
the formation and constant re-generation of the social. In light of Rawls' convincing 
analysis, my own investigation into Durkheim's theory of religion will explore this 
epistemic component, which, I will argue, helps bridge the gap between Benjamin's 
"materialism" and his "metaphysics." 
72 Rawls, Epistemology and Practice, 5. 
73 Ibid., 5-6. 
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Durkheim's thought, far from being positivist, can be read as representing a 
fruitful summation and important development of the Young Hegelians' Religionskritik. 
Perhaps alone for this reason, we can hear echoes of Durkheim's ideas in Benjamin's 
work, since like Durkheim, Benjamin was an assiduous reader of German philosophy. 
Penning a treatise on religion was something of a right of passage for continental 
European philosophers throughout the 18th and 19th century, which continued even into 
the early years of the 20th century. It was the Young Left Hegelians, Arnold Ruge, Bruno 
Bauer, as well as Feuerbach, and Marx, however, who moved the discussion ofreligion 
from the realm of rational theology to something resembling a modern sociology of 
religion, by advancing strictly materialist theories. F euerbach, in his Essence of 
Christianity, for example, holds that religion consists of the central characteristics of an 
idealized self-conception of the community, cathected and projected onto an 
anthropomorphic image: God as humanity's self-alienation. Durkheim's theory of 
religion evinces affinities with the F euerbachian thesis and with the ideas of the other 
Young Hegelians more generally. Like F euerbach, Durkheim regards the social as 
saturated with religion, and, like Feuerbach, Durkheim attempts to account for religion 
immanently, without recourse to the mystical or the transcendent. However, like Weber, 
Durkheim also develops his theory of religion as a critique of reductive materialisms, 
which understand religion to be simply a reflection of the economic base, or a 
mystification of social relationships, a lineage of thought which also has its roots in the 
critiques of the Young Left Hegelians. In his essay, "Marxism and Sociology: The 
Materialist Conception of History," Durkheim underscores his critique of reductive 
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materialisms, echoing in important respects Marx's comments in A Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Right, arguing that: 
Psycho-physiology, after having pointed to the organic substratum as the foundation 
of psychical life, has often committed the error of denying all reality to the latter. 
From this arose the theory which reduces consciousness to being a mere 
epiphenomenon. What has been lost to sight is that if representations depend 
originally upon organic states, once they are constituted, they are, by virtue of these 
realities sui generis, autonomous and capable of being causes in their turn, 
producing new phenomena. 74 
Durkheim systematizes the speculations of the Young Left Hegelians and attempts 
to support them with empirical data. He also contributes a significant new 
methodological insight that effectively amounts to a "Copernican turn" in the study of 
religion: this recognition consists in understanding that the social is a dimension of 
human life irreducible to the actions of individuals who comprise that social. Durkheim's 
Copernican turn will help to resolve the reductive oppositions that have come to define 
the reception of Benjamin on the question of the religious. However, before elaborating 
Durkheim's central insights, let us examine the evidence that might suggest that 
Benjamin is closer to Durkheim than Weber when it comes to his conception of religion. 
74 Emile Durkheim, "Marxism and Sociology: The Materialist Conception of History," in 
The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free 
Press, 1982), 174. 
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I - "Capitalism as Religion" as a Durkheimian Text 
Despite the brevity of "Capitalism as Religion," Benjamin indicates that his notion 
of religion to be fundamentally at odds with Weber's conclusion in the Protestant Ethic 
no less than three times. Benjamin exegetes, who have glossed this text, have inevitably 
highlighted Benjamin's supposed closeness to Weber, citing the following reference to 
Weber as evidence: "The proof of the religious structure of capitalism - not merely, as 
Weber believes, as a formation conditioned by religion, but as an essentially religious 
phenomenon[ ... ]" (SWJ, 288; GS4, 100.)75 Reading this passage, Samuel Weber, for 
example, claims that, "In one of the very few references in his writings to Max Weber, 
Benjamin asserts the need to go further than the author of the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism in determining the significance of religion, and in particular of 
Christianity, for the socioeconomic system that dominates the modem period." 76 A more 
cautious but similar formulation is advanced by Lowy who writes, "Benjamin's fragment 
is clearly inspired by Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. [ ... ] 
However, as we shall see, Benjamin's argument goes well beyond Weber[ ... . ]"77 What 
Samuel Weber, Lowy and others who have glossed this text suggest, is what I will term 
an "intensification" of the Weberian conclusion. In this reading Benjamin's similarity to 
Weber's thought is highlighted, with the difference in their views on religion being 
reduced to one of degree, or intensity. However, at the very point in the fragment where 
75 
"Der Nachweis dieser reliosen Struktur des Kapitalismus, nicht nur, wie Weber meint, 
als eines religios bedingten Gebildes, sondern als einer essentiell religiOsen Erscheinung 
[ .... ]" 
76 Weber, Benjamin's -abilities, 251. 
77 Lowey, "Capitalism as Religion: Walter Benjamin and Max Weber," 61. 
Benjamin mentions Weber, at the very moment when he seems to articulate a theory of 
religion that simply heightens Weber's conclusion, Benjamin is actually signaling his 
disavowal. 
It will be remembered that in The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggests that the 
Lutheran notion of the call, together with the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, were 
some of the ideational factors instrumental in changin,g the Medieval European 
mindscape to permit Capital to overcome the inertia typical of pre-modem societies. 78 
Lutheran and Calvinist doctrinal innovations, Weber argues, inverted the Medieval 
Catholic understanding of work and wealth. Medieval theologians tended to interpret 
Genesis 4 to indicate that humanity's need to labour for life's necessities was a sign of 
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damnation, a consequence of the first humans having disobeyed God's command not to 
eat of the tree of knowledge (of good and evil.) Individual poverty, in the spirit of imitatio 
Christi, by contrast was regarded as a sign of grace. The Protestant theological concepts 
of the call and predestination inverted this traditional interpretation. Eventually, wealth 
was considered an indication of God's favour and poverty was proof of lack of grace. 
This reversal occurred, Weber argues, because the doctrine of predestination suggests that 
God has already chosen who will win heaven in the afterlife (the elect) and who will be 
damned to hell. Calvin himself actually counseled his followers not to question on which 
side of the great divide they might find themselves. However, Weber notes that this state 
78 See, Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott 
Parsons (New York: Dover Publications, 2003). 
of indeterminacy in matters of utmost spiritual importance was psychologically 
speaking insufferable. 
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In response to the psychological pressure that arose from the doctrine of 
predestination, Calvinist pastors responsible for the laity's spiritual care reasoned that 
perhaps one's status as elect or damned could be glimpsed in this world, following a re-
interpretation of the Gospel of Matthew, "Ye shall know them by their fruits."79 God, it 
was thought, showers His chosen with earthly gifts. The curious consequence of the 
theological doctrine of predestination, so Weber argues, was that individuals worked 
hard, harder than was necessary to provide for their immediate needs, in order to allay 
their anxiety and prove to themselves and their community that they were destined for 
paradise. Weber claims that the belief in predestination helped to create a dynamic social 
process which paved the way for Capital to take root. 
However, in the final analysis, Weber maintains that although there were "elective 
affinities" between Protestant theologies and Capital's economic behavioral dictates, in 
essence, modernity should be understood as being no longer religious. Although at its 
inception Capital "needs" Protestantism to discipline the pre-modem, once people begin 
to enjoy their money, the connection to the religious is severed. Weber suggests that with 
technical mastery over nature comes a general decline in religious adherence, and, by 
extension a decline in religious experience. In its primordial origins, Capital was deeply 
related to the religious, but in modernity, Capital is a secular endeavor: the world has 
become "rationalized," and therefore "de-spiritualized." 
79 Mt. 7:16 
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It is this conclusion of Weber's Protestant Ethic that Benjamin rejects. As 
quoted above, Benjamin maintains that modem Capital continues to express an essentially 
religious character. He states that, "A religion may be discerned in capitalism [ ... ]" 
(SWJ, 288; GS4, 100)80 and again near the end~ "The Christianity of the Reformation 
period did not favor the growth of capitalism; instead it transformed itself into capitalism" 
(SWJ, 290; GS4, 102.)81 Benjamin clearly states repeatedly that Capital is not simply 
indebted to religion, or shares trace elements with the religious, but that it is itself a 
religion. This is not an "intensification" of the Weberian conclusion but its rejection. 
Cay gill agrees when he notes that, "The Christianity of the reformation period did not 
favour the development of capitalism, but transformed itself into capitalism. The 
corollary of Christianity becoming capitalism is that capitalism becomes a religion 
[ ... ]"(emphasis added.)82 Benjamin argues that modernity is religious and that this new 
religion is Capital. 
However, Benjamin's assertion that modernity remains religious, and further, that 
this "religion" is itself a mode of economic organization, seems, to put it mildly, an 
exaggerated claim. A central tenet of the narrative of modernity, derived, in part, from 
Weber's analysis, is that religion as an over-arching system of meaning declined and 
eventually collapsed over the course of the 16th to the 20th centuries. According to 
modernity's secularization-narrative, Christianity once informed everything from 
80 
"Im Kapitalismus ist eine Religion zu erblicken [ .... ]" 
81 Das Christentum zur Reformationszeit hat nicht das Aufkommen des Kapitalismus 
be guns ti gt, sondern es hat sich in den Kapitalismus umgewandelt." 
82 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (New York, New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 56. 
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philosophy and politics to social hierarchies, domestic relationships and even abstract 
notions of time and space. Weber does show convincingly that with the rise of 
Lutheranism, Calvinism and other protestant reformation movements that immediately 
preceded or were to some extent synchronic with the advent of Capital, the nation state, 
and the industrial revolution, Christianity ceased to provide the cover of meaning it once 
had. Weber's conclusion which underwrites the secularization thesis, holds that people in 
modernity and modem culture itself are no longer religious. 
It is important to note, however, as Charles Taylor demonstrates in A Secular Age 
that in actuality, secularism can have a number of differing definitions. Taylor describes 
at least three versions of secularism: (i) Secularism as public spaces emptied of religion -
the separation of "Church and State"; (ii) secularism as referencing a certain religious 
pluralism where Christianity no longer serves as the only normative symbolic code; (iii) 
as a "falling off of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from God [ .... ]"83 
Taylor's first two definitions are not at issue here. Instead, I will restrict my inquiry to 
discussing the third definition of secularism, the falling off from religion, or as Marx, 
Comte and others argue, that society's telos is a-religious. This third definition is what I 
will refer to in the remainder of this discussion as the "strong version of the 
secularization-thesis." While the legal separation of Church and State can be clearly 
traced, we can ask with Claude Lefort, whether eradicating the symbolic dimension of the 
83 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2-3. 
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religious is at all possible. 84 Denying the continuation of the symbolic dimension of 
the religious is what is entailed in the strong version of secularism. It is this strong 
version that I argue informs the resistance to Benjamin's inclusion of religious motifs in 
his "materialism," and it is the strong secularization-thesis that can be problematized 
effectively from the Durkheimian perspective, thereby opening the door to Benjamin's 
claim that Capital is, in fact, a religion. 
The strong version of the secularization-thesis suggests that the collapse of 
Christianity as Europe's psycho-social taxonomic system was hastened by the rise of the 
new modes of knowing embodied by the experimental sciences. The archetype of the 
new man was Newton.85 With the advent of science, religion lost its prominence in the 
world. Why would anyone want to believe that the Earth was the centre of the solar 
system, when the evidence was incontrovertible that this was not the case? Why would 
anyone hold on to the notion that Adam and Eve were the first human beings, placed on 
Earth by a benevolent God when, at least after Charles Darwin, it could be shown beyond 
a reasonable doubt that humans evolved from less complex organisms? The rise of 
critical Biblical scholarship in the 18th and 19th centuries also played its role in dethroning 
Christian dogma. The Bible, it could now be shown, had been written by human beings 
84 Claude Lefort, "Permanence of the Political-Theological?" in Democracy and Political 
Theory, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 222. 
85 This claim needs to be restricted to Newton as a symbol of the modern scientist. The 
historical Newton was preoccupied with Christian theology, writing more on the 
mysteries of the Bible than on the science of nature. Indeed, the distance separating the 
historical Newton from the revisionist Newton of liberal history itself gestures towards 





after all, and what was more, there were many editorial changes, resulting in differing 
versions of the "divine word." According to the secularization narrative to which 
Weber's thesis tends to lend its support, Christianity was past its usefulness. In 
modernity religion is relegated to the private sphere, a medieval vestige desperately clung 
to by those who can not find a place in the new world. As Voltaire mused, perhaps 
Christianity could provide a simplistic morality, especially for the illiterate. More often 
than not, however, it is the last strong-hold of those who are pathologically anti-
intellectual and who, perhaps out of spite, deliberately choose irrationality over the new 
reason. 
At least by the 21st century, it seemed as though religion had completely vacated 
Europe's public sphere. Although it made some appearances in political and social 
discourse, around issues such as pacifist objections to war, prohibition, or charity, it no 
longer held court as it once had. Questions once relegated to the religious, perhaps 
because as Hegel suggests, 86 they could not be answered in any other way, were now 
tackled by the natural sciences, whose explanatory model(s) proved far more effective. 
Politics and economics also encroached on Christianity's "imagined communities," 
replacing religious affiliation with national, ethnic and class identities. Christianity's one 
remaining bastion, morality, was secularized and codified as human rights. In short, no 
one believed anymore. How then could Benjamin's suggestion be even remotely 
86 See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). In much of the text God functions as a place 
holder for the unknown. (This holds true until the end of the argument when God is 
recognized as "the Absolute.") 
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plausible that modem Europe under Capital could be described as fundamentally 
religious? 
There are indeed aspects of the secularization narrative that cannot be denied. In 
modernity the form of European society did indeed undergo significant changes with 
respect to the legal status of religion in the public sphere. Habermas summarized these 
structural transformations when he noted that, "The status of the Church changed as a 
result of the Reformation; the anchoring in divine authority that it represented - that is 
religion - became a private matter. The so-called freedom of religion historically secured 
the first sphere of private autonomy [ .... ]"87 However,. the conclusions Weber draws from 
the changes that occurred with respect to the legal status of Christianity during the course 
of European modernity, depend to a great extent on how the concept of religion is itself 
defined. Marcel Gauchet, for example, challenges Weber's conclusion by suggesting that 
modernity is not so much less religious as it is less superstitious, thereby problematizing 
the concept of religion itself. 88 Similarly Lefort warns that: 
[ ... ] it would be quite illegitimate to leap to the conclusion that religion as such 
must disappear or, to be more accurate, that it must be confined to the realm of 
personal opinion. How, in fact, could we argue that, without losing all sense of its 
87 Ji.irgen Habermas, Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1989), 11 - 12. 
88 Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion, 
trans. Oscar Burge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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symbolic dimension, of the dimension that constitutes the relations human beings 
establish with the world?89 
If the essence of religion is to be found in its etiology ,90 in the literal belief in a 
pseudo-scientific Weltanschauung, then Weber and the other proponents of the strong 
version of the secularization-thesis are no doubt correct. It is likely true that in modernity 
fewer people believe in the literal truth of the Genesis creation stories than in pre-
modemity.91 However, as Terry Eagelton quips, "believing that religion is a botched 
attempt to explain the world [ ... ] is like seeing ballet as a botched attempt to run for a 
bus. "92 Which is simply to say that perhaps there is another way of defining religion 
other than emphasizing literal belief in its cosmology and creation myths. The truth of 
religion is not necessarily to be equated with the literal truth of its etiology. If the essence 
ofreligion is uncoupled from belief, especially literal belief in religion's cosmology and 
89 Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, 222. 
90 Etiology is generally defined as the study of causation. For our purposes, the term will 
refer to religious "myths" or stories that attempt to account for creation, or that provide 
origin narratives for various aspects of the world as it now exists. 
91 Cf. Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century 
Miller, trans. John and Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976.) As Ginsberg's arguments suggest, even this claim is contestable. Ginzburg 
examines the inquisitorial records of the Italian town of Montereale near Pordenone. 
Specifically, he investigates the trial of a 15th century miller, Menocchio, whose heretical 
views landed him in the inquisitorial court. What Ginzburg discovers is that there is little 
evidence to suggests that a Christian ideological hegemony dominated the imaginary of 
the lower orders. While the political and religious elites may indeed have been steeped in 
Christian dogma, those working in the towns and country-side espoused extremely 
original and in a Christian context, heretical views, infused by vestiges of ancient 
paganism and local folk lore. This fact is not to be seen as a contradiction of Durkheim's 
claim that the religious saturates the social, since the lower orders were steeped in a 
different religion than the elites, and were not therefore non-religious. 
92 Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 50. 
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etiology, then Weber's conclusion that modernity is de-spiritualized because it has 
been rationalized is less certain, and Benjamin's claim becomes more plausible. 
Durkheim, as I will show, provides precisely such a re-conceptualization of the religious. 
The difference between Weber's and Durkheim's theory of religion is based on a 
fundamental disagreement about the status of belief in defining the concept of religion as 
such. Weber's original thesis was that there exits a relationship of "elective affinity" 
between the belief in the theologies of Protestant "sects" emerging in Europe at the dawn 
of modernity and the economic discipline necessary for Capital to take hold and thrive. 
In some respects the Protestant Ethic was Weber's rebuke of the mechanical materialist 
social theory. At least in one respect, the Protestant Ethic was intended to be a corrective 
to the mechanistic explanations of cultural phenomena Weber found articulated in some 
Marxian theories. 93 Part of Weber's object of critique is the overly reductive base-
superstructure metaphor, which he is at pains to prove unsuitable for sociological 
analysis. While Weber would not deny the importance of "material conditions" (base) as 
one of many causal vectors that helped Capital become Europe's dominant economic 
mode of production, he will claim that the inclusion of ideational factors (superstructure) 
is necessary for a comprehensive and robust theory of culture. The Protestant Ethic, 
therefore, represents Weber's attempt to introduce the ideational content as a co-
contributing condition necessary for theorizing the emergence of Capital. In making this. 
argument, Weber implicitly posits that religion, here Protestant Christianity, is in essence 
93 Lowy, "Weber Against Marx?: The Polemic with Historical Materialism in the 
Protestant Ethic." 
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a belief system. Only if the religious is construed along the axis of belief, does 
Weber's larger project cohere, which is to demonstrate that beliefs, or more generally, 
ideational content represent data that need to be included when theorizing the social. 
Only because religion is a manifestation of the superstructure par excellence, can Weber 
make a case against the reductive Marxisms that attempt to explain culture 
mechanistically. 
It is of course true that Weber's definition of the essence of religion is not 
restricted to its ideational content. Nonetheless, in valuing all the elements that are 
generally recognized to constitute the religious - ritual, material culture, narratives and 
dogma - belief in the ideational content remains, for Weber, its central defining mark. 
Durkheim, like Weber also recognizes that religion is a complex phenomenon made up of 
various components. However, in determining the central feature of the religious, 
Durkheim argues that ritual and not belief, should be recognized as constituting the core 
of the concept. While Weber argues religion is something to be believed, for Durkheim 
religion is something that people do. This seemingly superficial disagreement between 
Weber and Durkheim on whether to place the emphasis of the definition of religion on 
belief or on ritual results in two radically different conclusions. Whereas Weber sees the 
decline in the literal belief in Christian dogma as a sign of the slow domestication, 
privatization and eventual eradication of the religious from the social, Durkheim 
concludes that modernity, even "secular" post-industrial European modernity under 
Capital, remains fundamentally religious. Durkheim interprets the decline in literal 
beliefs not as an indication of the eradication of religion, but rather as a change in form of 
70 
the religious. Similarly, in the fragment "Capitalism as Religion," Benjamin claims 
that modernity is not post-religious as Weber suggests, but rather, as maintains Durkheim, 
continues to be infused by the religious. 
One can hear echoes of Durkheim's point in one of Benjamin's earliest essay 
entitled, "Dialogue on Contemporary Religiosity," (Early Writings, 62-84; GS2, 16-34.)94 
At first Benjamin seems to support the typical Weberian thesis that, "Over the last couple 
of hundred years the old religions, have for us, become infirm," and as a result, "[ ... ] 
we're in a religious crisis" (Early Writings, 65; GS2, 20.)95 Benjamin, however, suggests 
a position closer to Durkheim's when he claims that in modernity there are signs that a 
new religion (neue Religion) is becoming visible (Early Writings, 72; GS2, 26.) With 
respect to Socialism, he even suggests that perhaps this is the "Heroic age of a new 
religion" (Early Writings, 72; GS2, 26.)96 
However, the problem for Benjamin is that in modernity, the question is not asked 
as to what the religiosity of the day might be, but rather, whether "one of the historical 
religions can still find accommodation in the present, no matter if its arms and legs are cut 
94 For a full discussion see, Uwe Steiner, "Early Writings, 1914-18," in Walter 
Benjamin trans. Michael Winkler (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004.) 
With respect to the early phase of Benjamin's writing that this essay represents, Steiner 
warns that, "It is often an all too easy ploy, and it is always tempting, to find evidence 
that a thinker's earliest writings foreshadow all of his later ideas." However, I agree with 
Steiner when he notes that in the case of "Dialog uber die Religiositat der Gegenwart," 
this strategy is actually justified since aspects of Benjamin's later thoughts come to the 
fore, albeit in embryonic form. 
95 
"Fur uns sind in den letzten Jarhunderten die a/ten Religionen geborsten," "[ ... ] wir 
sind in einer religiosen Krise." 
96 The German sentences in context read: "Jedenfalls erkenne ich in dieser Bewegung 
Anfange. Meinentwegen die Heroenzeit einer neuen Religion." 
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off, and its head as well" (Early Writings, 78-79; GS2, 34.)97 In order to determine 
whether the changes that occurred in modernity with respect to religion indicate, as 
Weber argues, the disappearance of religion or rather demonstrate as Durkheim and 
Benjamin intimate, the emergence of a new religiosity, it is necessary to pause and to 
elaborate the difference in Weber's and Durkheim's definition of the concept, especially 
in relation to belief. In order to put the differences in their theories of religion in high 
relief, it will be necessary to both determine the concept as a universal and also to "fill in;' 
the concept, to make it concrete by incorporating empirical data. 
II - Defining the Religion: The Problem 
Part of the problem in defining religion as a universal is endemic to the project of 
determining any general concept. However, in the case of religion, the complexity of the 
task is intensified due to its variegated history, multitudinous manifestations and often 
contradictory ideational content. Hegel noted this complexity when he maintained that he 
only felt ready to broach the subject of religion towards the end of his life; one assumes 
he means after such comparatively "simple" projects as the Phenomenology of Spirit and 
the Logic had been completed. Similarly, the byzantine nature of the concept led Weber 
to begin both his Protestant Ethic as well as The Sociology of Religion, with the caution 
97 
"[ ••• ] eine der historischen Religionen in ihr noch Unterkunft finden konne, und wenn 
man ihr Arme und Beine abschnitte und den Kopf dazu." The full quote reads, "And this 
most modem problem, of which the papers are full, results, because one does not ask [ ... ] 
after the religion of the times; but rather one asks if one of the old historical religions in 
[modernity] could still find a home, even if its arms and legs were cut off, and its head as 
well." 
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that a definition of religion can only be ventured after a long and careful study of it has 
been completed. Durkheim echoes this same warning in The Elementary Forms. 
Despite the opacity of the concept that these and other theorists identify, outside 
of the discipline of religious studies and the sociology of religion, the concept is often 
treated as straightforward and unproblematic in a significant portion of contemporary 
scholarship. Unfortunately, Benjaminian scholarship is no exception to this trend. I 
suggest that in the Benjamin reception the concept of religion in particular tends to 
remain an indeterminate abstraction. The problem is analogous to one pointed out by 
Marx in his critique of Thomas Malthus's use of the concept "population" in political 
economy. Marx argued that: 
It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, 
thus to begin, in economics with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and 
the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination 
this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the 
classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am 
not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labour, capital, etc.98 
The same point can be made about religion. Religion seems like a self-evident starting 
point, but it remains an abstraction, if the socio-historical context that shapes the 
98 Marx, Grundrisse, 100. Cf. Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family," in Critical 
Theory: Selected Essays, 69. Horkheimer makes a similar point with respect to defining 
the notion of authority in the abstract: "A general definition of authority would 
necessarily be almost empty of content, but this is true of all definitions which attempt to 
capture elements of social life in a way that would be valid for all of history." 
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phenomenon is left un-theorized. Durkheim notes this problem in his Rules of the 
Sociological Method, where he writes: 
However obvious and important this rule [of defining concepts] is, it is scarcely 
observed at present in sociology. Precisely because sociology deals with things 
which are constantly on our lips, such as the family, property, crime, etc., very often 
it appears useless to the sociologist initially to ascribe a rigorous definition to 
them.99 
As I have suggested, most readers of Benjamin interested in his understanding of 
the religious do not heed the warnings of Marx and Durkheim, and for that matter, 
Socrates. Instead, these theorists tend to implicitly follow Weber in assuming that belief 
comprises the essence of religion. In doing so, they fail to recognize, as Durkheim 
shows, that "belief-based" definitions of religion cannot provide a foundation for religion 
as a universal, and that this fact, in tum, might suggest a problem with how the concept 
itself is construed. 
Ideally, religion, as a universal concept should manage to subsume all actually 
existing religions with all their essential qualities. That is, the concept as general and 
universal should not be delimited so that in actually it only refers to Christianity, ethical 
monotheism, clericalism, dogma or some other subset of the general notion. However, it 
has proven to be a daunting challenge to find the definable essence that is assumed to lie 
at the core of all religions, an essence that could, for instance, legitimize the classification 
99 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes, trans. W. D. 
Halls (London: The MacMillian Press , 1982), 76. 
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under one notion of both Theravada Buddhism as practiced in Northern India around 
300 BCE and Thomist theology that flourished in parts of Europe before the Protestant 
Reformation. The approach of defining religion as a universal according to an underlying 
similarity in the dogmatic belief structures of these traditions is liable to fail because the 
belief-systems espouse mutually exclusive validity claims. In Theravada Buddhism, for 
example, gods are thought not to have any actual existence and are consequently not 
worshiped. In Medieval Catholicism, by contrast, the confession of faith in the one true 
God and His incarnation is the very criteria for being religious. 100 Not only are 
Theravada Buddhism and Roman Catholicism such divergent traditions that it is tempting 
to classify them as totally unrelated phenomena, but as Antonio Gramsci notes, even a 
single religious tradition is irreconcilably internally differentiated along, for example, 
class and gender lines. "Every religion, even Catholicism [ ... ] is in reality a multiplicity 
of distinct and often contradictory religions: there is one Catholicism for the peasants, 
one for the petit-bourgeois and town workers, one for women, and one for intellectuals 
which is itself variegated and disconnected." 101 
The problem with these approaches, as Durkheim sees it, is that definitions of 
religion that emphasize belief attempt to express the nature of religion as a whole. 102 
Pursuing this strategy tends to produce contradictory definitions since the whole 
100 See, for example, Augustine, "Of True Religion," in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. 
John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 218. 
101 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin 
Hare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, '.1971), 420. 
102 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New 
York: Free Press, 1965), 51. 
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conceived from the vantage point of beliefs is internally divided. Recognizing that 
despite these problems religion is nonetheless generally defined according to its belief 
system, Durkheim in The Elementary Forms launches his study into the "objective 
content of religion," by demonstrating that belief-based definitions fail to account for 
religion in its universality. Durkheim's gambit is that if he can show that typical belief-
based definitions do not, in fact, define the phenomenon, but instead illegitimately 
generalize a particular instance of the general notion ( diflerentia ), then he can 
demonstrate that there is a problem with how the religious itself is conceived and that the 
concept is in need of re-formulation. To accomplish his task, Durkheim focuses on two 
standard versions of belief-based definitions proposed by modem (typically European) 
theorists. One suggests that religion consists in the belief in the supernatural, while the 
second argues that religion is best conceived of as a belief in god(s). 
III - The Failure of Belief-Based Definitions of Religion 
Durkheim cites the sociologists Spencer and Max Mi.ill er as proponents of the 
view that religion in its essence has to do with the supernatural. 103 The fact that this is a 
fairly common determination of the concept is evinced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who 
already in 1792 wrote, "All founders of religions have appealed for proof of the truth of 
their doctrines not to the determination of our reason, nor to theoretical proofs, but rather 
to a supernatural authority and have required belief in this as the only legitimate way to 
103 Ibid., 39. 
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conviction"104 (emphasis added.) Durkheim highlights the problem with this position 
by pointing out that the idea of the supernatural is a relatively late arrival in the history of 
thought. It therefore cannot serve as a definition of the essence of religion since it does 
not articulate that which is common to all its essential manifestations. The supernatural is 
a modern concept. It implies its opposite, the natural, and that is predicated on a modern 
scientific paradigm. In the Newtonian "clock-work" universe, nature is thought to be 
governed by immutable laws. Only when nature is conceived as being regulated in this 
way, can a notion of the supernatural emerge. For most, if not all, pre-modern 
imaginaries the opposition between natural and supernatural cannot arise. That is to say, 
before science is elevated into a culture's meta-discourse, everything that happens is 
construed as "natural," or better, everything that happens does so "supernaturally." "That 
is why," Durkheim notes, "the miraculous interventions which the ancients attributed to 
their gods were not to their eyes miracles in the modern acceptation of the term."105 
These "miracles" were simply more spectacular and less frequent manifestations of the 
ever-present "supernatural." 
Another problem with this conception of the religious is that the notion of the 
supernatural places the accent of the definition on the unexpected. Yet, religion is not 
meant to account for the exceptional, the "miracles." Rather, for Durkheim, religion is 
the horizon within which the normal routinized activities of life accrue meaning: the 
104 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, trans. Garrett Green 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 80. 
105 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 41. 
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movement of the stars, the yearly harvest, coming of age, birth and death. 106 Also, 
notes Durkheim, even when a notion of mystery or the supernatural is a conspicuous 
marker of a given religion's dogmatic content, as in Christianity for example, it 
nonetheless can vary in significance throughout time. The emphasis on mystery has come 
to the fore, but has also receded far into the background of Christian theology, depending 
on the historical period and the Christian tradition in question. 107 If religion is to express 
the trans-cultural and trans-historical dimension that universal concepts strive to 
articulate, then it cannot be defined as being primarily constituted by a relationship with 
the supernatural. 
The second version of the belief-based definition of the essence of religion 
rejected by Durkheim is the claim that religion is primarily defined by a notion of 
divinity. 108 Although I read Hegel's fully developed theory of religion as more nuanced 
than the following passage might suggest, his determination of the general concept is 
instructive of how the notion of a divinity is often regarded as central to religion. Hegel 
writes, "religion is the relation of human consciousness to God." 109 Again, however, the 
empirical evidence provided by the existence of various religious traditions suggests that 
this conception too is fallacious. As mentioned above, Theravada Buddhism does not 
regard divinity as central to its dogma. Although it is true, as Durkheim admits, that 
106 Ibid., 43. 
107 See, for example, Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the 
History of Culture, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
108 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 44. 
109 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: The Lectures 
of 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans.RF. Brown, P. C. Hodgson and J.M. Stewart 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 76. 
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some later incarnations of Buddhism, for example Pure Land Buddhism in Japan, 
worship the Buddha as if he were a god, the existence of such groups does not invalidate 
the main claim, which is that some versions of Buddhism do not worship or even believe 
in gods. Perhaps if Theravada Buddhism were the only example of a religion without 
gods it could be dismissed as the exception that proves the rule. However, it is not the 
only tradition that denies ontological status to divinity. Certain versions of Jainism too, 
Durkheim notes, provide further examples of religious traditions without gods. It could 
be argued that scholastic Taoism fits this category as well. The totemic religions of 
various Australian aboriginal tribes that form the focal point of Durkheim's ethnographic 
analysis are also examples of traditions that are "foreign to all idea of divinity [ .... ]"110 In 
short, since there exist religious traditions that do without gods, a notion of divinity 
cannot be made the definitional criterion of the religious. 
There is, however, another strategy that proponents of "divinity-centric" versions 
of the religious pursue in light of the contradictions that their determination of the concept 
can provoke. According to this reading traditions which do not have a notion of god( s) 
are deemed to be either not actually religions in the proper sense, or represent "primitive" 
or inchoate manifestations of the true form of the religious. Hegel, for example, can be 
read as a proto-Comtean, suggesting that religions form a socio-historical hierarchy that 
proceeds from tribal religions characterized by notions of force, to "Asiatic" religions, 
eventually to Roman Paganism, Judaism, and finally to the "truly" religious realm 
embodied in the monotheistic idea of love expressed most fully in (protestant) 
110 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 19. 
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Christianity. Weber follows a similar strategy by revoking the status of religion from 
totemic traditions, arguing that their practices are best classed as forms of magic. The 
drawback to re-classifying traditions as a- or proto-religious is that only ethical 
monotheistic traditions, specifically Judaism, Christianity and Islam retain the status of 
actual religions. Even if this list is expanded to include Zoroastrianism and polytheistic 
traditions such as Hinduism and the Paganisms of classical antiquity, many of the world's 
cultures throughout much of recorded history are left without religion. As Hegel's 
hierarchy of world religions implies, a Eurocentric chauvinism can creep into the concept 
ofreligion when it is defined as a belief in god(s). 
The prevalence of belief-based definitions of the religious and its subterranean 
connection to Eurocentricism need not be surprising. It will be recalled that the notion of 
religion as distinct from other cultural manifestations, first emerged during Europe's 
modernity. The "religion" that was differentiated from other moments of the social was 
not religion in the abstract but a concrete historical instantiation of it: European 
Christianity. Augustine defined true religion as "the worship of the one true God, that is, 
the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit." 111 That this self-referential definition of 
Christianity should have presented itself as a definition of religion in general to modem 
philosophers and social theorists who first examined religion as a distinct object of 
(sociological) study, seems understandable. Augustine's politically motivated conflation 
of religion and Christianity is exemplary of an endemic lack of distinction in the works of 
many European theorists of religion, such as the aforementioned Fichte. The concepts 
111 Augustine, "Of True Religion," 218. 
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"religion" and "Christianity" are often used interchangeably. The view that the central 
tenet of the particular instance, the Christian insistence on the belief in God, on ortho-
doxy, can legitimately be expanded to the universal, the religious as such, is problematic 
because it is not the general that is universalized but the differentia, that is precisely what 
is not common to all instances of the particulars. 
There is a sinister side to this manner of theorizing which needs to be taken into 
consideration: the fact that the formation of the notion of religion coincided with 
European colonialism has left traces in the "abstract" concept. "Religion," much like the 
concept "civilization," could be marshaled to justify colonial expansion. By defining 
religion as a belief in (a monotheistic) god, and regarding this belief system as a sign of 
progress, as Hegel seems to suggest, non-European cultures that expressed religiosity in 
different ways could be simply regarded as the laggards of history who could only be 
rectified by European intervention. To be blunt: religion is something civilized people 
have, and if a given people do not have it, then they are by extension not civilized. One 
of the virtues of Durkheim's method is that as an ethnographer and (proto)-sociologist he 
begins with empirical data gathered from different civilizations and historical periods, as 
opposed to a priori trying to make his data fit an abstract idea. This inductive method 
tends to preclude making culturally specific generalizations, and helps to prevent forming 
a concept of religion in the abstract sense decried by Marx. In fact, Durkheim is at pains 
to show that those cultures generally regarded as lacking a "coherent religion," those 
Weber classed as mere practitioners of magic, are as religious as any "civilized" 
European. 
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Let me suggest yet one more problem with belief-based definitions of religion 
which Durkheim himself does not broach. As Slavoj Zizek points out, the question of 
what it might mean to believe is by no means self-evident. So far, I have been 
emphasizing that belief-based definitions of religion seem to imply that religious belief 
must be literal. What happens to the strong version of the secularization-thesis, however, 
if belief is not construed as necessitating literal belief? Zizek provides a witty if perhaps 
apocryphal example suggesting that belief is a problematic sociological category. 112 
According to Zizek, the physicist Niels Bohr was receiving a guest at his holiday home in 
Denmark. The guest was surprised to find a horseshoe on the front door of Bohr's 
cottage, obviously meant to bring good luck. I paraphrase Zizek' s account of the 
exchange that followed: "But Niels" said the guest, "You have a horseshoe on your door~ 
I had no idea you believe in such things. You're a rational man, a scientists!" "I don't" 
said Bohr, "but I was told it works whether one believes in it or not." Bohr's answer 
indicates that belief is a highly ambiguous concept. Who actually knows what one 
believes oneself, let alone anyone else? Evidence for this comes even from Christian 
authors, who sometimes feared that their belief was not genuine enough. 113 The notion 
that subjects have straightforward definable convictions rests on a rather nai've theory of 
112 See, Slavoj Zizek, The Universal Exception: Selected Writings, ed. Rex Butler and 
Scott Stephens (London: Continuum, 2006), 306-307. This anecdote is also found in 
Slavoj Zizek First as Tragedy then as Farce (New York: Verso, 2009). 
113 See, Mt. 4.1-11; Mk. 1.12-14; Lk 3.21-22. The template for this is already given in 
Christian scripture, where Jesus's forty days in the desert and his temptation by the Devil 
have been interpreted as expressing moments of doubt. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural 
Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, vol. 1. (New York: 
Basic Books, 1963), 175 - 179. For an anthropological analysis also see, Levi-Strauss' 
example of the "doubting shaman." 
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human psychology, such as is posited in Jeremy Bentham's pleasure-calculus for 
instance. However, is this not the psychological shallowness and naivete that must be 
attributed to human subjectivity if strong versions of the secularization-thesis are to be 
espoused? The choice: either one believes wholly and literally in a religious cosmology 
or one does not believe at all. However, if belief is difficult, if not impossible to measure, 
even with respect to one's self, then the secularization-thesis, or Weber's conclusion, both 
of which assume that religious belief is in decline, are at best uncertain. 
Belief is a problematiG concept in social theory if the ambivalence and ambiguity 
germane to subjectivity and culture are recognized. It also implies a conception of 
religion understood primarily as an etiology, a pseudo-scientific cosmology, meant to 
explain natural phenomena. Once an older scientific theory has been displaced by a 
newer model better able to account for the given facts, the only rational course of action 
is to accept the new theory. However, this conception of religion as essentially 
determined by belief in its etiology, assumed in secularism and espoused by most 
Weberian-Marxists, is problematic. We encounter here the rather curious supposition of 
the Weberian-secularist thesis, but which is expressed most clearly in reductive Marxian 
theories of religion, that once the "false consciousness" or "illusions" of religion have 
been recognized as such, the religious itself simply falls away. This line of reasoning 
demands that religion be regarded as an explanatory system along the lines of scientific 
inquiry. Expressing the world in some "direct" almost "literal" way as science attempts 
to do,- or, to be more accurate, as nai've philosophies of science assume that it does -
need not be deemed an essential aspect of the religious, however. 
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To put the problem with this view into perspective, let us imagine another 
example again inspired by Zizek, 114 this time one in which an audience member watching 
a performance of Shakespeare's Hamlet exclaims after the curtain dropped: "Yes, this is 
all well and good, but I don't believe it. That man is not really the king of Denmark, he is 
an actor. And furthermore, this is not Denmark but a stage." The obvious reason this 
pronouncement is out of place in terms of the truth-content of the play is precisely 
because it is a play. To assume that the actors on the stage and the stage itself must in 
some sense literally express the "real" misses the point. Charles Rosen notes precisely 
this "double movement" of expressing reality by conjuring "fictions" in Benjamin's 
Tragic Drama . He writes, "Benjamin relates the breaking of illusion, the staginess of the 
Trauerspiel [Tragic Drama], to the effort to express the 'play' character oflife itself, 
which has lost its ultimate seriousness in the despair of Counter-Reformation theology." 
It is in the very "staginess" of the play that its truth is to be found. Indeed, with respect to 
Hamlet, the truth of treachery is revealed precisely at the moment when a play is staged 
within play. Similarly, supposing that religion is primarily a mistaken way of 
understanding natural phenomena in lieu of science, misses what, from a Durkheimian 
perspective, is at issue in religion, namely the codification of meaning, and not a 
referential theory of nature for the purpose of scientific-technical mastery. 
Weber and the Weberian-Marxists tend to regard the religious as being essentially 
constituted by beliefs. Therefore, as these beliefs are replaced by scientific knowledge 
114 See, Slavoj Zizek, The Pervert 's Guide to Cinema, directed by Sohpie Finnes, 2006. 
See especially Zizek's discussion of Lars von Trier's 2003 film Dogville. 
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and technical mastery, religion declines in influence. The science fiction writer Arthur 
C. Clark claimed that any sufficiently advanced technology will seem like magic to those 
who do not understand it. Weber and many Marxian theorists of religion seem to 
articulate a similar position, but in reverse, with respect to the religious, arguing that for 
pre-modems, the religious functions by populating the cosmos with spirits, deities, and 
other "supernatural" creatures, thereby making the unknown know~ble. The drive 
towards rationalization in modernity, Weber believes, results in a hollowing out of the 
spiritualized cosmos. However, the undisclosed positivist supposition that informs 
Weber's and many Marxian theories of religion, as well as strong versions of the 
secularization-thesis more generally, is expressed in the conviction that the psycho-social 
taxonomy can be replaced by a non-symbolic "scientific" discourse with direct access to 
"truth." This supposition is unwarranted. 
There are two related problems with this thesis. First, as Zizek points out, by the 
21st century the expert jargon of scientists and other specialists is so far removed from the 
life-world of the non-experts that it cannot function as a coherent meaning-system. 115 A 
deeper problem is noted by Benjamin, who following the logic of Hegel's dialectic, 
argues in "Goethe's Elective Affinities," that the medium first produces that which it 
seems to mediate, that is the "thing-in-itself," is always already the "thing-for-us" (SWJ, 
351; GSJ, 195.) The "screen" through which reality is perceived is what is meant by 
reality itself. Without the symbolic, the real is lost. However, because of the 
bourgeoisie's politically warranted, but historically erroneous association of a-religiosity 
115 Zizek, The Matrix or, the Two Sides of Perversion, Philosophy Today 43 (1999). 
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or secularism with social progress and religion with a stagnant feudal order, resistance 
to the notion that modernity is religious remains. The claim, however, becomes less 
problematic, if we move away from the belief-based conceptions which construe the 
religious as a pseudo-scientific Weltanschauung. 
Belief-based definitions of religion fail to account for religion as a universal. 
Instead, they secretly emphasize a culturally specific instance of the religious, often 
Christianity or more generously, ethical monotheism( s ), and suggest that this particular 
instance expresses the underlying essence of the phenomenon as s11ch. The task at hand 
then is to determine the concept in a way that it is broad enough to be a universal and yet 
specific enough to correctly distinguish the religious without also naming too many other 
related phenomena. The explanatory power of Durkheim's theory of religion, what I 
above called his Copernican turn, derives in part from the fact that he recognizes that the 
methodological bias towards individualism, imbedded in the western intellectual 
tradition, is detrimental to the project of theorizing religion. That the individual is the 
primary "site" for religion is an unquestioned presupposition in most modern European 
theories. Whitehead represents the logical conclusion to this line of reasoning when he 
defines religion as, "what an individual does with his solitariness."116, 
Durkheim, by contrast, regards religion as "eminently social." Like Marx, he 
understands that the individual is the result of a social process not its starting point. This 
acknowledgement leads Durkheim to replace the abstracted individual with the concrete 
116 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures 1926 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1996), 47. 
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social group as the focal point of analysis. The consequence of re-conceptualizing the 
analysis from the perspective of the social, instead of the individual, is an almost 
complete inversion of the European philosophical cum sociological notion of what 
constitutes religion. Whereas S0ren Kierkegaard, for example, had introduced the 
distinction between Christianity and Christendom to highlight the importance of 
individual faith in contrast to "empty ritual" as the key ingredient in a religious life, 
Durkheim claims that beliefs are in fact only retrospective justifications of social 
practices. 117 He argues that beliefs are largely irrelevant, if not detrimental, to 
understanding religion as such. Bart Ehrmann, the scholar of early Christian writings, 
makes Durkheim's point with an empirical example, explaining that, "The gods [of 
ancient Rome] were not impressed by anyone's beliefs about them nor did they require 
people to say the proper creed or acknowledge the proper 'truths.' Odd as this may seem 
to us moderns, doctrine played virtually no role in these religions: it scarcely mattered 
what people believed." 118 By critically revaluing the status of the abstracted individual as 
the methodological starting point of most inquiries into the nature of religion, Durkheim 
stands not only Kierkegaard, but most of the European philosophers and social theorists 
of religion back on their feet. 
117 S0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
118 Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian 
Writings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 24. 
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IV - Religion as Social Praxis 
To manage the complexity that the focus on beliefs engenders, Durkheim suggests 
a different strategy. Instead of attempting to define the central belief( s) common to all 
religions, Durkheim proposes looking for an underlying principle which gives rise to the 
religious systems themselves. His strategy is to find a proto-religious moment, logical, 
but not necessarily temporal, which opens the dimension to the religious; he is seeking 
the Ursprung [origin] in Benjamin's sense. "What we want to do," notes Durkheim, "is 
to find a means of discerning the ever-present causes upon which the most essential forms 
of religious thought and practice depend." 119 
This Ursprung, Durkheim argues, resides in a primary and elemental distinction, 
which organizes the world into two radically separate domains. Crucial to note is that 
Durkheim shifts the focus here from what religious adherents believe to social practice, 
from the individual to the collective. He maintains that: 
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex present one common 
characteristic: they presuppose a classification of all the things, real and ideal, of 
which men think, into two classes or opposed groups, generally designated by two 
distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sacred 
(profane, sacre). This division of the world into two domains, the one containing 
all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious 
thought; the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either representations or 
systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and 
119 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 20. 
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powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with 
profane things. 120 
The sacred is that which is protected and isolated by prohibitions. 121 The sacred is 
not limited to personal beings but can obtain to any object at all. 122 Religions, discovers 
Durkheim, are not united by a common belief in something, but rather by a common 
activity: ritual activity which results in the classification of the world into sacred and 
profane domains. All existing religions organize the world in this way. A preliminary 
definition of the concept can now be proposed: the abstract concept of religion is 
determined by ritual activity that generates the distinction between the profane and 
sacred. Any time this distinction is socially operative, we find ourselves within the realm 
of the religious. 
Let us return to a statement in Benjamin's "Capitalism" fragment in light of 
Durkheim's claim that ritual, not belief, is at the core of religion. Benjamin qualifies his 
suggestion that Capital is a religion as follows, "In the first place, capitalism is a purely 
cultic religion, perhaps the most extreme that ever existed. In Capital, things have a 
120 Ibid., 52. 
121 Ibid., 56. 
122 See W.S.F. Pickering, "The Sacred's Own Binary System" in Durkheim's Sociology 
of Religion: Themes and Theories (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, ·.1984.) Pickering 
notes that according to Durkheim, the sacred can be both consecrated or accursed. The 
distinction between the two forms of the sacred is developed by Durkheim's occasional 
co-author and nephew, Marcel Mauss, and later Mauss' student and Benjamin's friend, 
Bataille. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, ed. 
Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 75 - 80. Agamben contested the ambiguity of the 
sacred, writing that it is a "mythologem that not only explains nothing but is itself in need 
of explanation" (80.) 
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meaning only in their relationship to the cult; capitalism has no specific body of 
dogma, no theology" (SWJ, 288; GS4, 100.)123 The religion of capitalism has a cult, but 
no theology, which amounts to saying that it is a religion defined exclusively by ritual 
without dogmatic content. And in the "Dialogue on Contemporary Religiosity," 
Benjamin claims that this new religion becomes a cult, and asks, "Are we not thirsting for 
convention that would have spiritual, ritual meaning?" (Early Writings, 74; GS2, 29.) 124 
If we read Benjamin as arguing for a definition of this modern religion as characterized 
by ritual, and if we theorize the role of ritual in the way Durkheim suggests, we can 
establish a thoroughly "anthropological materialist" theory of religion that nonetheless 
affirms the religious in the social. We can read Benjamin with Marx on religion. 
To see how this is the case, let us return to the Weber-Durkheim "debate" about 
the role of belief and ritual. Weber decried that (vulgar) Marxists focused solely on the 
material base when explaining the rise of Capital, and he countered with the need to 
include super-structural content. However, the importance of the new Protestant beliefs is 
to be found in the actions that they inspire. It is not the beliefs themselves but the actions 
in-the-world that beliefs justify which are of socio-historical consequence. So is 
Durkheim right after all when he claims that it is action not ideas that are of central 
import, at least with respect to a theory of the social? Indeed, there seems to be a potential 
for an endless regress regarding the primacy of action versus beliefs. Does belief precede 
123 Erstens ist der Kapitalismus eine reine Kultreligion, vielleicht die extremste, die es je 
gegeben hat. Es hat in ihm alles nur unmittelbar mit Beziehung auf den Kultus 
Bedeutung, er kennt keine spezielle Dogmatik, keine Theologie." 
124 
"Dursten wir nicht nach geistiger, kultischer Konvention?" 
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action, or does action precede belief? Durkheim may simply be articulating "the other 
side of the coin" when he argues that ritual practice should be seen as primary. 
The deadlock between the relative importarice of beliefs and rituals in relation to 
religion can be resolved, if we follow Durkheim in his argument that ritual activity 
creates the foundations for reason and by extension for belief as such. Even though 
thought and action are constantly co-determining each other, Durkheim argues that the 
"origin" or "foundation" of communicability and reason cannot be based on thought. 
Ultimately, it must be based on action. His theory echoes aspects of what Marx suggests 
in the "Theses on Feuerbach," claiming that thought is shaped by praxis. In essence, 
Durkheim argues that ideas cannot be communicated unless they have some basis in 
collective experience. This collective experience cannot, however, be based first in the 
ideas themselves. Since purely individual ideas are limited to individual subjects, they do 
not entail their own grounds for communication. 
In a sense, Durkheim's theory can be read as an answer to Meno' s paradox. 
Meno's question to Socrates centers on the logical (im)possibility of learning. The 
problem, as Meno explains, is that if something is not known, it cannot be recognized as 
that something for which one is searching, since one does not know what it is. 
Alternatively, if one already knows for what one searches, then there is no real meaning 
to the concept of learning, since one already has the information. 125 
125 Plato, "Meno," in Five Dialogues, trans. G. M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. 
Co, 2002), 70. 
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Structurally, Meno' s paradox re-appears in the modern European philosophical 
debate regarding the phylogenesis of human reason. Taking my cue from this reading of 
Meno's paradox, I follow Rawls when she suggests that The Elementary Forms provides 
a solution to the aporias that arise in the debate about the origin of reason between 
Humean-inspired empiricists and what Durkheim terms the "apriorists," that is certain 
readings of Kant and the N eokantians. Durkheim argues that both philosophical positions 
fall into the methodological trap of starting with the abstracted individual, a mistake that 
is homologous to the mistake made in the European philosophical tradition with respect 
to religion. The result is that neither philosophical tradition is able to account for how 
reason can be established. The apriorists, Durkheim argues, avoid the question of where 
the categories of the understanding come from by positing them as pre-existing the 
subject. This strategy simply evades the question. How the categories arise in the first 
place is left to divine intervention, or happenstance. Durkheim maintains that the 
Humean-empiricists believe that the categories and human reason are derived from 
individual engagements with nature. Nature, Durkheim counters, is not reasonable and is 
therefore insufficient to ground the emergence of reason. "But what is completely 
lacking to us in all this," writes Benjamin, "is proper regard for the social" (Early 
Writings, 65; GS2, 19.)126 
The social, for Durkheim and for Benjamin is thought to have a dynamic 
irreducible to the actions of individual agents. Instead, as Rousseau argues in A 
Discourse on Inequality, Durkheim posits that reason is created through social practice. 
126 
"Aber bei alledemfehlt uns vollkommen die Achtung vor dem Sozialen." 
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Unlike for Rousseau, however, the most basic form of social practice for Durkheim is 
religious ritual. Durkheim's answer to Meno' s paradox is to develop an immanent 
epistemology that accounts for communication on the basis of embodied, somatic, 
corporeal sensations. Durkheim suggests that collective activity generates collective 
experiences, which in turn are the foundation for communicability, reason and the social 
itself. The introduction of the sacred-profane distinction as constituting the essence of 
religion allows us to follow Durkheim in his argument that religion is implicated in 
human sociality and the emergence of reason and to affirm his thesis that beliefs arise 
subsequent to the practices to which they are related. Beliefs do not justify practice, 
rather argues Durkheim, practice (ritual) creates the foundations for belief. As a whole, 
the arguments in The Elementary Forms attempt to demonstrate that religious ritual is the 
primary social process that creates the necessary foundation of shared experiences upon 
which the categories of thought and eventually fully developed human reason is 
constructed. 
The foundational category, Durkheim theorizes, is the sacred. It forms the basis 
upon which all subsequent categories and eventually reason itself is constructed, because 
the sacred entails a somatic moment that is generated through shared experiences. It is 
the first properly social category of the understanding, and therefore, the first category of 
the understanding as such. Evidence that the sacred is an entirely social construction is 
suggested by the fact that an object's sacred character cannot be derived by examining its 
natural properties. In Volume One of Capital, Marx makes a similar point about the 
social character of value, when we writes that "Not an atom of matter enters into the 
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objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely 
sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects. We may twist and turn a single 
commodity as we wish it remains impossible to grasp it as a thing possessing value." 127 
Durkheim agrees, indicating with respect to the sacred that if the sacred were based on 
natural properties, one might expect this status to be reserved for particularly awe 
inspiring objects or phenomena, such as conspicuously large mountains, thunder, or the 
sun. However, as his ethnographic study demonstrates, precisely the opposite is the case. 
It is often the inconspicuous, the seemingly mundane, that is elevated to the status of 
sacred object. 
Durkheim not only suggests that religious ritual creates the notion of the sacred, 
but also that the notion of the sacred is related to the emergence of the social. The sacred 
and the social are united in a dialectic of creation, with the third term in this dialectic 
being reason. Durkheim argues that the social creates the sacred and the sacred 
establishes the experiential basis for the categories of the understanding, that is for the 
possibility of communication and, hence reason, which in turn is the "foundation" of the 
social. Of course, these arguments should be read as logical rather than historical. Unlike 
other abstract categories of the understanding, the sacred is actually anchored in both 
personal and social experience. The sacred is physically and psychically experienced as 
sacred, that is as different, powerful, awe-inspiring. Durkheim will call it a "social fact." 
This experience is first and foremost generated by and, simultaneously, experienced by a 
127 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, III vols. (London: Penguin 
Books with New Left Review, 1990), 138. 
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collective through ritual. In ritual, that is in socially enacted practice, a "moral force" 
is generated sufficient to create a "collective effervescence" that is, to change and 
harmonize the subjects' collective experiences of certain objects, places and/or times. "If 
all hearts beat in unison this is because the same force is propelling them in the same 
direction." 128 Since the sacred must be enacted to exist, and since this enactment results 
in shared sentiments by those involved, Durkheim believes he has found the answer to the 
Ursprung of human reason and language. 
In arguing for the sacred as the first category of the understanding because it is the 
first social category, Durkheim engages in a speculative and impressionistic account of 
the effects of religious ritual on the Australian aboriginal. It is worth keeping in mind 
that Durkheim believes the elements of the religious, found among the Australian 
aboriginals, are fundamental features of all religious traditions. His hope is that the 
elements common to all religions are more easily discernable in cultures with relatively 
undifferentiated social systems. However, he holds that the essence of the religious does 
not change fundamentally in highly complex social systems. The key features that 
characterize Australian aboriginal religions are the same as those of Coptic Christianity of 
the fifteenth century Egypt, or contemporary Sunni Islam, for example. This fact helps 
explain a conspicuous aspect of his ethnography. Throughout The Elementary Forms 
Durkheim refers almost exclusively to Australian aboriginal tribes to make his case for 
the universal aspects ofreligion. This "single case method," is justified if Durkheim's 
claim is correct that the elements of all religions can be seen in any one example. 











Although not clearly articulated in The Elementary Forms, underlying 
Durkheim's argument about religion in relation to the emergence of reason and the social 
is the analytic distinction of a divided subject. In an article published in Scientia, 
subsequent to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim explained that a dualistic conception of 
the human subject split between first and second nature informed his argument. 129 He 
suggests that on the symbolic level, the sacred-profane distinction reproduces a subject 
split into the "animal" and "social" or, what Marx might term "species being." The 
profane symbolically represents the subject's "pre-rational" or "animal" self, while the 
sacred refers to the social, the "truly human" realm. Reminiscent of Feuerbach's 
argument, Durkheim claims, for example, that the idea of the soul is the idea of society 
internalized, whereas the idea of the material·body is classed as profane. 13° For Durkheim, 
this fact explains why many theologies maintain that the soul outlives the corporeal 
individual. Society really does continue after the empirical subject has vanished into 
death, and, as a result, the symbolic representation of the soul outliving the material body 
can be seen as accurate; true, in the same sense that Shakespeare's Hamlet is true. I agree 
129 Cited in Rawls, Epistemology and Practice, 72. 
130 See, Origen, "On First Principles," in Origen, trans. Rowan A. Greer (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1979), 215. The prescience of Durkheim's insight that religious 
representations symbolically express a subject split between natural and social being, 
becomes evident when we (re-)tum to religious texts. In light of Durkheim's analysis, it 
is worth re-reading the third century Neoplatonic Christian theologian, Qrigen, for 
example. In a passage dedicated to the nature of sin and redemption, Origen writes, 
'·'even if the mind falls through negligence so that it cannot receive God into itself purely 
and entirely, it nonetheless always retains in itself, as it were, certain seeds of restoration 
and of being recalled to a better understanding, when the 'inner man' (cf. Rom. 7:22), 
which is also called the rational man, is called back to the image and likeness of God, 
who created him" (emphasis added). 
with Rawls, however, when she notes that the multiple strains of this complex 
argument are not clearly demarcated in The Elementary Forms and this has resulted in 
significant misreading of Durkheim's intentions. 
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To return to the phenomenological account of ritual, according to Durkheim's 
study, aboriginal clan members living in a traditional indigenous context, spend most of 
their existence roaming in small family based social units, focused on the mundane 
activities of survival. However, at pre-appointed festival days, these bands gathered into 
large groups to perform religious rites. Merely the fact of congregating into a large 
group, Durkheim suggests, would have an immense psychic impact on people who spend 
most of their lives in small and isolated social settings. This psychic intensity is 
heightened when the emotions and thoughts of the individual tribes people are unified 
through coordinated movements and sounds. Durkheim argues that these changed 
circumstances are rooted in the subject's psycho-psychical apparatus. As religious rituals 
become more intense, this subjective experience is heightened. Durkheim maintains that 
this is the process which first suggests the idea of the sacred. Social enactment leads to 
somatic changes in the subject that are experienced as changes in the environment. The 
air "feels charged." There is an "energy" that pervades the members. Many 
contemporary corollary examples can be appended here: the congregation of fans at a 
sporting event or political rallies, particularly those that emphasize collective rituals, as 
did the National Socialists, echo aspects of this process. 
That ritual precedes belief was powerfully depicted in Denis Gansle's 2008 film, 
Die Welle. Reiner Wenger, a high school teacher in Germany, played by Jiirgen Vogel, 
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asked his students whether a new fascism like one similar to that of the Third Reich 
were possible in contemporary Germany. His students explain that the Third Reich was 
an exceptional situation that was unlikely to be repeated, citing the fact that racism, 
particularly anti-Semitism, was not something they or their peers believed. Over the 
course of the semester, this teacher manages to recreate an environment in the classroom 
shockingly similar to that of Germany in the 1930s. Interestingly, he does not accomplish 
this through any sort of ideological indoctrination. Instead, he begins by having his 
students engage in rudimentary rituals, such as marching together in·unison. This simple 
group activity, totally non-verbal, already has an effect on many of his pupils. New 
bonds begins to develop between the classmates. The class begins to understand itself as 
part of the "insider-group," which only later expresses itself in symbols and narratives. 
The process of group formation, of creating "mechanical solidarity," to use Durkheim's 
term, is accomplished by ritualized group activity, not from ideological persuasion. The 
ideology follows the formation of the group, and the formation of the group is the 
consequence of ritual. The ideology itself, however, is not actually the valence that binds 
the group together. 131 
Durkheim suggests that the power of ritual to generate feelings that only later are 
converted into beliefs is also recognized by some evangelizing Christians who wish to 
win back "lost souls." Those who are most successful at this, argues Durkheim, do not 
attempt to convince people of the veracity of their beliefs. Instead, an attempt is made to 
have those who have left the Church return for a ritual, say, Sunday Mass, knowing that a 
131 Dennis Gansel and Peter Thorwarth, Die Welle, directed by Dennis Gansel, 2008. 
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sense of peace, community, and· well-being will likely be the consequence. These 
feelings are generated by ritual, rituals that internalize the sacred, and are only later 
justified by thought. To return to the question about the role of the ideal in the real, 
Durkheim hereby accounts for the ideal in wholly immanent, materialist terms. 
Collective group ritual, that is material praxis, is what generates the ideational moment, 
just as Marx had argued in his later writings. 132 For Durkheim, there is no radical 
disjuncture between the "real" and the "ideal" since both are necessarily mediated, even 
constructed, by the social. 
Religion is an illusion, a mistake, or "false consciousness" to the extent that 
religious practitioners tend to assume that the feeling of the sacred is logically prior to the 
ritual, that ritual is dependent on a pre-existing sacred, when, in actuality, the sacred is 
produced by the ritual. Durkheim notes that religious practitioners tend to attribute the 
psycho-physical changes generated by religious ritual to the sacred object, place, or time 
instead of to the ritual that generates the notion of the sacred. Levi-Strauss provides an 
instructive warning germane to the problem ofrelying on religious practitioner's 
interpretation of their experiences, writing that anthropological fieldworkers: 
are always in danger of confusing the native' s theories about their social 
organization [ ... ] with the actual functioning of the society [ .... ] The sociological 
representations of the natives are not merely a part or a reflection of their social 
132 See, for example, Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in The German Ideology (New 
York: Prometheus Books, 1998). 
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organization. The natives may just as in more advanced societies be unaware of 
certain elements of it, or contradict it completely. 133 
It is important to emphasize that the error Durkheim identifies with respect to the 
experience of the sacred resides in assuming that religious beliefs provide the literal 
justification for the practitioners' ritual actions. This problematic notion is repeated by 
belief-based social scientific theories of religion. Both (naive) religious practitioners and 
belief-based theories of religion assume that, in the final analysis, it is the content of the 
beliefs that express the purpose of ritual. Again, Durkheim argues that beliefs only arise 
subsequent to ritual practice. Their actual function is to justify the underlying objective 
reason for religion's existence, which is the need to have community members congregate 
and re-affirm their social bonds. "Religions" writes Benjamin, "arise out of [ ... ] need 
[ ... ]"(Early Writings, 70; GS2, 25.) 134 The social-sacred must be continuously renewed. 
The underlying purpose and result of ritual congregation is to generate solidarity among 
group members. The Australian clansperson, who wanders with a small group of family 
members through the Outback has little that binds her to the larger tribe. And yet, the 
tribe is necessary for survival: exogamous marriages, protection, trade. Similarly, the 
contemporary Christian or the German burgher of the 1930s does not have any self-
evident emotive ties with their larger community. Therefore, Durkheim reasons, some 
133 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 130. 
134 
"Religion aber kommt aus der Not." The full English passage reads, "Religions, 
however, arise out of difficulty and need [Not], not out of prosperity [Gluck]." A note on. 
translation: The German term "Not" can be variously translated as "emhgency," "need," 
"adversary," "poverty." The specific context under investigation suggests the term 
"need" more so than "difficulty." I believe that including both terms in the English 
translation somewhat obscured Benjamin's point. 
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mechanism is needed to renew bonds of solidarity with community members. This 
renewal of the social is the purpose of religious ritual specifically, and religion as such 
generally. The aim of all ritual is to create identification with the collective. This is the 
"objective content ofreligion." Religion, as the etymology of the term suggests, binds 
people together. 
The competing belief-based materialist theories ofreligion of Marx, Weber, 
F euerbach, and Comte, among others, do not explain religion's existence, but tend, rather 
to explain religion away by suggesting that at bottom religion is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of reality. Durkheim maintains that while religious beliefs may not 
function the way a devotee might assume, religion is not, therefore, illusory. By contrast, 
many social theorists who presuppose belief-based definitions of religion, have needed to 
attribute ignorance or even moments of hallucination to religious practitioners in order to 
explain the phenomenon, since the content of religious beliefs and the specific acts that 
comprise rituals are often only tenuously related to the effects they are purportedly meant 
to ensure. This observation seems to confirm the Eurocentric biases encoded into the 
concept of religion by suggesting that there is an intellectual deficiency of some sort in 
those who are religious. In fact, some modern atheist polemicists have suggested 
appending a final stage to Hegel's hierarchy of world religions, in which overcoming the 
delusion of religion is the truly final stage of human intellectual development beyond 
(European) monotheism. 
Durkheim's emphasis on the objective content of religion also explains the 
resilience of ostensibly absurd religious dogma and praxis. If the religious practitioner's 
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justification for ritual were really the reason for the ritual's existence, then it should 
be expected that whenever the desired results the ritual was meant to bring about did not 
materialize, the ritual would be discarded as useless. Why engage in mimetic rites aimed 
at ensuring the reproduction of important animals if these rites have little effect on the 
likelihood of the animals actually proliferating? In locating ritual practice aimed at (re-
)generating the sacred-profane distinction as the essential core of the concept, Durkheim 
demonstrates that religion is not based primarily on illusion, and religious practitioners do 
not act from a place of error. 
Mimetic rites meant to ensure that animals reproduce are enacted to secure the 
survival of the community. This is actually accomplished by the ritual. Not because 
mimetic rites create animals, but because engaging in these rites re-creates the community 
as a community. Religion is based on entirely material conditions. The sacred is not only 
psychically but also physically felt as powerful, special and vital. The ritual really creates 
moments of shared experience that found solidarity among community members. 
Durkheim's comprehensive definition follows: "a religion is a unified system of beliefs 
and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community [ ... ] all those who 
adhere to them." 135 
135 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 62. Despite the fact that the term "belief' ~recedes 
'~practice" in this definition, the argument in The Elementary Forms as a 1whole clearly 
militates against a belief-based definition of religion. Of course, religion is actually 
constituted by belief, but as Durkheim indicated beliefs arise subsequent ·~o the rituals 
they justify. This is an example of Durkheim's problematic manner of pliesentation that 
Rawls points out, and which she suggests leads to the misreading of his theory. 
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If we follow Durkheim's insistence that religion is defined by ritual activity, 
that it creates and maintains the distinction between the sacred and profane, and that 
religion answers an objective human need that does not diminish as societies become 
more internally differentiated, then we are closer to affirming his and Benjamin's 
conclusions that religion remains central to the social, even in modernity. However, we 
may raise an objection on semantic grounds. Durkheim and Benjamin both suggest that 
the functions of the religious have been take over by "non-religious" institutions. This 
view leads both to claim that these institutions are therefore fundamentally religious. 
Benjamin, after all, suggests Capital itself is a religion, and Durkheim maintains that the 
social is always religiously constituted. However, could it not be argued that precisely 
the opposite is the case, that because the function of religion has been taken over by 
"secular" institutions, religion itself has disappeared? Certainly, if religion is defined 
primarily by belief in the supernatural or a divinity, then the secularist thesis and Weber's 
conclusions are convincing. However, if religion is defined by ritual activity, as 
Durkheim argues, then secularism in its strong version amounts to a neologism for a new 
form of religion. According to Durkheim's definition, any institution primarily designed 
to generate feelings of solidarity and group membership is a religious institution, 
regardless of the "belief(s)" associated with it. This recognition allows us to read 
Benjamin's "theological" statements as not necessarily expressing a literal dogmatic 
belief in a religious tradition. 
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In One-Way Street for example, Benjamin echoes Durkheim's suggestion that 
the nation state is religiously constituted. He writes, "The provider for all mankind is 
God, and the State is his deputy" (SWJ, 481; GS4, 138.)136 This statement, characteristic 
of many similar claims in his oeuvre, together with his references to Carl Schmitt's 
political-theology in Tragic Drama, furnishes additional evidence that Benjamin has a 
conception of the religious that is closer to Durkheim than to Weber (see Tragic Drama, 
105-106; GSJ, 245-246.) As Wiesenthal, Samuel Weber and Horst Bredekamp all note, 
Benjamin was an admirer of Schmitt's Political-Theology. 137 Benjamin even sent a letter 
introducing himself and priming Schmitt for the arrival of his newly finished book. 138 
Schmitt's central argument in Political-Theology is that the modem European state 
imported wholesale the structures of the Medieval Christian state, while suppressing 
explicit reference to God. The fundamental structure of the European state, argues 
Schmitt, is nonetheless religious, specifically Christian. On this point, Schmitt seems to 
approach Durkheim's general insistence that the religious is retained by modernity, that 
"secular" structures like the state manifest a religious dimension. Benjamin's esteem for 
Schmitt's theory is another indication that his thought can be read with Durkheim's The 
Elementary Forms, rather than Weber's Protestant Ethic. 
136 
"Der Ernahrer aller Menschen ist Gott und der Staat ihr Unterernahrer." 
137 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenscha.ftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 17; Samuel Weber, "Taking 
Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt," Diacritics 22, no. 3/4 
(Autumn - Winter 1992): 5-18; Horst Bredekamp, "From Walter Benjamin to Carl 
Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes," Critical Inquiry 25, no. 2 (Wntr 1999): 247-266. 





V - The Totem as the Symbolic Anchor 
We need to trace Durkheim's theory still further in order to define more precisely 
the modem form of the religious, to understand how the state or Capital can be deemed a 
religious phenomenon. Central to Durkheim's conception of religion is the notion of the 
totem, which is the representation of the sacred. After his philosophical introduction, 
Durkheim begins his ethnographic analysis by investigating the social functions inscribed 
in the totem. He discovers that the totem is the fundamental sacred object which 
structures the clan's entire symbolic universe. It is the paragon of the sacred object. "In 
fact, it is in connection with it [its religious character] that things are classified as sacred 
or profane." 139 It is in relation to the totem that the sacred-profane distinction is first 
applied and it is the totem which moors a clan's entire psycho-social taxonomic system. 
The totem is generally a plant or animal, although, in some cases, natural forces 
such as wind or rain can serve this function as well. 140 It is not any specific object such as 
a particularly conspicuous tree. Rather the totem includes all the members of that class of 
objects. 141 Durkheim notes that the rituals performed by many aboriginal tribes imply 
that there is actually a higher level of abstraction at work in relation to the totem. It is not 
usually the empirically existing totemic object that is worshiped, but rather abstract 
representations of it. That is, the totemic object is thought to be the outward expression 
of a more general essence, which is often depicted by symbolic markings. These images, 
and not the totemic being itself, become the focal point of the cult. 
139 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 140. 
140 Ibid., 124. 
141 Ibid., 125. 
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In the clan's imaginary, the totem has multiple functions. "The totem is a 
name first of all and then, as we shall see, an emblem."142 In this respect it is a marker of 
group identity, differentiating one clan from another within a given tribe. Conspicuous 
features of the totem are often used to adorn the body at ceremonial events, illustrating 
the individuating aspect of totemic insignia. 143 The totem is also "a veritable coat-of-
arms whose analogies with the arms of heraldry have often been remarked." 144 The totem 
as emblem can also serve as a marker of ownership. Symbols representing the totem are 
often displayed on houses, weapons, or other items. There are also affinities, as 
Durkheim indicates, between the totem and the surname. Like the totem, the surname is 
often shared by a large group of people only distantly related. It serves as a marker of 
individual and group identity as well as marking ownership. Like family names, the 
totem furnishes a common point of (often imagined) ancestral origin and the totemic 
object is often considered to be either the embodiment of the primordial ancestor or to 
share a yet more distant ancestor with the clan. 
Unlike the surname, however, the totem is a religious object. "It is the very type of 
sacred thing."145 It is set apart from other similar objects by prohibitions and regulations 
relating to hygiene, maturity, gender, status, and religious power. Often these regulations 
include dietary restrictions. Benjamin references the logic of the taboo when he notes the 
strict rules that tended to accompany sacred images in the European tradition: 
142 Ibid., 131. 
143 Ibid., 134-137. 
144 Ibid., 134. 
145 Ibid., 140. 
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Cult value as such even tends to keep the artwork out of sight: certain statues 
of gods are accessible only to the priest in the cella; certain images of the Madonna 
remain covered nearly all year round; certain sculptures on medieval cathedrals are 
not visible to the viewer at the ground level (SW3 106; GS7, 358.)146 
The totem is generally treated with the utmost respect and protected by sanctions. 
Violating these sanctions can result in banishment or even death. Images of the totem 
tend to be safeguarded in places designated as sacred themselves, and these places are 
often governed by further regulations. 
Durkheim argues that the centrality of the totem is obscured when modern 
Eurocentric notions of group membership are (mis )applied to pre-modern and indigenous 
imaginaries. He maintains that for Australian aboriginals in traditional communities all 
animate and inanimate things in the universe are "a part of the tribe; they are constituent 
elements of it and, so to speak, regular members of it; just like men, they have a 
determined place in the general scheme of organization of the society." 147 By virtue of 
membership in the tribe, everything in the universe becomes enmeshed in the psycho-
social taxonomic system that is structured by the totem. Durkheim gives the example of 
the Mount Gambier tribe which itself is divided into two phratries: the Kumite and the 
Kroki. 148 According to Durkheim, the members of this tribe also regard everything in the 
146 
"Der Kultwert als solcher drangt geradezu darauf hin, das Kunstwerk im Verborgenen 
zu halten: gewisse Gotterstatuen sind nur dem Priester in der eel/a zuganglich, gewisse 
Madonnenbilder bleiben fast das ganze Jahr uber verhangen, gwiesse Skulpturen an 
mittelalterlichen Domen sind fur den Betrachter zu ebener Erde nicht sichtbar." 
147 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 166. 






universe as also being either Kumite or Kroki. That is, everything shares one of two 
possible essences. The phratries are further divided into ten clans, each with its own sub-
totem, and again everything in the universe is further sub-categorized as belonging to one 
of ten sub-totem groupings. Thus, for the Mount Gambier tribe, "Blackwood trees, dogs, 
fire, ice, etc.," are all part of the pelican clan which is a sub-set of the Kumite family, 
while "Kangaroos, summer, sun, wind, autumn, etc.," are thought to share an essence 
with the Crestless White Cockatoo sub-totem classed under the Kroki totem. 149 As 
Durkheim explains, when a Mount Gambier tribe member claims that Kangaroos, 
summer and wind are Crestless White Cockatoos that means that "the same principle is 
essential to all of them and shared with the animals" of that totem. It does not mean, as 
some proponents of belief-based characterizations of the religious have claimed, that the 
indigenous are incapable of making distinctions between animate and inanimate, real and 
1magmary. 
In essence, the totem is the central building block of a psycho-social taxonomy 
which encompasses the life-world of the clan member. As Durkheim's investigation is 
intended to show, the totem and its taxonomy are intrinsically related t0 social 
organization. The Mount Gambier tribe's manner of organizing the cosmos, Durkheim 
maintains, is found in one form or another for all the Australian tribes for whom he had 
data. His argument though, is not limited to an indigenous context. This method of 
conceptually organizing the life-world is the result of religious activity as such, which 
149 Ibid., 167. 
Durkheim argues structures European "secular" modernity as much as any pre-
modern indigenous community. 
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Levi-Strauss, with his analysis of the spatial organization of houses in the 
Winnebago adds another vital insight to Durkheim's observation that the religious casts a 
semiotic net over the social. He notes that depending on whom one asks in this 
community, two distinct descriptions of the arrangement of houses are recounted. One 
group imagines houses in their village forming concentric circles that widen as one moves 
away from the centre of the community. A second group believe that there is a clear 
dividing line bisecting the circle of houses. Both groups, Levi-Strauss claims, relate the 
conception of their community's spatial organization to an origin narrative. However, 
neither the narratives nor the imagined organization of the community coheres between 
the two groups. Levi-Strauss suggests that this indicates a primal division in the social 
that needed to be overcome on the symbolic level. This overcoming was only partially 
successful, the original trauma not having been fully eradicated as evinced by the 
differing narrative accounts of the community's internal organization which no longer 
forms a unity. 
One can extrapolate from this example that the religious-symbolic self-
representation of a society need not necessarily be shared by everyone in the same way. 
That is, the symbolic self-representation can include very different, even contradictory 
representations, which nonetheless belong to the same "moral" community. This insight 
helps shed more light on the problem of the status of beliefs in religion. As was argued 
above, beliefs tend to vary to such an extent that it is difficult to arrange them together 
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under one concept. However, if the unity of the group is maintained, not through its 
beliefs, but rather through some other mechanism, ritual, then the beliefs themselves can 
vary greatly and yet still be classified as belonging to the same group, community, or 
indeed, religion. 150 
In light of this analysis of the totem, we can translate Weber's insights into 
Durkheim's theory and arrive at Benjamin's conclusion that Capital is modernity's new 
religion. I follow Rawls when she notes that a consequence of the introduction of Luther 
and Calvin's theological innovations was that money became the new totem for the 
European Protestants. 151 In Marx's words, it was "A strange God [who] proclaimed the 
making of profit as the ultimate and sole purpose of mankind." 152 Does money, or 
perhaps more accurately, value in Marx's sense, not function in virtually the same way as 
Durkheim's totem? Is not money, as the universal instance of the commodity form, the 
fetishized object that must be accumulated, safeguarded, but never actually used? Does it 
not evince a "metaphysical" character? Is the accumulation of value not the sign of 
something beyond the given, a marker of identity, the goal of modem life under Capital, 
and the sign of power? More generally, it could be argued that Capital has become 
modernity's totemic signifier, measuring the value of everything else in relation to 
profitability, efficiency and cost. Reading Benjamin' arguments in the Tragic Drama, 
together with his reflections in the Arcades Project, suggests that, he regards the 
commodity form in a manner similar to Durkheim's notion of the totem. A central 
150 See, Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 13 2-163. 
151 Rawls, Epistemology and Practice, 198. 
152 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 342. 
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premise of the Arcades is that commodities are the new emblems of modernity and, 
therefore, lend themselves to being read allegorically. Marx suggests that the commodity 
is a fetish, and Durkheim that the totem functions much like an emblem. Thus it seems 
reasonable to suggest, as Rawls does, that the commodity itself is the totemic emblem in 
modem Capital. 
The question whether this process manifest in modernity actually amounts to the 
eradication of the religious from the social as suggested by Weber and some Weberian-
Marxists, or rather a change in the form of the religious as argued by Durkheim and 
discemable in Benjamin's fragment, can now be answered in favour of the latter, ifthe 
religious is construed as characterized by ritual rather than by belief. In fact, the history 
of the Protestant Reformation and its after effects that Weber recounts can be 
reinterpreted along Durkheimian lines. It is helpful to remember Owen Chadwick's 
insight that secularism refers less to an observable social trend than to a prescriptive 
political category which had its genesis in the Thirty Years War. This category was taken 
up by the rising bourgeoisie as a weapon in their (ideological) war against the feudal 
state. Alexis de Tocqueville and Marx both note the link between the ideological 
function of the Christian Church and the Feudal aristocracy's political hegemony. In his 
history of the French Revolution, Tocqueville suggested that the weakest link in the 
feudal armature was its Christian legitimation, a weakness the new middle class exploited 
by making reference to all the arguments now recognized under the umbrella of 
secularism. Secularism, however, not only describes the process by which society 
becomes a-religious in terms of the political hegemony of Christianity but also refers to a 
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break with the symbolic system that codified and legitimized the feudal state in 
Europe. Rawls provides a helpful distinction here when she notes that, "[ ... ] the 
secularization of religious ideas is not the same thing as the secularization of the functions 
of religion."153 Secularism, then, canals~ describe a process by which a new material 
base finds its symbolic expression. 
Noteworthy with respect to Durkheim and Benjamin's claim that a new religion 
arises in modernity, is that the Enlightenment's critiques of religion which have been 
interpreted as Europe's decisive (intellectual) movement away from the religious, can be 
read as following a well established historical precedent. Most religions for which we 
have historical records arose first as a_ critique of an existing religion. That is to say that 
the critiques of religion we have inherited from the Enlightenment can be understood as 
critiques of a certain form of the religious from the perspective of a different religious 
point of view. For example, Buddhism, Jainism and more contemplative and 
introspective forms of Hinduism all arose during the "axial period" (usually date to 600 -
500 BCE) as a critique of the over-ritualistic religious system of Brahmanism, a form of 
proto-Hinudism. Christianity too was first and foremost a critical re-interpretation of 
Judaism, and Islam arose as a critique of the polytheism being practiced on the Arabian 
peninsula in the seventh century. The ostensibly anti-religious polemics of the 
Enlightenment were generally not atheist in character but rather anti-clerical, that is not 
non-religious but a critique of religion from the perspective of religion. Voltaire, 
generally assumed to be an atheist, was a pantheist. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
153 Rawls, Epistemology and Practice, 288. 
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which is often used to legitimate atheist criticisms of religion, was actually written in 
support of religion. The immediate heirs of the Enlightenment, like Nietzsche, are also 
often thought to have articulated a theory of atheism. Nietzsche's critique was in fact 
directed at European Christianity, not at religion as such. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is 
Nietzsche's hope for a new religion, not an atheist polemic. Indeed, with respect to 
Nietzsche, Benjamin believes he has discovered a prophet of the new religion (Early 
Writings, 79; GS2, 34.) Thus, compelling reasons exist to regard the Enlightenment's 
criticisms of dogmatic and clerical Christianity as a move towards a new form of religious 
expression. 154 
I suggest that reading Capital with Benjamin and Durkheim as religious 
illuminates aspects of its appearance that remain hidden when modernity is conceived of 
as a field fully administered, bureaucratized, de-spiritualized and rationalized. Regarding 
the commodity form not simply as an instance of the capitalist mode of production, but 
also as a religious fetish, as suggested by Marx, includes the subjective and social 
dimensions of experience that inevitably constitute the real and lived encounter with 
modernity. Marx, in his discussion of alienation, noted the religious experience that 
Capital provokes. While the objective forces of Capital can be theorized in a rigorous and 
comprehensive manner, as Marx does, nonetheless, these objective forces confront the 
modem as godlike spectral powers, even when, contrary to Marx and Weber's reading of 
154 See, Horkheimer, "Authority and the Family," 73. Horkheimer reminds us that the 
Enlightenment's ideological critiques of the Church were attacks on the status of feudal 
authority, not the ontological status of God. 
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religion, the mystification of the fetish is recognized. Indeed, they function 
psychologically much the same way as gods do in pagan religions. This fact was also 
intimated by Weber, who, in his 1922 lecture "Science as a Vocation," suggested that, 
contrary to the implications of his Protestant Ethic, there was a new polytheism emerging 
in modemity. 155 
Unlike Weber and Marx, who would regard the religious as constituting the wrong 
side of truth, Benjamin and Durkheim, unhinge religion from a literal belief in a religious 
cosmology and its etiologies. If religion is not defined as an irrational belief in pseudo-
scientific theories but rather by ritual practices that establish the basis for the social, then 
modernity under Capital can be seen to remain religious. Durkheim's two central 
categories, sacred and profane, are all encompassing, organizing the entire world into a 
binary and mutually exclusive opposition. Put another way, nothing "real or ideal" is left 
out of religious representation. Everything is tinged by the religious because everything 
participates in the sacred-profane distinction. Defined in this way, there can be nothing 
that falls outside the concept of religion, as indeed, Be11i amin' s distinction between myth 
and theology implies. In this sense the religious is a totalizing concept. It encompasses 
the entirety of the life-world. As Rawls reads Durkheim, "The concept of totality is but 
the concept of society in abstract form." 156 
"When, in the religions which later come into being," writes Durkheim: 
155 Max Weber, "Science as Vocation" in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and 
trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 156. 
156 Rawls, Epistemology and Practice, 306. 
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the gods properly so-called appear, each of them will be set over a special 
category of natural phenomena, this one over the sea, that ome over the air, another 
over the harvest or over fruits, etc., and each of these provinces of nature will be 
believed to draw what life there is in it from the god upon whom it depends. This 
division of nature among the different divinities constitutes the conception which 
h 1. . . f h . 157 t ese re 1g1ons give us o t e umverse. 
The religious process then, is one of organizing the social world, not simply into 
two opposing monolithic blocks comprised of the sacred on the one hand and the profane 
on the other. Rather the sacred-profane distinction is continuously operative arranging all 
elements of the social into relational clusters of meaning. Durkheim's theory of religion, 
taken together with Levi-Strauss' analysis of the various representations of a 
community's special organization, suggests that the symbolic is not limited to individual 
beliefs, but saturates the entire domain of the social. 
Durkheim's definition of the religious also problematizes some of the glosses of 
Benjamin's work. In his "Surrealism," essay, Benjamin speaks of a "profane 
illumination." Much has been made of this notion in Benjaminian scholarship, because it 
is assumed that this references a secularization of religious ideas. However, if we follow 
Durkheim, the very notion of the profane is a religious concept. It is half of what 
constitutes the religious. The profane only exists by virtue of the sacred, and the sacred 
by virtue of the profane. I argue that Benjamin is suggesting that the notion of profane 
illumination is turning a religious gaze, illumination, upon those objects, events and 
157 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms, 179. 
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phenomena of the social world that are mundane, but not, therefore, "non-religious." 
Profane illumination means re-integrating a religious perspective derived from a 
philosophy of religious experience within a theory of culture that denies its existence. 158 
That is, if we can grant that secular modernity can be construed reliigiously, then a method 
of social analysis that incorporates the subjective dimension of religious experience is 
required. Benjamin's work, as is already evident in his early essay "On the Coming 
Philosophy," points toward a method of social analysis that recognizes the religious as a 
constitutive aspect of the social and, therefore, also of experience. To imagine the 
religious away, as Weberian-Marxist readers of Benjamin attempted to do, misses the 
actual manifestation of the form modernity takes. We arrive at an insight of Joh_ri 
Milbank, who writes: 
An extraordinary contrast therefore emerges between political-theology on the one 
hand and postmodern and post-Nietzschean social theory on the other. Theology 
accepts secularization and the autonomy of secular reason; social theory 
increasingly finds secularization paradoxical and implies that the mythic-religious 
can never be left behind. 159 
I argue that Benjamin's incorporation of the religious provides us with the 
beginnings of a social theory that incorporates the religious dimensions of modernity. In 
order to trace the broad outlines of how this proposition informs Benjamin's philosophy, 
158 Cf. Wohlfarth, "Re-Fusing Theology. Some First Responses to Walter Benjamin's 
Arcades Project," 21. 
159 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 3. 
we now tum to the subjective dimension implied by arguing that the religious 
constitutes the social, namely to the religious dimension of experience. 
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Chapter Two -The Transcendence of Truth: God in Benjamin's Critical 
Epistemology 
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As I argued in the previous chapter, Durkheim provides us with the broad outlines of a 
materialist theory of religion which, I maintain, is more helpful for reading the religious 
in Benjamin's work than descriptions of the phenomenon which emphasize belief. 
However, having established this theoretical affinity we now need to introduce an 
important conceptual distinction in Benjamin's notion of the religious which is not central 
to Durkheim's analysis. As I have endeavoured to demonstrate in the preceding chapter, 
Durkheim is at pains to show that the symbolic representation of the social is not illusory 
simply because it is a symbolic representation. For Durkheim, religions are "true," in as 
much as they carry out their social function, namely, to re-establish group identity 
through communal rituals that generate a shared symbolic code of the social. Benjamin, 
however, emphasizes that these symbolic representations of the social can be either true 
or false. The question for Benjamin is not the Durkheimian one, that is whether symbolic 
representations contribute to re-establishing the community, but rather whether these 
symbolic representations encode the possibility of agency and freedom. On the one hand, 
Benjamin affirms the "Durkheimian moment" when he suggests that there is no "outside" 
of the religious, that there is no such thing as a non-symbolic unmediated access to the 
real. On the other hand, Benjamin introduces an essentially biblical distinction, when he 
refers to the false mode of representing the social with pagan religious categories, the 
umbrella concept of which is myth or the mythic, while reserving theological categories 
to gesture towards true symbolic representations. 
I 
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"Benjamin," notes Rochlitz, "institutes a relation that opposes theology and 
mythic paganism."160 By suggesting that myth and theology gesture towards fase and 
true representations of the social, respectively, Benjamin is employing Hamann' s method 
of metaschematizing. As briefly noted in the introduction, metaschematism was the 
principle informing Hamann's method of devising thought-images which place the 
interpretive accent on relationships rather than essences, or, put differently, regards 
relationships as essences. For Hamann, metaschematizing meant establishing often 
disparate thought-images in which the key elements of one image stood in either an 
analogous or homologous relation to the elements in another. Kenneth Haynes notes the 
theological dimension of Hamann's method, when he writes that "metaschematism is an 
extension of typology, the practice of reading the Bible in such a way that people and 
events of the New Testament are foreshadowed or figured by those of the old." 161 
Hamann, for example, suggests that his relationship to his peers was essentially the 
relationship of Socrates to the Sophists, and he made this image the basis for his Socratic 
Memorabilia. 
The relationship Benjamin attempts to establish with the notion of the myth-
theology distinction is that the modem's imaginary in Capital is in important respects 
similar to, perhaps even foreshadowed, by the relationship of classical Greek and Roman 
pagans with their gods. The second part of the thought-image suggests that a Marxian 
160 Rainer Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art: The Philosophy of Walter Benjamin, 
trans. Jane Marie Todd (New York: The Guilford Press, 1996), 34. 
161 See especially the introduction, by Kenneth Haynes, in Hamann, Writings on 
Philosophy and Language, xi- xii. 
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recognition of the truth of the social is analogous to the introduction of the biblical 
message of radical freedom conditioned by a relation to a transcendent and ineffable God. 
However, that the mythic and the theological are in fact distinct is not always 
recognized in the literature examining Benjamin and the religious. Too often, the 
concepts myth, theology and religion are used interchangeably, as if they all referred to 
the same object. For example, Roland Boer, in his otherwise excellent article for 
Historical Materialism, writes that Benjamin, "in his very effort to break out of the 
horrible myth of capitalism [ ... ] reverts to myth itself, especially myth of a distinctly 
biblical variety." He continues, "I have begun to argue that both Bloch and Benjamin are 
linchpins for a reconsideration of political myth for the Left, carrying on Georges Sorel's 
unfinished project." 162 Michael Taussig, argues a similar "Sorealian" point, writing: 
And if the Fascists were willing and remarkably able to exploit these dreams, that 
did not mean that myth and fantasy were necessarily reactionary. Totally to the 
contrary, the Left had abandoned this terrain where the battle had to be fought and 
whose images contained the revolutionary seeds which the soil ploughed by Marxist 
dialectics could nourish and germinate. 163 
Boer and Taussig are correct in emphasizing that Benjamin rejects the scientism inherent 
in sociological descriptions to which the Left tends to retreat in its political discourse, and 
that Benjamin would agree that this positivist moment needs to be supplemented with a 
non-positivist imaginary. The content of this non-positivist imaginary is what these 
162 Roland Boer, "The Perpetual Allure of the Bible for Marxism," in Historical 
Materialism l 5 (2007), 59. 
163 Michael Taussig, "History as Sorcery," Representations 7 (Summer, 1984): 89. 
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authors refer to as "myth." However, Boer and Taussig miss Benjamin's second 
distinction, namely that the non-positivist imaginary can, indeed must, itself be subject to 
some measure of truth, even if this criterion is itself not scientific in the positivist sense. 
While the religious as an abstract universal concept contains both true and false 
representations of the social because according to Durkheim, it is the source of 
representation as such, Benjamin's second distinction occurs within the domain of 
representation, and this distinction is indexed in his work by the mutually exclusive 
concepts of myth and theology. As Benjamin explains in "Goethe's Elective Affinities,": 
What emerges from this is the meaning,fundamental to all knowledge of the 
relation between myth and truth. This relation is one of mutual exclusion. There is 
no truth, for there is no unequivocallness - and hence not even error - in myth. 
(SWJ, 325; GSJ, 162; emphasis added) 164 
Throughout his oeuvre, Benjamin continuously insists that the mythic is distinct 
from truth, which, as I will demonstrate, he equates with the theological. For Benjamin, 
the mythic references illusion, the theological refers to Whitehead's "really real." 
Rochlitz is correct in noting that for Benjamin, "Judaism's or monotheism's sublime 
represents the antidote par excellence to myth or to any particularist or national 
ideology." 165 
164 
"Es erweist sich an ihr dir fur a/le Erkenntnis fundamentale Bedeutung im Verhaltnis 
von Mythos und Wahrheit. Diese Verhaltnis ist das der gegenseitigen Ausschliefiung. Es 
gibt keine Wahrheit, denn es gibt keine Eindeutigkeit und also nicht einmal lrrtum im 
Mythos." ' 
165 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 52. 
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Benjamin suggests that the mythic imaginary is built around a hard core of 
fatalism which, in the modern context, results from regarding the human social as 
essentially similar to the natural, as simply a more complex extension of the natural. If 
the social is understood in terms of natural categories, then humanity under this sign is 
governed by objective forces, by "natural" social laws, much like physical matter is 
governed by gravity. According to this view, freedom and agency are thought to be 
subjective illusions. Analogous to the natural domain, the mythic imaginary is dominated 
by a cyclical temporality. As with the changing of the seasons, the mythic is 
characterized by a continual return of the same. In Benjamin's work, the mythic is the 
symbolic representation of the domain that Marx and Durkheim would have termed "first 
nature." The mythic is the representation of the social as natural and, therefore, as fated 
because humanity in this psychic domain remains determined by the objective forces, not 
by a self-chosen telos. 
The mythic is therefore elaborated by Benjamin with the concept of pagan fate, 
which he sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, contrasts with a biblical, especially 
a New Testament theology of radical freedom, such as is elaborated by Augustine, for 
example. The notion of fate as represented in the literature of classical Greek antiquity 
essentially expresses the status of this concept in Benjamin's philosophy. In this 
literature, as in Benjamin's work, fate is descriptive of an encounter with the world in 
which agency is alienated from subjectivity, externalized and cathected onto some 
objective force, such as "the market," for example. One thinks of Sophocles' Oedipus, 
who, in the very act of trying to escape the prophecy of the Delphic Oracle, only managed 
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to fulfill it. For Benjamin, the modem day mythic imaginary is philosophically 
justified by positivism and by the scientism inherent in liberal ideologies. Its ideological 
expression is found in the liberal notion of continued social progress, and, as will be 
explored below, it is reaffirmed by all the autarkic, atomistic forms that mold the 
experiences of the modem social under the aegis of Capital. All of these forms of the 
modem social, from the atomistic ontology of positivism to the disjointed presentation of 
information in newspapers, contribute to an experience of the social as fundamentally 
devoid of agency, in which external forces, like ancient mythic gods, control humanity's 
destiny. Benjamin's thought-image, therefore, suggests that the modem is actually closer 
in "spirit," as it were, to the ancient pagans and that an awakening to the reality of this 
condition would be structurally similar to introducing the biblical message of freedom 
into the Greco-Roman imaginary so dominated by the forces of myth. 
Here, however, we encounter a potential limit to reading Benjamin alongside 
Durkheim. Benjamin maintains that the mythic expresses a relation to the social in which 
agency is denied, in which humans act by compulsion and force, while the theological 
gestures towards a radically free relation. Durkheim's theory that the religious is a 
psycho-social taxonomy generated through communal activity, is based in part on what 
we might term a "mimetic compulsion." This compulsion, however, seems contrary to 
the notion of total freedom inherent in Benjamin's understanding of the theological. We 
recall from the previous chapter that in Durkheim's idiom, the mimetic faculty is the basis 
for the production of "social effervescence," that force which compels group members to 
act as a group. It is the basis upon which subjective experience occasioned by group 
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ritual activity is felt as a psycho-social pressure on group members to participate. It 
is that social force which compels one to stand at attention during the playing of the 
national anthem, even when one might be disenchanted with, say, one's country's foreign 
policy. Durkheim, as was suggested in the previous chapter, argues that religion is a 
social fact. A social fact is defined, as consisting "of manners of acting, thinking and 
feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of 
which they exercise control over him,"166 and further, "A social fact is identifiable 
through the power of external coercion which it exerts or is capable of exerting upon 
individuals." 167 This type of "group think," is antithetical to the notion ofradical 
freedom. One need think only of National Socialism to confirm this insight. The rallies 
of the National Socialists, which, Durkheim might argue, were part of the formal 
mechanism that created a "religion of nationalism" in post-Weimar Germany, did not 
express individual freedom vis-a-vis the social, but its polar opposite. Stating this 
contradiction more starkly: Durkheim argues that the religious taxonomy of the social is 
generated through mimetic behavior, while Benjamin might conclude that this type of 
mimetic behavior is productive only of mythic consciousness, not of a theological relation 
to the real, which amounts to saying that the mimetic is not the source of religion as such. 
This paradox can be overcome, however, with recourse to the dialectic. As 
suggested in the introduction, the appearance of fundamental distinctions belies a more 
subtle moment in Benjamin's thought, one that recognizes the paradox at the heart of the 
166 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, 52. 
167 Ibid., 56. 
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human condition. There exists an analogy here with Benjamin's understanding of 
truth. As will be theorized more fully below, Benjamin argues that truth cannot be 
predicated and yet, expressing truth is the very point of the philosophical enterprise. The 
solution that Benjamin suggests is to use language against itself in the hopes that a truth 
can nonetheless be intimated. This problematic is similar to the one facing us with 
respect to the theological and the mythic. Whereas Benjamin presents these concepts as 
totally distinct, as articulating essentially distinct ways of encountering the social, there 
is, nonetheless, a need to affirm both moments. On the one hand, I follow Durkheim's 
argument that the mimetic is a necessary moment for establishing the symbolic code of 
the social and, at the same time, I follow Benjamin in recognizing that remaining entirely 
determined by this social code, being trapped in a mythic imaginary, is detrimental to the 
project of social and political emancipation. The mythic in the form of National 
Socialism, as Benjamin knew only too well, is an extremely dangerous force. However, I 
follow Durkheim in noting that without ritual, without a certain degree of "mimetic 
compulsion," there is no social. Benjamin's strategy ofreplacing a representation of the 
social devoid of agency, the mythic, with a representation of the social in which agency is 
affirmed and emphasized, can, I believe, be read together with Durkheim's insistence that 
the social is constituted through ritual activity, if the dialectic movement between these 
conceptual polarities is also affirmed. To put this in a Benjaminian idiom: the mythic is 
a necessary logical moment in order to establish the theological, one which has biblical 
precedence. Abraham, after all, was a polytheist. He was known as Abram, before being 
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called by God. 168 Put differently, one needs the social as the basis for freedom from 
the social, much as Marx posited the need for capitalist production as the basis for its 
overcoming. 
As Benjamin states, "the mimetic faculty has a history[ .... ]" (SW2, 720; GS2, 
210.) 169 For him, mimesis is a rudimentary expression of what later becomes the ability 
to discern "non-sensuous similarities," which he places in the service of his theory of 
language and translation, and which, he believes, is central to deciphering the truth of the 
social. In the 1930s, Benjamin developed the notion of the mimetic faculty as a 
methodological principle for reading the real. The ability to read non-sensuous 
relationships in the real is a development of the mimetic faculty that essentially flips it 
into its opposite. As Benjamin explains: 
[ ... ] language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most 
complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a medium into which the earlier 
powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without residue, to 
the point where they have liquidated those of magic. (SW2, 722; GS2, 213) 170 
That is to say that while mimesis in Durkheim's sense is generative of mythic 
consciousness in Benjamin's sense, it nonetheless represents a necessary logical moment, 
that of establishing the symbolic code of the social, which, once established, even through 
168 Gen. 12:1-20. 
169 
"Dieses Vermogen hat aber eine Geschichte [ .... ]" 
170 The full German sentence reads, "Dergestalt ware die Sprache die hochste Stufe des 
mimetischen Verhatlens und das vollkommenste Archiv der unsinnlichen Ahnlichkeit: ein 
Medium, in welches ohne Rest die fruheren Kriifte mimetischer Hervorbingung und 
Aujfassung hineingewandert sind, bis sie so weit gelangten, die der Magie zu 
liquidieren." 
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coercion, founds the basis for its own overcoming. 171 Despite its possible liberatory 
potential, mimetic behavior is by and large a detrimental force. I suggest that here we see 
an example of the pitfall of trying to read Benjamin's work as characterized by either a 
materialist or a theological phase which are mutually exclusive. Rochlitz, for example, 
suggests that, "In his materialist period, Benjamin reformulates his theory of language 
without resorting to theological terminology, through the concept of mimesis."172 Yet, 
mimesis is clearly a category of mythic consciousness, and, therefore, does not replace 
the myth-theology distinction with materialist concepts, but rather elaborates the 
distinction with materialist concepts. 
As alluded to above, although Benjamin maintains that there exist true and false 
representations of the social, he also insists that truth itself cannot be know. Benjamin 
emphasizes the distinction between truth and knowledge in part to counter the positivist 
moment in social theory. Whereas in positivism truth can, at least theoretically, be 
apprehended and expressed, Benjamin stresses that truth escapes all attempts to codify it. 
In this argument, Benjamin adopts an essentially pre-modem philosophico-theological 
position when he equates truth with God. In Benjamin's philosophy, truth is God, and, 
God is truth. The "God-concept," which, as will be shown below, is not properly 
speaking a concept, is an unjustifiable but ultimately necessary presupposition of 
Benjamin's critical epistemology. God, in Benjamin's philosophy is, as Hans Heinz 
171 Here it is necessary to affirm that this argument is logical rather than historical. 
Otherwise we might again be liable to fall prey to Eurocentric readings of history which 
characterize many sociological and anthropological theories of religion. 
172 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 42. 
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Holtz has termed it, a "meta-semantic regulative function." 173 In some respects, the 
"God-concept" in Benjamin's philosophical edifice occupies essentially the same 
epistemic terrain as do Durkheim's totem, and Levi-Strauss' zero-level, namely, it is the 
Ur-signifier, itself inscrutable, but in reference to which meaning is produced and 
anchored. Levi-Strauss defined the zero-value institution as, "having no intrinsic 
property other than that of establishing the necessary preconditions for the existence of 
the social system to which they belong, their presence - in itself devoid of significance -
enables the social system to exist as a whole." 174 Levi-Strauss goes on to identify the 
paradox occasioned by the fact that the zero-value institution - or, for our purposes the 
"God-concept" - is both necessary and un-definable, writing, "Anthropology here 
encounters an essential problem, one which it shares with linguistics [ .... ] This problem is 
posed by the existence of institutions having no function other than that of giving 
meaning to the society in which they are found." 175 This, I claim, is the role of God in 
Benjamin's work. 
Although many of Benjamin's readers have emphasized his Jewish or, more 
generally, his biblical theology, I would suggest that Benjamin's God is the God of the 
philosophers, especially the God of the Neoplatonists, utterly transcendent, disembodied, 
and "beyond being." In Chapter Three, I argue that the difference between a mythic and a 
theological imaginary can be located in whether this original institution is left 
173 Hans Heinz Holz, "Idee," in Benjamins Begri.ffe, vol. 2, ed. Michael Opitz and Erdmut 
Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 463. 
174 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 159. 
175 Ibid., 159. 
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symbolically "empty," as in the biblical taboo on making graven images, or whether 
there is an attempt to symbolize it, as in "paganism." The claim which will be developed 
in subsequent chapters, is that under Capital, like in the mythic religions of pagan 
antiquity the symbolic zero-level institution, the totem, the "God-concept," is symbolized. 
This implicates these cultural constructs in the logic of identity. By contrast, a truly 
Anarcho-Marxian revolutionary politic attempts to leave an undefined, unrepresented 
notion of"the human" in the centre, which, following Benjamin's logic of 
metaschematism, shares affinities with the biblical conception of God according to a strict 
monotheistic theology. 
Benjamin argues that, while truth cannot be known, we come to God through the 
(Neo)Platonic ideas. Towards the end of the present chapter, therefore, I will examine 
Benjamin's theory of the ideas, which, though inspired by the Neoplatonists, and 
ultimately even by Plato himself, enters his philosophy through the works of the Marburg 
Neokantians. However, before arriving at a discussion of his theory of the ideas, of truth, 
and of the transcendent nature of God, we begin by discussing Benjamin's philosophy of 
experience in relation to myth and truth. The connection here might not be immediately 
evident. The philosophical arch stretching from experience to truth as God, however, is 
suggested by the author himself when in his early essay "On the Coming Philosophy," 
perhaps the most important work before the Tragic Drama for understanding his 
philosophy, Benjamin engages in a critique of Kant and the Neokantians on the basis of 
what can be considered true in experience. Here Benjamin explicitly argues for a return 











How it came to be that Kant thought the religious could be excluded from the concept 
of experience is, Benjamin argues, historically conditioned, based in part on the type of 
experience modernity makes available. In a somewhat paradoxical manner, Benjamin 
guides his readers to the unchanging and unlimited, by reintroducing history and 
particularity into the notion of subjectivity. According to Benjamin, the notion that there 
could.be a concept of experience devoid of the religious, arises because a historically 
particular subjectivity, the modem (male) European subject, is absolutized and 
hypostatized as an unchanging a-historical quantum of existence. By re-historicizing the 
subject, Benjamin believes he has also found the social forces that impose a limit on the 
notion of subjectivity which, in tum, leads to experience being valued solely for its 
scientifically verifiable "essence." That is, experience, for Benjamin, is in part 
conditioned by the form of the social. If the social is formed such that the experiences it 
makes available seem to exclude a religious dimension, one should not necessarily 
conclude that the religious dimension is therefore unreal, or untrue. It is equally possible 
that the form of the social is "not true" since it does not allow for the religious dimension. 
The latter, of course, is Benjamin's argument. The form of the modem social produces a 
particular type of experience, and, therefore, also a concept of expevience which is devoid 
of the religious. Ironically, capitalist modernity produces a mythic determination of 
experience by attempting to exclude the religious. 
In what follows, we begin by examining Benjamin's critique of the Kantian 
"transcendental" subject, and follow him in re-historicizing it by supplementing his 
thoughts with the insights of Marx, Bergson, Proust and even, somewhat strangely given 
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his anti-positivist bent, the Marburg Neokantians. Having established that experience 
in modernity is to a large extent "not true," that it is mythic, we need to develop 
Benjamin's notion of truth. Truth, for Benjamin is unchanging and unfathomable. We 
therefore move from the historical to the unconditioned, from the temporal to the infinite, 
in an attempt to trace the notion of the religious in Benjamin's theory of experience and, 
ultimately, to situate the mythic-theological in his epistemo-critical philosophy. 
I - "On the Coming Philosophy": Benjamin as a Reader of Kant and the Neokantians 
The secondary literature is virtually unanimous in viewing "On The Coming 
Philosophy," as challenging the concept of experience determined along mathematical-
mechanical lines by Kant and the Neokantians. Benjamin seems to say as much when he 
begins the essay, stating that: 
[ ... ] in the Prolegomena, Kant wanted to take the principles of experience from the 
sciences - in particular mathematical physics; yet from the very beginning and even 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, experience itself and unto itself was never identical 
with the object realm of that science. (SWJ, 101; GS2, 158)176 
While the gloss of the secondary literature echoes Benjamin's own introduction, I 
contend that this essay is as much a critique of the Neokantians as it is of Kant himself. It 
represents Benjamin's struggle to find his own interpretation of their theories. The 
176 Hat Kant auch, vor Allem in den Prolegomena, die Prinzipien der Erfahrung aus den 
Wissenschaften und besonders der mathematischen Physik abnehmen wollen, so war ihm 
doch zuniichst und auch in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft die Erfahrung selbst und 
schlechthin nicht mit der Gegenstandwelt jener Wissenschaft identisch [ .... ]" 
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critique of the Neokantians seems, to some extent, inspired by the thoughts of 
Bergson, whose plea for a human component in the philosophy of experience could be 
read as the clarion call guiding Benjamin's arguments in this early essay. Bergson: 
Such is, in truth, the ordinary course of philosophic thought: we start from what we 
take to be experience, we attempt various possible arrangements of the fragments 
which compose it, and when at last we feel bound to acknowledge the fragility of 
every edifice that we have built, we end up by giving up all effort to build. But 
there is a last enterprise that might be undertaken. It would be to seek experience at 
its source, or rather above that decisive tum where, taking a bias in the direction of 
·1· . b 1 h . 177 our utI 1ty, 1t ecomes proper y uman experience. 
While Benjamin's critique of Kant and the Neokantians is perhaps guided by Bergson's 
central insight, the essay itself is actually mediated by a critique of topics in Kant's 
Transcendental Idealism, which are of interest to the Marbug Neokantians, particularly 
the mathematical nature of experience. 
I maintain that the Neokantians are a formidable influence on Benjamin's thought: 
it is in reading the works of the Marburg School, especially Hermann Cohen and Paul 
Natorp, that Benjamin discovers the contemporary significance of the theory of "rescue of 
the phenomena," (henceforth, simply "rescue") glimpses of which are already apparent iri 
this essay. 
It should be mentioned here, however, that like the role of religion, the role of 
177 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York: 
Zone Books, 1991), 184. 
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Kantianism and Neokantianism in Benjamin's philosophy represents another highly 
contested front in the post-War reception of his work. Rochlitz, for example, claims that 
Benjamin merely "dressed up" his philosophy in the language of Neokantianism because 
it was in vogue in the academy.1 78 Rosen, too, maintains that Benjamin's theory owes less 
to Transcendental Idealism(s) than to the aesthetic theories of the early Romantics, 
especially Novalis and Schlegel. 179 Rosen's point, that Benjamin's theory of ideas is 
developed in a highly idiosyncratic manner is already evident in "On the Coming 
Philosophy," and as Holz shows, is thoroughly demonstrated by Benjamin's letters 
written during the time of the essay's composition. 180 I believe that Rochlitz and Rosen, 
whose thoughts on the influence of German Romanticism on Benjamin are shared by 
many scholars, introduce an unnecessary dichotomy. I do not agree that we need to read 
Benjamin as either influenced by the Romantics or Kant and the Neokantians. Instead, as 
with regard to the ostensible impossibility of the co-existence of religious and materialist 
thought in Benjamin's work, I again resort to reading Be~jamin as able to incorporate and 
sub late aspects of both influences. In the discussion that follows, which is focused 
especially on Kant and the N eokantians, I do not mean to perpetuate the notion that 
Benjamin was influenced by one tradition more than another. That is, I do not deny the 
impact of the Romantics, especially Schelling, and Novalis on his philosophy. My choice 
178 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 34. 
179 Chalres Rosen, "The Ruins of Walter Benjamin," in On Walter Benjamin: Critical 
Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 135. 
180 Holz, "Idee," 451 - 453; Heinrich Kaulen, "Rettung," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 2, 
ed. Michael Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 619-
664. 
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of emphasis is primarily guided by the fact that his theory of the ideas, which I claim 
is central to understanding Benjamin's philosophy in general, and the role of the 
religious, specifically the "God-concept" in his epistemo-critical theory comes primarily 
via a critique of the Neokantians reading of Kant with Plato, rather than from the 
Romantics. 181 Thus, while I agree that Benjamin clearly distances himself in important 
ways from Kant and the Marburg Neokantians, I contend that their influence remains a 
constant force guiding his philosophy. 
That Benjamin simply pretended to be a Kantian, or that the Kantian system had a 
negligible impact on his own philosophical development strikes me as textually 
insupportable. Some of Benjamin's central notions beyond the theory ofrescue, such as 
origin ( Urpsrung), for example, are taken from the works of Cohen, although certainly 
not without undergoing important changes. Another methodological concept Benjamin 
inherits from the N eokantians, one that is not too distantly related to the theory of rescue 
is that of the extreme. I agree with Wiesenthal that the concept of the extreme is an 
important but often overlooked aspect of Benjamin's philosophical method. On the 
surface it does not seem to bear any obvious relation to the thoughts of the Neokantians, 
but is in fact Benjamin's re-working of the Neokantian theory of the experiment, which, 
in turn, is predicated on a re-reading of Kant's conception of the idea from a 
(Neo )Platonic perspective. 182 If only for these reasons, I maintain that while Benjamin 
certainly developed his own philosophy and cannot be called a N eokantian in the sense 
181 Kaulen, "Rettung," 623. 
182 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 8 - 17. 
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that Ernst Cassirer might be, his philosophy is nonetheless deeply marked by the 
Marburg school's re-discovery of Kant and their re-reading of Plato with respect to a 
modem theory of ideas. 
Beyond these examples it is worth noting that Benjamin not only reads and cites 
Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer, but was also a student of Heinrich Rickert, a leading 
Neokantian of the South-West German school. Even in his last letter to Adorno, 
Benjamin reminds his friend that, "As you know, I'm a former student of his [Rickert's]" 
(SW4, 418.) Rochlitz too is forced to admit that Benjamin had seriously considered 
writing a study on Kant at the time when he was embarking on his Tragic Drama book, 
which I take as evidence for more than a passing interest on his part in Transcendental 
Idealism. 183 Scholem recounts that upon his arrival at Benjamin's residence, the latter 
was eager to study the works of Cohen with him, following through on his intensive study 
of Kant. 184 Scholem notes that eventually Benjamin became disappointed with Cohen's 
philosophy. Nonetheless, taken in the context of the wealth of textual evidence, the 
centrality of Kantian and (Neo)Platonic themes, introduced through the Neokantians to 
his overall philosophy, cannot be denied. Perhaps then, we can agree with Pierfrancesco 
Fiorato's more carefully formulated assertion that Benjamin's relationship to the Marburg 
Neokantians is characterized by a complex "elective affinity." 185 
183 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 53. 
184 Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin: Die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975), 77. 
185 Pierfrancesco Fiorato, "Walter Benajmin als Leser von Kants Theorie der Erfahrung" 
in Hermann Cohen's Philosophy of Religion: International Conference in Jerusalem 
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The gambit of "On the Coming Philosophy," is Benjamin's suggestion that a 
future philosophy (i.e., his future philosophy) needs to develop a notion of experience 
which "includes religion, as the true experience in which neither [G]od186 nor man is 
object or subject of experience but in which this experience depends on pure knowledge 
as the quintessence of which philosophy alone can and must think [G]od" (SWJ, 104; 
GS2, 163.)187 As Rudolf Speth notes, Benjamin is suspicious of traditional epistemology. 
This suspicion accounts for the rather odd title of the Prologue to the Tragic Drama, 
"epistemo-critical,"188 and is pivotal in identifying the role of the theological, 
specifically God-as-truth, in his philosophy. Benjamin does not believe that truth can be 
an object of knowledge. Yet, since knowledge is the proper domain of epistemology, the 
success of the gnoseological enterprise must remain limited. Benjamin states the 
essential problem as follows: 
It simply cannot be doubted that the notion, sublimated though it may be, of an 
individual living ego which receives sensations by means of its senses and forms its 
1996, edited by Stephane Moses and Hartwig Wiedebach (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1997), 72. 
186 The English translators have chosen to translate "god" with a lower case "g" in this 
passage. I believe this choice to be incorrect. Given that the arguments of this essay 
suggest that Benjamin is referencing the biblical God, and given the importance of the 
distinction between mythic pagan gods and the biblical monotheistic God to his 
philosophy, the choice to use a lower case "g" in the translation makes Benjamin's point 
unnecessarily obscure. 
187 
"Diese Erfahrung umfaj3t denn auch die Religion, namlich als die wahre, wobei weder 
Gott noch Mensch Objekt oder Subjekt der Erfahrung ist, wohl aber diese Erfahrung auf 
der reinen Erkenntnis beruht als deren lnbegriff allein die Philosophie Gott denken kann 
und muj3." 
188 Rudolf Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik: Untersuchungen zum Fruhwerk Walter 
Benjamins (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1991), 232. 
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ideas on the basis of them plays a role of the greatest importance in the Kantian 
concept of knowledge. This notion is, however, mythology, and so far as its truth 
content is concerned, it is the same as every other epistemological mythology. 
(SWJ, 103; GS2, 161)189 
Benjamin continues: 
The task of future epistemology is to find for knowledge the sphere of total 
neutrality in regard to the concepts of both subject and object; in other words, it is 
to discover the autonomous, innate sphere of knowledge in which this concept in no 
way continues to designate the relation between two metaphysical entities. (SW 1, 
104; GS2, 163)190 
Thomas Weber argues that Benjamin needed to "purify" Kantian "epistemology" 
with respect to the concept of knowledge on the one hand, and experience on the other. 191 
According to Benjamin, there are two central problems with the Kantian system. 
Benjamin writes: 
189 
"Es ist niimlich gar nicht zu bezweifeln daj3 in dem Kantischen Erkenntnisbegriff die 
wenn auch sublimierte Vorstellung eines individuellen leibgeistigen !ch welches mittelst 
der Sinne die Empfindungen empfiingt und auf deren Grund/age sich seine Vorstellung 
bildet die groj3te Rolle spielt. Diese Vorstellung ist jedoch Mythologie und was ihren 
Wahrheitsgehalt angeht jeder andern Erkenntnismythologie gleichwertig." 
190 
"Es ist die Aufgabe der kommenden Erkenntnistheorie fur die Erkenntnis die Sphiire 
totaler Neutralitiit in Bezug auf die Begriffe Objekt und Subjekt zu finden; mit anderen 
W orten die auto no me ureigne Sphiire der Erkenntnis auszumittelnin der dies er Begriff auf 
keine Weise mehr die Beziehung zwischen zwei metaphysischen Entitiiten bezeichnet." 
191 Thomas Weber, "Erfahrung," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz and 
Erdmut Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000):, 232-33. "Philosophie soil 
wieder Erste Wissenschaft werden [. .. } Dazu beabsichtigt Benjamin eine 'Reinigung der 
Erkentnistheorie ' Kants sowohl von seiten des Erfahrungs- als auch des Erkentnisbegriffs 
her." 
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The inadequacies with respect to experience and metaphysics manifest 
themselves within epistemology itself as elements of speculative metaphysics (that 
is, metaphysics that has become rudimentary). The most important of these 
elements are, first, Kant's conception of knowledge as a relation between some sort 
of subjects and objects or subject and object- a conception that he was unable, 
ultimately, to overcome, despite all his attempts to do so; and, second, the relation 
of knowledge and experience to human empirical consciousness, likewise only very 
tentatively overcome. (SWJ, 103; GS2, 161) 192 
In the Addendum of the essay, Benjamin supplements the above with the following 
explanation: 
The original or primal concept of epistemology has a double function. On the one 
hand, this concept is the one which by its specification, after the general logical 
foundation of knowledge, penetrates to the concepts of specific types of cognition 
and thus to specific types of experience. This is its real epistemological 
significance and simultaneously the one weaker side of its metaphysical 
significance. However, the original and primal concept of knowledge does not 
reach a concrete totality of experience in this context, any more than it reaches a 
concept of existence. But there is a unity of experience that can by no means be 
192 
"Die Unzulanglichkeiten in Hinsicht auf Erfahrung und Metaphysik auftern sich 
innerhalb der Erkenntnistheorie selbst als Elemente spekulativer ( d. i. rudimentar 
gewordener) Metaphysik. Die wichtigsten dies er Elemente sind: erstens die bei Kant 
trotz al/er Ansatze dazu nicht endgultig iiberwundene Auffassung der Erkenntnis als 
Beziehung zwischen irgendwelchen Subjekten und Objekten oder irdendwelchem Subjekt 
und Object; zweitens: die ebenfalls nur ganz ansatzweise uberwundene Beziehung der 
Erkenntnis und der Erfahrung auf menschlich empirisches Bewufttsein." 
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understood as a sum of experiences, to which the concept of knowledge as 
teaching [Lehre] is immediately related in its continuous development. The object 
and the content of this teaching, this concrete totality of experience, is religion, 
which, however, is present to philosophy in the first instance only as teaching. Yet 
the source of existence lies in the totality of experience, and only in teaching does 
philosophy encounter something absolute, as existence, and in so doing encounter 
that continuity in the nature of experience. This failing of neo-Kantianism can be 
suspected in its neglect of this continuity. (SWJ, 109; GS2, 170)193 
As these citations suggest, for Benjamin, the Kantian error resides in the uncritical 
reliance on the decidedly metaphysical supposition of a subject-object dualism. For Kant, 
the supposition that there exists a fundamental subject-object dualism, is the theoretical 
justification for wanting to rid experience of subjective biases. The real core of 
experience is what is encountered in the intuitions of the objective, after the subjective 
distortions have been subtracted. That is not to say that for Kant the categories 
193 
"Der erkenntnistheoretische Stamm- oder Urbegriff had eine doppelte Funktion. 
Einmal ist er es der durch seine Spezifikation, nach der allgemein logischen Begrundung 
von Erkenntnis uberhaupt zu den Begriffen von gesonderten Erkenntnisarten und damit 
zu besonderen Erfahrunsarten durchdringt. Dies ist seine eigentlich 
erkenntistheoretische Dedeutung und zugleich die eine, schwachere Seite seine 
metaphysischen Bedeutung. Jedoch kommt der Stamm- und Urbegriff der Erkenntnis in 
diesem Zusammenhang nicht zu einer konkreten Totalita,t der Erfahrung, ebensowenig zu 
irgen einem Begriff von Dase in. Es gibt aber eine Einheit der Erfahrung die keineswegs 
als Summe von Erfahrungen verstanden werden kann, auf die sich der Erkenntnisbegriff 
als Lehre in seiner kontinuierlichen Entfaltung unmittelbar bezieht. Der Gegesntand und 
lnhalt dieser Lehre, diese konkrete Totalitat der Erfahrung ist die Religion, die aber der 
Philosophie zunachst nur als Lehre gegeben ist. Die Que/le des Daseins liegt nun aber in 
der Totalitat der Erfahrung und erst in der Lehre stoftt die Philosophie auf ein Absolutes, 
als Dasein, und damit aufjene Kontinuitat im Wesen der Erfahrung in deren 
Vernachlassigung der Mangel des Neukantianismus zu vermuten ist." 
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contributed by the experiencing subject, such as relation, extension, and the a priori 
intuitions of time and space are meant to be subtracted, but rather, that these scientifically 
inspired categories comprise the truth of experience. Any extra, any subjective emotional 
dispositions, any intellectual biases and the like, are merely particularistic distortions that 
cloud the apprehensio~ of reality. Benjamin, therefore, introduces an important 
corrective to the Kantian system, one already formulated by Hegel. In an ontology of 
internal relations, subject and object represent two moments of a dialectic interplay, not 
diametrically opposed autarkic entities. 
According to Michael Brocker, this desire to overcome a subject-object dualism 
represents the erotic moment in Benjamin's philosophical enterprise. Plato provides a 
helpful etiology of Eros in the Symposium, which articulates the philosophical impetus 
animating Benjamin's work. According to Plato, Zeus split human beings originally 
complete and conjoined, into separate entities that forever wander the world looking for 
their other half. Brocker suggests that this striving for completion, for wholeness, is what 
leads humanity beyond itself and towards union with the Godhead. 194 It is the driving 
force animating Benjamin's dialectic. By transposing Kant's subject-object dualism into 
an ontology of internal relations, subject and object are seen as having been always 
already intimately related and co-determined by each other. This, of course, has the 
consequence of historicizing the Kantian universal abstract subject. The Kantian subject 
is no longer an atomistic element that remains unaffected by the social, but is seen as in 
194 Michael Broker, "Sprache," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 2, ed. Michael Opitz and 
Erdmund Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 755. 
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part determined by the form of the social, the objective. The logical consequence of 
this could extend to historicizing the categories as well. That is, for Benjamin, experience 
is not composed of categories that are trans-historic, but the experiencing subject is 
conditioned by its socio-cultural particularity. It follows, then, that the concept of 
experience cannot be deduced in the abstract, but must be theorized with reference to the 
"objective" conditions of the social. Benjamin's critique of the Kantians' understanding 
of experience essentially follows this trajectory: he analyzes the changes in the social in 
order to determine the changes in the form of experience in modernity. 
II - Diminished Experience 
Benjamin's theory of experience195 is more fully elaborated in a number of essays 
written after "On the Coming Philosophy." Even at this early juncture then, we need to 
read "On the Coming Philosophy" typologically, that is, in conjunction with subsequent 
writings, in order to see the principles that inform his still inchoate formulations. 
195 The English term "experience" fails to distinguish between the German concepts of 
Erlebnis and Erfahrung. As will be discussed presently, Benjamin argues that the two 
German terms refer to radically different encounters with the social. I:n the "Storyteller" 
essay, Erfahrung is translated as "long experience" and Erlebnis simply as experience. 
This approach is repeated in such essays as "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," and 
"Goethe's Elective Affinities." Although this distinction is not explicitly operative in 
"On the Coming Philosophy," Benjamin refers to a "higher" experienc.e, "flat" 
experience, and "changes" to the concept of experience, suggesting that his later 
distinction is already at play in this early essay. Therefore, despite the fact that 
experience-as-Erlebnis and experience-as-Erfahrung is not distinguished in this text, I 
maintain that the difference between the two is relevant for gaining insight into 
Benjamin's intention. The distinction is also important in determining the place of 
religion in his theory of experience. 
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Collectively, these essays suggests that the structure of experience is undergoing 
momentous changes in modernity. Benjamin goes so far as to claim that certain types of 
experience have become less available to the modern subject. Evidence for this claim 
Benjamin finds in the works of Baudelaire and especially in the reception of his lyric 
poetry. For Benjamin, Baudelaire anticipated and embodied a new type of experience, 
particular to the modern, whose life, organized by the dictates of Capital, reduces 
traditional experience, Erfahrung, or "long-experience," as it is sometimes translated, to 
momentary and discrete fragments, experience-as-Erlebnis. Baudelaire's conceit was to 
be the last lyric poet.in an age when lyric poetry could barely be understood. "Baudelaire 
envisaged readers to whom the reading of lyric poetry would present difficulties" (SW 4, 
313; GSJ, 607.) 196 "Willpower and the ability to concentrate are not their [the moderns'] 
strong points," writes Benjamin (SW4, 313; GSJ, 607.) 197 Benjamin attributes the 
unfavorable reception of lyric poetry in modernity, which he sees as one symptom of a 
larger process, to the fact that "only in rare instances does lyric poetry accord with the 
experience of its readers. This may be due," he writes, "to a change in the structure of 
their experience" (SW4, 314; GS2, 608.) 198 For Benjamin, the change in the structure of 
experience is mirrored in the rise of newspapers, which displace storytelling, in the rise of 
factory machine-based labour which displace pre-modern relations of production, and at 
196 
"Baudelaire hat mit Lesern gerechnet, die die Lekture von Lyrik vor Schwierigkeiten 
stellt." 
197 
"Mit ihrer Willenskraft und also auch wohl ihrem Konzentrationsvermogen is es nicht 
we it her[. .. .]" 
198 
"Das konnte sein, weil sich deren Erfahrung in ihrer Struktur veriindert hat." 
---~-------------! 
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the philosophical level, theorized in "On the Coming Philosophy," in the rise of 
scientistic determinations of experience that replace "metaphysical" accounts. 
Indeed, when Benjamin theorizes the fate of storytelling and epic poetry in "Some 
Motifs on Baudelaire," "The Storyteller," and "Karl Krauss," when he examines the role 
of remembrance in "Proust," and Berlin Childhood around 1900, and when he analyzes 
the changes to experience in "On the Coming Philosophy," and in "Critique of Violence," 
he is in some sense tracing the same phenomenon: the consequences for subjectivity 
resulting from new modes of production that ultimately present the real as discrete, 
autarkic, atomistic and subjectivity as dominated, alienated and without agency. 
Newspapers chop up pre-modem wisdom into isolated facts just like the conveyor belt 
chops up the production process from one integrated into tradition to one dominated by 
repetitive, senseless movements. The underlying ontology of this new experience is 
given in the positivist representation of the universe as composed of dead matter, existing 
in external relations devoid of inherent meaning. 
In "The Storyteller," Benjamin begins with a similar observation as in the 
Baudelaire essay, noting that the causes for the change in the structure of experience are 
to be found in changes manifested in the objective conditions of the social. "Beginning 
with the first World War," Benjamin notes, "a process became apparent which continues 
to this day. Wasn't it noticeable at the end of the war that men who returned from the 









143; GS2, 439.) 199 Benjamin's phenomenology of experience is predicated on the 
traditionally Marxian assumption that there exists an essentially dialectic relationship 
between the mode of encounter with the manifold and the mode of production prevalent 
in society. The form that experience takes is related to the mode of production and this, 
in tum, produces a certain type of subjectivity. For Benjamin, the changes to the 
production processes that mark the European transition to Capital have dramatic 
consequences both for how the social is constituted, and also for how it is encountered. 
The conveyor belt not only produces new products; it also produces new subjects. 
Essentially, Benjamin claims that experience-as-Erlebnis describes the mode of 
encounter for the modem in Capital. Experience-as-Erlebnis is the result of factory work, 
loud overwhelming cities, in which tradition is replaced by novelty, and wisdom by facts. 
Experience-as-Erfahrung, by contrast, is descriptive of the pre-modem's encounter with 
work in "traditional" conditions exemplified, if not also romanticized, by medieval 
European guild relations. A note of caution here: the contrast with the pre-modem 
should not be taken too literally. Benjamin is not theorizing the experience of any 
actually existing historical subject, living in medieval Europe, and contrasting this with 
the experiences of an actually existing modem subject. The fact that pre-modem work 
relations were often brutal and repressive, dominated by "mythic" worldviews, is a matter 
of historical record. I do not read Benjamin as naively suggesting a return to a pre-
modem system of economic and social organization as a meaningful socio-political 
199 
"Mit dem Weltkrieg began ein Vorgang ojfenkundig zu werden, der seither nicht zum 
Stillstand gekommen ist. Hatte man nicht bei Kriegsende bemerkt, daft die Leute 









alternative to industrial Capital. Instead, the pre-modem in Benjamin's theories 
functions as a thought experiment, perhaps even a literary trope. It is another instance of 
Hamann's method of metaschematizing. Parallels to Benjamin's method abound. One 
example might be Hegel's "master-slave dialectic," another Freud's Oedipal myth. When 
discussing the Oedipal myth, Freud remained cautious and hesitant, insisting that 
"something of the kind may have happened," but not that it necessarily represented an 
actual onto- or phylogenetic event. Similarly, Benjamin's contrast between the modern 
and pre-modem is an attempt to exaggerate the newness of the modem condition. It is 
meant to highlight the changes that he believes have taken place in the stru~ture of 
experience in response to changes in production and the organization of the social. 
Adomo's statement that "in psychoanalysis nothing is true except the exaggerations,"200 
could be generalized as a quasi-methodological principle of presentation in Benjamin's 
work when he constructs his highly artificial thought-images. In order for these thought-
mages to have their intended effect, the actual conditions of the medieval peasant need to 
be bracketed. The contrast is not between the pre-modem and the modem, but between a 
hypostatized and abstracted component of the pre-modem's supposed experience, 
specifically experience as condition by the relations of production. 
Benjamin elaborates the contrast between pre-modem and modem forms of 
experience by examining the change in the value of experience in modem factory work. 
As he notes, there are two shades of "long experience" (Erfahrung) the pre-modem brings 
200 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. 
Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), 49. 
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to the work process: the experience of tradition, handed-down from master to 
apprentice, and experience developed through years of working in a given trade. Both of 
these forms of experience are necessary in the pre-modem productive process. At work, 
the pre-modem is saturated by practice and tradition. The work itself is the expression of 
this experience and, in tum, is the condition for experience-as-Erfahrung, that is 
experience as contextualized, coherent, meaningful. Benjamin explains, "Experience 
[ Erfahrung] is indeed a matter of tradition, in collective existence as well as private life. 
It is the product less of facts firmly anchored in memory [ Erinnerung] than of 
accumulated and frequently unconscious data that flow together in memory [ Gedachtnis ]" 
(SW4, 314; GSJ, 608.)201 
By contrast, in the modem productive process, typified by the factory assembly-
line, experience in both the above senses counts for little. Whereas an apprentice in the 
workshop of his master might need years to acquire the traditional knowledge associated 
with his craft, and still many more years to become proficient at it, the modem factory 
worker can be easily and quickly integrated into the production process without requiring 
much, if any, prior training. Benjamin draws an analogy between the status of experience 
in the factory assembly-line and gambling. The factory worker in front of the machine is 
like the gambler for whom the experience of the previous turn of the roulette wheel has 
no bearing on the outcome of the current bet. For the factory worker as for the gambler, 
201 
"In der Tat ist die Erfahrung eine Sache der Tradition, im kollektiven wie im privaten 
Leben. Sie bildet sich weniger aus einzelnen in der Erinnerung strengfixierten 
Gegebenheiten denn aus Gehiiuften, oft nicht bewuj3ten Daten, die im Gediichtnis 
zusammenfliej3en." 
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time spent performing a task in the past has no relationship to the ability to perform 
the required duties in the present. For Benjamin, the diminished value of experience in 
production describes only one side of a larger phenomenon. Experience-as-Erfahrung is 
not necessary for factory work, but factory work produces a new, devalued form of 
experience: experience-as-Erlebnis. 
Benjamin further theorizes the changes to the structure of experience by 
discussing two types of memory, each determined by the mode of encounter with the 
manifold. If modernity produces Erlebnis instead of Erfahrung, it is because the 
conditions of the modem social require subjects to develop fundamentally new psychic 
strategies for encountering, or, perhaps, more accurately, for coping with the real. 
Although Benjamin's theory of memory is based in large part on Bergson and Proust, it is 
helpful to begin this discussion with the psychoanalytic concept of shock because the 
modem form of experience-as-Erlebnis, and the memory most associated with it, are 
essentially attempts to reduce the trauma with which the modern social threatens the 
individual. 
Shock is the prevailing response to the hostile manifestations of modernity: the 
factory, the crowd, the machine. "The shock experience which the passer-by has in the 
crowd corresponds to the isolated 'experiences' of the worker at his machine" (SW4, 329; 
GSJ, 632.)202 The subject is overwhelmed by the intensity of the objective, the density 
and strangeness of the crowd, the loudness of the factory, the incessant repetitive 
202 
"Dem Chockerlebnis, das der Passant in der Menge hat, entspricht das 'Erlebnis' des 
Arbeiters an der Maschinerie." 
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movements demanded by the machine. In the face of this traumatic exterior, the 
modern subject must use her psychic energy to defend her subjective integrity. Benjamin 
comments: 
The greater the shock factor in particular impressions, the more vigilant 
consciousness has to be in screening stimuli, the more efficiently it does so, the less 
these impressions enter long experience [ Erfahrung] and the more they correspond 
to the concept of isolated experience [Erlebnis]. Perhaps the special achievement of 
shock defenses is the way it assigns an incident a precise point in time in 
consciousness, at the cost of integrity of the incident's contents. (SW4, 319; GSJ, 
615)203 
As suggested above, a homology exists between this mode of consciousness and 
the emergence of newspapers, in that, similar to heightened consciousness, the newspaper 
"isolate[s] events from the realm [in] which they could affect the experience of the 
reader" (SW4, 315-316.)204 Benjamin supposes that the encounter with the objective 
conditions of the social calls for specific types of consciousness, characterized by 
presence of mind and fragmentation of content. If the encounter with the manifold occurs 
in the constellation of shock, a heightened consciousness is required to parry the 
203 
"Je grafter der Ante ii des Chockmoments an den einzelnen Eindrucken ist, je 
unablessiger der Bewufttsein im Jnteresse des Reizschutzes auf dem Plan sein muft, je 
grafter der Erfolg ist, mit dem es operiert, desto weniger gehen sie in die Erfahrung ein; 
desto eher erfullen sie den Begriff des Erlebnisses. Vielleicht kann mann die 
eigentiimliche Leistung der Chockabwehr zuletzt darin sehen: dem Vorfall auf Kosten 
der lntegritiit seines lnhalts eine exakte Zeitstelle im Bewufitsein anzuweisen." 
204 
"[ ... ] die Ereignisse gegen den Bereich abzudichten, in dem sie die Erfarhung des 
Lese rs betrejfen konnten." 
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traumatic intrusion. This psychic defense against the traumatic exterior, i.e., a 
heightened presence of mind, however, is acquired at the expense of the integrity of the 
experience, and this loss is registered in memory. In fact, the structure of shock and 
heightened consciousness resembles the structure of trauma, in which the event is often 
only "experienced" after the fact, in spastic repetitions, themselves disjointed. 
Shock as the dominant mode of encounter with modernity is in part related to the 
subject-object reversal, noted also by Adorno, which typifies the production process 
under Capital.205 There is perhaps no clearer depiction of this change in productive 
relations than in Charlie Chaplin's Modern Times, where the tramp is no more than an 
appendage of the assembly-line. Even after his shift on the conveyor belt is over, 
Chaplin's character continues to echo the machine's jerky movements to which he was 
forced to adapt. The discontinuity and rupture characteristic of modernity under the aegis 
of the machine is the objective counterpart to the subjective expression of this condition 
in which alienation is the mode of experience. As we saw above, the apogee of this new 
situation for Benjamin was the First World War. 
Thomas Weber notes that it was the thoughts of Bergson that made Benjamin 
aware of the important link between experience and memory.206 In Matter and Memory, 
Bergson writes, "In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories, "207 and 
"However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, 
205 See Theodor W. Adorno, "Subject and Object," in The Essential Franlifurt School 
Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: The Continuum Publishing 
Group, 2005), 497 - 511. 
206 Weber, "Erfahrung." 
207 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 33. 
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and involves, consequently, an effort of memory which prolongs, one into another, a 
plurality of moments."208 Bergson argues that there is a sense in which what he terms a 
"pure" perception and memory overlap and interpenetrate each other, thereby generating 
the experience of a single event. Indeed, "These two acts, perception and recollection, 
always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance as 
by a process of endosmosis."209 Memory provides the "subjective character" of the 
experience, what he calls the "spirit" of a perceptual event.210 The key as to what type of 
memory arises is for Benjamin, again loosely following Bergson, determined by the 
objective. For Bergson, which specific memory arises to give the spirit of a perceptual 
event is a question of similarity, of affinity. Bergson posits a certain type of mimetic 
faculty in the process of recollection. The memories that arise are in some sense similar 
to the perception which caused them to be called up. Benjamin seems to develop this 
theory, suggesting that factory work, or the social conditions of Capital more generally, 
produce certain forms of experience, and these in turn call forth certain types of 
memories, memories particular and similar to the objective conditions. 
It is not so much the specific content of the memory that establishes the basis of 
similarity to the objective, but its form. Benjamin posits two forms of memory that 
correspond to the differing forms of the social. As Thomas Weber again explains, 
Bergson distinguished between memory as memoire pure, which is contemplative 
remembrance and motoric or somatic memory, a type of "bodily" memory trained 
208 Ibid., 34. 
209 Ibid., 67. 
210 Ibid., 73. 
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through repetitive movement.211 Bergson notes, "The past survives under two 
distinct forms: first, in motor mechanism; secondly in independent recollections."212 He 
continues: 
But then the practical, and, consequently, the usual function of memory, the 
utilizing of past experiences for the present action - recognition, in short - must 
take place in two different ways. Sometimes it lies in the action itself and in the 
automatic setting in motion of a mechanism adapted to the circumstances; at other 
times it implies an effort of the mind which seeks in the past, in order to apply them 
to the present, those representations which are best able to enter into the present 
situation. 213 
For Benjamin, it is the contemplative immersion in the detail alone, Bergson's 
memoire pure, which can function as the alchemical medium powerful enough to 
transubstantiate the phenomenal flux of fragmentary Erlebnis into contextualized 
Erfahrung. Benjamin notes the structural affinities between immersive and motoric 
memory and the modes of production in modem and pre-modem society. On the 
assembly-line, the worker must employ primarily motoric memory. As Chaplin's 
Modern Times shows, the worker internalizes the movements of the machines to which he 
has become subjected.214 By contrast, in the objective material domain the productive 
process of the pre-modem resembles the structure of immersive contemplative memory. 
211 Weber, "Erfahrung," 238. 
212 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 78. 
213 Ibid., 78. 
214 Charles Chaplin, Modern Times, directed by Charles Chaplin, 1936. 
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Unlike the modem worker, who incessantly repeats a set of simplified and abstracted 
motions, the master craftsman approaches work by immersing himself in the work 
process. 
A contrast to the relative psychic openness of the pre-modem worker is 
demonstrated by the practice of telling and listening to stories, which highlights the 
contrast Benjamin strives to articulate. In the old workshops of Benjamin's thought-
image, where master andjoumeyman worked together, stories comprised the rhythm of 
pre-modem work and life. Like the pre-modem manufacturing process, these stories 
embedded the listener in a rich tapestry of tradition. The craftsmen recognized 
themselves in the products of their labour and in the stories they heard. In these 
workshops, the listener could open up to the stories that were being told. There is a 
certain "giving over" of oneself to the narrative. According to Benjamin, this openness 
allows the tales to sink into the listener and thereby forms a more stable and long-lasting 
memory. He cites Freud who notes that "vestiges of memory are 'often most powerful 
and most enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that never entered 
consciousness"' (SW4, 317; GSJ, 612-613.)215 Contrary to the heightened consciousness 
of the factory worker, who needs a presence of mind so as not to be swallowed up by 
machines, the pre-modern worker exhibits a degree of "dreaminess," in which stories and 
work happen somewhere beyond the domain of awareness. Immersive memory, 
however, cannot be produced when the worker is psychically preoccupied with the task of 
215 
"Erinnerungsreste sind vielmehr 'oft am starksten und haltbarsten, wenn der sie 
zurucklassende Vorgang niemals zum Bewufttsein gekommen ist. '" 
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parrying the shocks of a traumatic objective. This type of psychic environment is not 
productive of stories. The soldiers in Benjamin's "The Storyteller," who were struck 
silent by front warfare, represent merely the most extreme example of a process that he 
saw happening in the factories and cities across industrialized Europe. 
Benjamin supplements Bergson's theory of memory with that of Proust. Proust, 
who himself relied on Bergson's distinction, was nonetheless critical of the voluntarism 
in Bergson's conception of memoire pure, and developed his own conception of memoire 
involuntaire. Proust's Madeleine episode demonstrates that there is a certain involuntary 
moment to memory, when a thought from the past strikes out from the unconscious 
without any premeditation. By siding with Proust against Bergson, Benjamin introduces 
the troubling problem of agency into his theory. For Benjamin, recollection is a critical, 
even revolutionary faculty. It is through the process of remembrance that a constellation 
arises in which formations of the social can be "exploded" out of the continuum of 
"homogeneous empty time." However, if the revolutionary dimension of memory is 
found in memoire involuntaire, then, just as the term indicates, a lack of agency seems 
implied in Benjamin's revolutionary politic. 
I believe that the solution to this problem is to be found in the notion of 
recognition, discussed more fully in Chapter Three. In brief, however, while the 
revolutionary, perhaps revelatory, constellation produced through memory and experience 
is, to some extent involuntary, the recognition of the critical element is not. Recognition 
is a deliberate act accomplished by the agent, in bringing philosophy, particularly 
critique, to bear on its object. Critique, or the critical engagement and distance to the 
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objective, is the messianic moment in which truth can in some sense be glimpsed, if 
only briefly, and incompletely. Yet who exactly this agent might be is not explained. 
Sometimes Benjamin suggests it is the working class, while at other times this 
hypothetical agent seems to be more like an individual. I, again, read Benjamin here as 
making a logical rather than historical argument. Benjamin seems to suggest that 
something of this sort would need to happen, both at the level of the individual and at the 
level of social classes if a truly revolutionary politic were to succeed. Regrettably though, 
Benjamin does not theorize his notion of agency and subjectivity enough to make a firm 
statement on this point. Nonetheless, relevant for the present argument is the claim that 
despite the involuntary moment implied in Proust's formulation, there is still a need for 
an active conscious agent, be that an individual or a class, capable of recognizing the 
revolutionary-revelatory constellation for what it is. 
As was intimated above, Benjamin finds that the distinction between the two 
modes of experience and the two types of memory are also expressed in modem 
philosophies that are formulated as Capital becomes dominant. In, "On the Coming 
Philosophy," Benjamin suggests that Kant and the Neokantians did not theorize 
experience as such, but only experience-as-Erlebnis. Benjamin muses that perhaps 
experience-as-Erlebnis was already the only form of experience available to Kant and his 
intellectual heirs: indeed, according to Benjamin, Kant and the Neokantians provide the 
philosophical apology for the new form of experience, in which the meaning-making 
aspects of human life are excluded from analysis. For Benjamin, however, the future 
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philosophy is one in which the concept of experience-as-Erfahrung needs to be (re-
)developed such that is also allows for religious and metaphysical experiences. 
III - Benjamin's Critique of Kant and the Neokantians 
It may seem rather audacious of Benjamin to suggest that religion of all things 
should be re-introduced into a philosophy based on a Kantian typology, given that it is 
perhaps the defining feature of Kant's three Critiques, to set limits on what reason can 
discover. Kant specifically excludes traditional metaphysics, and especially religious 
metaphysics from his field of inquiry. It will be recalled that in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, and, shortly thereafter, in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant had 
argued that knowledge of what is traditionally understood by metaphysics is by definition 
impossible. For Kant, speculating on questions such as the existence or non-existence of 
God or the immortality of the soul, is akin to counting the sides of square circles. While 
Kant recognizes that these questions are of abiding interest, perhaps even the motivating 
force behind the philosophical venture, he, nonetheless, argues that no matter how elegant 
the theory, no knowledge could be gained from metaphysical speculation, since it is not 
grounded by any empirical datum of experience. "Metaphysics has been a mere groping, 
and what is worse a groping among mere concepts."216 Kant, who was living.in the midst 
of the scientific revolution, was perturbed by the fact that, unlike Newtonian physics, the 
history of metaphysics had not shown any significant signs of progress, even though it is 
216 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), B xiii. 
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"older than all other science."217 The recognition that metaphysics entails a constant 
"retracing of our steps" led Kant to attempt to recast the entire intellectual endeavor along 
scientific lines: he wanted to tum metaphysics and philosophy in general into a science. 
To establish philosophy as the equal of science, to assure it has the same 
explanatory power, Kant looked to the method of the scientists, specifically Galileo and 
Newton.218 Taking his cue from how he believed scientists arrive at their conclusions, 
Kant yoked knowledge to experience. In perhaps the most quoted line of the first 
Critique, Kant wrote that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind."219 As his Transcendental Idealism implies, the term "content" clearly 
refers to empirical experience. Of course, this claim must be understood in the limited 
sense in which Kant meant it, since his entire system is dedicated to arguing that neither 
an encounter with the sensory manifold, nor the cogitating mind, are in and of themselves 
sufficient to account for the existence of experience and knowledge. 220 One of the 
enduring insights of the first Critique is in having found a middle ground between the 
seemingly intractable one-sidedness of empiricist and rationalist positions, by claiming 
that both the mind and the sensory manifold make essential contributions, which are 
217 Ibid., B xv. 
218 This is not to imply that Kant developed naive scientistic philosophy predicated on 
Newtonian physics. There are significant differences between the two thinkers, shown 
best by their differing views on the nature of space. For Newton, space is an empty 
container in which things exist. For Kant, space is a transcendental category necessary 
for knowledge, but its ontic status must remain a mystery. The Newtonian influence on 
Kant is a methodological one. It has less bearing on specific content. 
219 Ibid., A 51, B 75. 
220 Ibid., B 127 - B 129. 
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necessary for experience and knowledge to arise.221 In the final analysis Kant agrees 
with the rationalist position that the mind helps to determine what enters into the field of 
knowledge, but he also affirms the Humean-empiricists moment that all actual knowledge 
is fundamentally dependent on an encounter with the sensory manifold, that is on 
experience. The result of Kant's meticulous investigation into the justification of 
knowledge is to exclude metaphysics almost entirely. Since metaphysics is, by definition, 
never a datum of sensory experience, it cannot become known. 
In point of fact, as Benjamin himself notes, Kant did not deny the possibility of 
metaphysics entirely, but merely wanted to establish the criteria for its legitimation.222 
This point notwithstanding, the driving force motivating Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 
as Benjamin rightly claims, is a desire to establish experience and knowledge on 
certainty, the kind of certainty Kant thought the physical sciences had achieved. This 
desire led Kant to limit what can be known to what can be experienced, and what can be 
experienced is determined by the a priori intuitions of time and space, the concepts of the 
understanding and the categories of judgment. The a priori intuitions, the concepts and 
the categories themselves express only a bare minimum of the encounter with the world. 
However, as other commentators besides Benjamin have noted, foremost among them the 
221 I am indebted to J.M. Berstein for this formulation. See J.M. Bernstein, "The Berstein 
Tapes," bernsteintapes.com/, 2006, http://www.bemsteintapes.com/ (accessed 07 17, 
2012). 
222 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Come 
Forward as Science with Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. 
Garry Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Kant argues that 
mathematics, being the only synthetic a priori form of knowledge is therefore also the 
only legitimate form metaphysics can take. 
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Marburg school, Kant's radical reduction results in limiting experience to what can 
be broadly defined as "scientific experience." It is this reduction that the Marburg 
Neokantians believe is the most valuable insight of Kant's philosophy.223 According to 
the Neokantians, the scientific comprises the real core of experience; it expresses 
Whitehead's "really real." However, as was suggested above, for Benjamin this radical 
reduction of experience to scientific experience is a symptom of the historical situation. 
It merely articulates philosophically the diminished status of experience in modernity. 
In "On the Coming Philosophy," the determination of truth in relation to 
knowledge and experience is the major fault line separating Benjamin's thought from that 
of the Marburg Neokantians. If Kant had wanted to reduce knowledge to what could be 
scientifically verified in experience, and if the Marburg school was suggesting that the 
scientifically verifiable core is the truth of that experience, then truth itself can be known. 
The Neokantians diverge from Kant on the question of truth in a subtle but, nonetheless, 
significant manner. Whereas for Kant, a certain truth inheres in the noumenal Ding-an-
sich, the Neokantians, as will be demonstrated below, essentially do away with the 
noumenal realm, and see the truth content as residing exclusively in the scientifically 
verifiable essence of experience. If the truth of an experience is the experience of its 
mathematical-scientific essence, then it follows that it can also be expressed in 
mathematical formulae or in philosophical speech acts that conform, as closely as 
223 Jurgen Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene: Ursprung und Geschichte eines 
antiken Forschungsprinzips (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1962), 17. 
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possible, to mathematical exactitude.224 Perhaps this line of reasoning partially 
accounts for the privileged place of mathematics and physics as paragons of truth in 
positivism, since for the positivists mathematical physics is uniquely positioned to 
express the truly real in experience, being unencumbered by the "delusions" that 
subjective particularity tends to be burdened with. 
Benjamin, however, sees this differently. Whereas the Neokantians read Kant as 
arguing that the truth of an experience is found in a reduction of the concept of experience 
to the scientifically verifiable, for Benjamin, truth is utterly transcendent. "Truth, bodied 
forth in the dance of represented ideas, resists being projected, by whatever means, into 
the realm of knowledge" (Tragic Drama 29-30; SWJ, 209; emphasis added.)225 In his 
notes, which as yet remain untranslated into English, Benjamin elaborates the distinction 
between truth and knowledge as follows, "Knowledge and truth are never identical; there 
is no true knowledge and there is no known truth."226 According to Benjamin, the 
Neokantian equation of truth with knowledge excludes religion, especially the biblical 
God, from the field of experience. As Kant makes clear in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(the biblical) God cannot be known through experience, and, therefore, traditional 
metaphysics which attempts to theorize "the mind of God" is a vacuous enterprise. On 
this point, Benjamin and Kant agree: God cannot be known. For the Neokantians, 
however, this means that God exists beyond the horizon of truth, since truth and 
224 Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene, 23. 
225 
"Die Wahrheit, vergegenwartigt im Reigen der Dergestellten Ideen, entgeht jeder wie 
immer gearteten Projektion in den Erkenntnisbereich." 
226 
"Erkenntnis und Wahrheit sind niemals identisch; es gibt keine wahre Erkenntnis und 
keine erkannte Wahrheit" 
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knowledge are dependent on experience. Benjamin draws a different conclusion: 
that God cannot be known means that truth itself cannot be known, which is to say that 
truth exists beyond the horizon of knowledge. For Benjamin, the Neokantians theorize 
within the horizon of knowledge, which is distinct from truth, while one might imagine 
that for Kant, Benjamin verges dangerously close to falling back into a metaphysical 
mode of thinking. 
It is interesting on this point to note that Kant entirely rejects a Durkheimian 
conception of religion. In Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, for example, 
Kant follows Augustine in drawing a clear distinction between what he terms the true 
religion on the one hand, and cultic actions on the other. "All religions," writes Kant, 
"can be divided into religion of rogation (of mere cult) and moral religion, i.e., the 
religion of good life conduct."227 For Kant the latter, the moral religion, is the only true 
religion, and is represented by "[ ... ] Christianity alone. "228 The true religion rests solely 
on reason, on the moral law, which is itself not given in experience, but is deducible from 
reason itself. Although Jesus for Kant is the prototype of a morally perfect being, he 
nonetheless claims that "there is no need [ ... ] of any example from experience to make 
the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as a 
model already in our reason. "229 In Kant's deistic, rationalist definition of religion, in 
which the social-symbolic function of the cult is entirely denied, and in his reduction of 
227 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and other Writings, 
ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 6:51. 
228 Ibid., 6:52. 
229 Ibid., 6:62-6:63. 
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religious experience to the moral law where all the narrative, and experiential or 
"mystical" elements are stripped away, one could argue that human meaning itself is lost, 
because the meaning generating function, that is the symbolic nexus that ritual 
establishes, is repressed. Benjamin writes that "The reality with which, and with the 
knowledge of which, Kant wanted to base knowledge on certainty and truth is a reality of 
a low, perhaps the lowest, order" (SWJ, 101; GS2, 158.)230 
IV - Benjamin's Ideas 
Benjamin's critique of the Kantians in "On the Coming Philosophy," therefore is 
two-fold. His first argument, or better, his first "sketchy indication" suggests that he sees 
what is usually meant by the concept experience as reaching far beyond what the 
Neokantians believed was its essence. His second objection is that he does not believe 
Kant had been radical enough in purifying his epistemic concepts of metaphysics, and 
that a "latent and infertile metaphysics," i.e., a subject-object dualism, actually lay at the 
basis of the Kantian system. With respect to this second critique, Benjamin objects to 
Kant's two-world theory, in which a noumenal unknown is posited but which itself 
cannot be experienced: all knowledge is generated by a something-out-there but that very 
something argues Kant must remain a mystery. This, Benjamin suggests is in itself a 
metaphysical claim. 
230 
"[ ••• ] diejenige Wirklichkeit deren Erkenntnis und mit der er [Kant] die Erkenntnis auf 
Gewiftheit und Wahrheit griinden wollte, ist eine Wirklichkeit nidern, vielleicht niedersten 
Ranges." 
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With these two "arguments" Benjamin simultaneously moves close to the 
Marburg critique of Kant and away from it: Benjamin, like the Marburg Neokantians, is 
troubled by Kant's two irreconcilable sources of knowledge, but he does not accept the 
Marburgers' appraisal to the effect that the concept of experience should be equated with 
scientific experience. Benjamin, I suggest, agrees with the Marburg school's assessment 
that the irreconcilability of the two-world theory in Kant remains problematic (SW 1, 104; 
GS2, 163)-what, in light of the Neokantians reading of Plato might be termed Kant's 
"methexis problem." He also follows the Neokantians in their suggestion that the theory 
of rescue is a solution to this difficulty. That is, Benjamin is in agreement when they 
argue that the notion of rescue can help solve the problem of how the noumenal realm 
relates to the phenomenal realm in Kant's Transcendental Idealism. This problem 
structurally parallels the problem in Platonic philosophy of how the ideal forms are 
related to the objects in the empirical world that supposedly "reflect" them. Not only is 
rescue of the phenomena a solution to the two-world conundrum that exists in both 
Platonism and Kantianism, it is also Benjamin's recourse to a certain nominalism. In 
fact, it was Plato's Socrates, who in the Parmenides first suggested a nominalist strategy 
to deal with the problem of how the forms might be related to their phenomenal objects, 
although he did not develop the specific theory of rescue.231 The theory of rescue will be 
examined in Chapter Three where I analyze Benjamin's philosophical method derived 
from considerations presently under investigation. Since his theory of rescue and his 
231 Plato, Parmenides, trans. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Rayn (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1996). 
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insistence that God as truth is beyond knowledge, both rely on his theory of the ideas, 
it is to an investigation of this theory to which we turn first. 
Benjamin writes that "ideas are to things as constellations are to stars" (Tragic 
Drama, 34; SWJ, 214.)232 Unfortunately, there is some ambiguity implied in the English 
translation of this phrase that I believe has resulted in some readers mistakenly conflating 
Benjamin's notion of ideas with either the Kantian notion of concepts or intuitions. There 
are in fact three moments to the constellation, which, I maintain, Benjamin means to map 
onto the Kantian philosophical triad of intuition, concept and idea. These three moments 
are: (i) the empirical stars that make up the constellation, (ii) the assembly of certain stars 
into simple geometrical groupings based on their apparent proximity to one another, (iii) 
and finally the mostly mythological figures to which these star-groupings are meant to 
refer. It is this last moment of the constellation, the narrative referent, and not the second 
moment of the grouping of empirical objects, that Benjamin is referring to, when he 
claims that ideas are to things as constellations are to stars. That is, ideas are to intuitions 
as the mythological referents are to the physical existence of individual stars in a 
constellation. 
To continue Benjamin's metaphor, the empirical manifold can be equated with the 
individual stars of the night sky. They are the antic objects of the noumenal realm that 
exist "out there" in the world. These stars can be conceptually organized into groups, into 
constellations. The constellations indicate the role of the concept, which has an analytic 
232 Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik. "Die Ideen verhalten sich zu den Dingen wie die 
Sternbilder zu den Stemen." My translation: "Ideas relate to things as stars to 
constellations." 
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as well as a synthetic function. Benjamin will call the analytic, the "destructive" 
moment of the concept. Its function is to break up the whole, the "false unity" of the 
night sky. At the same time, however, the concept draws stars together synthesizing them 
into a new whole, an actual unity.233 Benjamin writes, "The scientist arranges the world 
with a view to its dispersal in the realm of ideas, by dividing it from within into concepts" 
(Tragic Drama, 32; GSJ, 212.)234 And further: 
Phenomena do not [ ... ] enter into the realm of the ideas whole, in their crude 
empirical state, adulterated by appearances, but only in their basic elements, 
redeemed. They are divested of their false unity so that, thus divided, they might 
partake of the genuine unity of truth. In this their division, phenomena are 
subordinated to concepts, for it is the latter which effect their solution of objects 
into their constituent elements. Conceptual distinctions are above all suspicion of 
destructive sophistry only when their purpose is the salvation of phenomena in 
ideas[ .... ] (Tragic Drama, 33; SWJ, 213-214)235 
Through the concept, the empirical is organized into relationships that define how the 
empirical manifold relate to each other, how the stars are grouped. The idea, however, is 
233 Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik, 239. 
234 
"Der Forscher disponiert die Welt zu der Zersteuung im Bereiche der !dee, indem er 
sie von innen im Begriffe aufteilt." 
235 
"Die Phanomene gehen aber nicht integral in ihrem rohen empirischen Bestande, dem 
der Schein sich beimischt, sondern in ihrer Elementen allein, gerretet, in das Reich der 
ldeen ein. lhrer falschen Einheit entauj3ern sie sich, um aufgeteilt an der echten der 
Wahrheit teilzuhaben. In dieser ihrer Aufteilung unterstehen die Phanomene den 
Begriffen. Die sind es, welche an den Dingen die Losung in die Elemente vollziehen. Die 
Unterscheidung in Begriffen ist uber jedweden Verdacht zerstOrerischer Spitzfindigkeit 
erhaben nur dort, wo sie aufjene Bergung der Phanomene in den ldeen [ ... ]es abgesehen 
hat. " 
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not actually given, either in the empirical, or in the given's relationship with other 
empirical elements. In terms of the empirically given, the idea is extra; it is surplus; it is 
meaning. Cohen suggests that the idea is the concept's self-consiousness.236 The idea is 
that which the concept references; it is that which the constellation itself is meant to 
represent, it is the bull in Taurus; it is the bear in Ursa Major. 
Whereas the concept is a spontaneous product of the intellect, ideas are simply 
given to be reflected upon. Ideas are pre-existent. The distinction between truth 
and coherence provided by knowledge thus defines idea as essence. Such is the 
implication of the theory of ideas for the concept of truth. As essence truth and 
ideas acquire that supreme metaphysical significance expressly attributed to them 
by Plato. (Tragic Drama, 30; SWJ, 214-215)237 
In Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, however, Broker notes that for Benjamin the 
relationship of phenomenon to concept is not homologous to the relationship of concept 
to idea. While each concept is made up of a multitude of intuitions, and each idea of a 
number of concepts, the elements that comprise the concept share a certain similarity by 
virtue of which they are subordinated under one notion, but there is no necessary 
conceptual unity among the concepts that comprise an idea, or, for that matter, the 
236 Hermann Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer Verlag, 1922), 
15: "Die !dee dagegen ist das Selbstbewufttsein des Begriffs." 
237 
"Wahrend der Begriff aus der Spontaneitiit des Verstandes hervorgeht, sind die Jdeen 
der Betrachtung gegeben. Die Jdeen sind Vorgegebe. So dejiniert die Sonderung der 
W ahrheit von dem Zusammenhange des Erkennens die !dee als Sein. Das ist die 
Tragweite der ldeenlehre fur den Wahrheitsbegriff. Als Sein gewinnen Warheit und !dee 
Jene hochste metaphysische Bedeutung, die das Platonische System ihnen nachdrucklich 
zuspricht." 
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relationship between the ideas and truth.238 Benjamin's metaphor of the mosaic is 
helpful in this regard. With the mosaic, Benjamin suggests that concepts have a similar 
relationship to ideas, as the fragmentary mosaic pieces do to the picture that finally 
emerges from them. Benjamin writes: 
Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite their fragmentation into capricious 
particles, so philosophical contemplation is not lacking in momentum. Both are 
made up of the distinct and the disparate; and nothing could bear more powerful 
testimony to the transcendent force of the sacred image and the truth itself. The 
value of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to 
the underlying idea, and the brilliance of the representation depends as much on this 
value as the relationship between the minute precision of the work and the 
proportions of the sculptural or intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is 
only to be grasped through immersion in the most minute details of the subject-
matter." (Tragic Drama, 28-29; SWJ, 208)239 
This metaphor of the mosaic suggests an important difference between the Platonic and 
Benjaminian theory of ideas. Unlike for Plato and perhaps the Neoplatonists, for 
238 Michael Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit: zum Verhtiltnis von Sprache, 
Geschichte und Theologie bei Walter Benjamin (Wiirzburg: Konigshausen & Neumann, 
1993), 218. 
239 
"Der Wert von Denkbruchstucken ist um so entscheidender, je minder sie unmittelbar 
an der Grundkonzeption sich zu messen vermogen und von ihm htingt der Glanz der 
Darstellung im gleichen Mafte ab, wie der des Mosaiks von der Qualittit des Glasflusses. 
Die Relation der mikrologischen Verarbeitung zum Maft des bildnerischen und des 
intellektuellen Ganzen spricht es aus, wie der Wahrheitsgehalt nur bei genauester 
Versenkung in die Einzelheiten eines Sachgehlts sich fassen ltiftt." 
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Benjamin the idea takes the form of an image.240 The mosaic's image is the idea; it is 
that which the concepts together create. The image-as-idea is the basis for Benjamin's 
method of creating thought-images, of metaschematizing. It is the elementary building 
block of his method of philosophical critique. 
The ideas, for Benjamin, are not truth itself, however, but a way of gesturing 
towards it. Here, Benjamin's account of the legend of the stones of the Sinai might be 
helpful to highlight this relationship. My translation of Benjamin's explanation follows: 
[The legend is about] stones which cover the Sinai. As Salmon Maimon recounts it, 
these stones carried an imprint of a leaf (or tree) the unique nature of which was to 
immediately duplicate itself into infinity on each stone that was broken from the 
larger rock. (GSJ, 934)241 
Like these stones, each of which replicates the original information on its constituent 
parts when broken into smaller pieces, each concept contains the imprint or information 
of the idea, and each idea the essential unity from which it came. 242 A contemporary 
analogy might be the mathematical fractal, which duplicates its essential geometric 
pattern at each order of magnitude. Unlike the fractal, however, which replicates its basic 
shape, the stone that is broken off from the larger piece need not bear any obvious 
240 
"Die !dee selbst jedoch ist nicht Theorie, sondern Bild." My translation: "The idea 
itself, however, is not theory but image." Liselotte Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie 
Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenaum Verlag GmbH, 1973), 129. 
241 The original German reads: "Sie handelt von den Steinen, welche den Sinai bedecken. 
Diese trugen, wie Salomon Maimon berichtet, die Zeichnung eines Blattes (Baumes) 
eingepragt, deren sonderbare Natures sei, alsbald aufjedem Steinstiick sich herzustellen, 
welches abgesprengt von einem groj3en Blocke sei und so ins Unendlichefort." 
242 Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, 218. 
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outward relation to the original rock. Similarly, the mythic referents of the 
constellations Aries and Cassiopeia, for instance, share no obvious relation with one 
another. Yet, both constellations are imprinted with the worldview, the culture from 
which they arose. Aries is no less part of the Greco-Roman pantheon than is Cassiopeia. 
In Benjamin's fable we can hear the intimations of a further transformation of the 
Platonic-Kantian theory of the ideas, not inherited from the Neokantians directly, but 
from a later "Neoplatonist," namely G. W. Leibniz.243 According to Speth, it was 
Benjamin's close friend, the protestant theologian Florens Christian Rang, who first 
recommended Leibniz to him.244 Benjamin later wrote to Rang that, "Leibniz's entire 
way of thinking, his idea of the monad, which I adopt for my definition of ideas [ ... ] 
seems to comprise the summa ofa theory of ideas" (SWJ, 389.) Textual references to 
Leibniz's philosophy can be found in some of Benjamin's most important pieces, 
including the "Epistemo-Critical Prologue" of the Tragic Drama, the Arcades Project, 
and later in the "Theses on the Concept of History." Benjamin's notion of the idea is 
similar to Leibniz's notion of the monad in that it is a representation of totality. In the 
243 I argue that Benjamin's (re-)interpretation of Leibniz' spiritual atomism is not 
necessarily in conflict with an ontology of internal relations. Admittedly, Leibniz argues 
that the actual structure of reality is atomistic, that, in reality there are only discrete 
monads which are related to one another by the divine intercession of Ood. Benjamin, 
however, applies the monadology to his theory of ideas. He does not maintain that it 
articulates an ontological essence. In so far as the monad can be equated with the idea, in 
so far as it is a theory of ideas, it implies a relational ontology since, as both Leibniz and 
Benjamin aver, the monad, or the idea, represents the whole. Therefore, one can reach 
any other idea folded within it through an analytical operation of disentanglement. 
Benjamin seems to suggest that any idea contains a reference to truth within itself, that 
the universe is encapsulated in a representation. 
244 .. Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik, 249. 
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Tragic Drama, Benjamin elaborates, "The idea is a monad - that means briefly: 
every idea contains the image of the world. The purpose of the representation of the idea 
is nothing less than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world" (Tragic Drama, 48; 
GSJ, 228. )245 I paraphrase Wiesenthal who notes that for Benjamin the monad represents 
a hermetically sealed model of the universe similar to the architect's blueprint, which 
depicts the idea of a building. In this sense the monad is a model of the universe.246 As 
Holtz notes, the Leibnizian influence on Benjamin's theory of ideas also furnishes 
another indication of how his theory differs from Plato's, which, ultimately served as the 
basis of its Neokantian iteration. In Holtz's reading Plato envisioned an ontic realm in 
which the ideas actually exist.247 However, as Broker, argues, there is no discrete realm 
of ideas for Benjamin.248 Instead, for Benjamin, argues Holz, the ideas function more in 
Leibniz's sense of an ars combinatoria, they are the building blocks of a grammar of 
human thought. This thought, however, crystallizes in images not narratives. 
245 
"Die !dee ist Monade - das heiflt in Kurze: jede !dee enthalt das Bild der Welt. lhrer 
Darstellung ist zur Aufgabe nichts Geringeres gesetzt, als dieses Bild der Welt in seiner 
Verkurzung zu zeichnen." 
246 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 43: "In dieser Metapher 
wird deutlich, das die Monade ein in sich geschlosenes strukturmodell des Universums 
ist. Wie in den Planen des Archikekten die !dee eines Baus nach Mafi und Ordnung 
dargestellt ist, so stellt die Monade ein Model/ des Universums dar. " My translation: "It 
becomes clear in this metaphor that the monad represents a structural model of the 
universe. Just as in the idea of a building is presented according to size and organization 
in the floor plans of the architect, so too is the universe represented in the monad." 
247 Holz, "Idee," 465. 
248 Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, 220. 
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V -The Transcendence of Truth 
As Speth notes, truth in Benjamin's philosophy is not synonymous with the realm 
of ideas but is above the ideas. 249 In Tragic Drama, Benjamin claims that, "Truth is an 
intentionless state of being, made up of ideas"250 (Tragic Drama, 36; GSJ, 216.) In the 
Nachlass, Benjamin notes that truth belongs to a "higher order" (GSJ, 929),251 and in "On 
the Coming Philosophy," Benjamin further distances the ideas from truth when he 
explains that the value of metaphysics lies in being able to "tie all of experience 
immediately to the concept of God, through ideas" (SWJ, 105; GS2, 164; emphasis 
added.)252 I believe that it is in Benjamin's insistence that the ideas are dependent on 
another, higher principle, that we start to detect the influence of the Neoplatonic readings 
of Plato on Benjamin's thought, especially that of Augustine. 
Although Augustine was a late member of the Christian Neoplatonic tradition, and 
many of his ideas can already be found in Origen' s thought, much of Origen' s works have 
been lost, and the synthesis between biblical and Platonic philosophico-theologies, which 
were only in their infancy in his extant works, are more fully developed in the writings of 
Augustine. It is Augustine, therefore, who is our reference point in this discussion of a 
biblical Neoplatonism that finds its way into Benjamin's philosophy. 
249 .. Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik, 232-33. 
250 
"Die Wahrheit ist ein aus Ideen gebildetes intentionsloses Sein." 
251 The full German passage reads: "Der Mensch ist schonfiir den Liebenden, an sich ist 
er es nicht. Und zwar deswegen, weil an sich sein Leib in einer hoheren Ordnung als der 
des Schonen sich darstellet. So auch die Wahrheit." 
252 
"[ ••. ] die gesamte Erfahrung mit dem Gottesbegriff durch ldeen unmittelbar 
verkniipfen." 
170 
In his Confessions, Augustine clearly associates God with truth. 253 
Addressing himself to God, Augustine asks, "What then am I to say, my Light, my 
Truth?"254 Although Augustine understood himself as theorizing within a Platonic 
paradigm, he actually introduced some decidedly un-Platonic themes, inherited from the 
Christian tradition. The most conspicuous example of this is the notion of creatio ex 
nihilo, which was totally foreign to the classical Greek imaginary.255 The other important 
innovation that Augustine inherited from Origen and Plotinus, among other 
Neoplatonists, and which marks his Platonism as distinctive from that of Plato, is the 
notion that the ideas are dependent upon a higher realm, that they are thoughts in the 
mind of God. As do many other N eoplatonists, Augustine reads Plato as foreshadowing 
these themes. Although Augustine would not have had direct access to Plato's Republic, 
a citation from this text is often referenced as the point of departure for Neoplatonists like 
Origen and Plotinus in coming to the notion that the ideas are "in" the mind of God. 
In book six of the Republic, Plato develops the well-known metaphor of the sun, 
which might be read by a Christian philosopher-theologian, like Origen, as suggesting 
that the realm of the forms is dependent upon a higher entity. The good, intimates Plato, 
is not a form, or the entire realm of forms in the same way that the sun is not that which it 
253 Cf. Origen, "On First Principles," 206. The fact that Augustine's equation of truth 
and God has precedence in the Neoplatonic tradition is evinced by Origen, when he 
writes, for example, "For that would be no different from saying that there was a time 
when truth was not, when wisdome was not, when life was not, since it should be judged 
that the substance of God the Father involves all of these things. They cannot be 
separated from Him, nor can they ever be cut off from His substance." 
254 Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 335. 
255 Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene. 
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illuminates. "The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the 
intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality yet it is not 
itself that reality but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power."256 That is, the 
ideas in an Augustinian Neoplatonic idiom are the forms, which are illuminated by the 
sun, which itself is "above" the forms. As Broker notes, God in Benjamin's work is not 
the unity of the ideas, but utterly transcends the ideas.257 This, I suggest is Benjamin's 
Neoplatonic move. Like Augustine, following Origen and Plotinus, Benjamin too 
suggests that the realm of ideas is dependent upon something higher. Like Plato, 
Benjamin recognizes the transcendent nature of truth and beauty, but in his philosophy 
these concepts function as virtual synonyms for the ultimate epistemic signifier, which is 
expressed explicitly only in a few works, but hovers in the background of every piece he 
writes. Like Augustine, Benjamin ultimately recognizes the transcendent something as 
God. As Broker, I think correctly remarks, Benjamin's God is beyond the ideas, having 
neither substance nor being.258 That Benjamin regards the ideas as dependent on God is 
also suggested by his reference to Leibniz's "Monadology." Leibniz echoes Plotinus by 
suggesting that the monads are "in the thoughts of God." In this sense, Plato's 
illuminating sun can be read Neoplatonically, as it were, as something other than the 
realm of ideas, something one comes to through the ideas, indeed, something that itself 
makes the ideas possible. If the ideas are components of Benjamin's epistemo-critical 
256 Plato, The Republic, 2nd Edition, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, 
1974), 509 b-c. 
257 Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, 224. 
258 Ibid., 211. 
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method, which is meant to reveal the truth in phenomena, the truth discovered is not 
the idea itself, but the "really real," the relational essence, to which the ideas themselves 
refer. Through the ideas one comes to God, and God is not an ontological autarkic 
existent but, as Holtz puts it, a "metasemantic regulative function."259 
Benjamin's notion of God is closer to that of a biblical N eoplatonism than of a 
more literalist interpretation of an interventionist God. Benjamin's God is the 
"philosopher's God" of Origen, Plotinus and Augustine. His God certainly shares 
affinities with that of Christianity and Jewish mysticism, but only if these traditions are 
given a non-literal reading: the God of biblical "wisdom literature." That is, unlike the 
biblical God in more literalist (particularly contemporary fundamentalist) interpretations, 
who is taken to be a personal agent, walking in the Garden of Eden talking to his 
creation260 or who stops the sun's path across the sky for Joshua,261 a God, incidentally 
which is often the only one allowed by some less generous (often positivist Marxist) 
reader's of Benjamin, the God in Benjamin's work is impersonal, the ultimate source of 
meaning, and at the same time fundamentally inexpressible. Although Benjamin gives an 
exegesis of the second creation story, precisely the creation story in which an 
anthropomorphic God interacts as a human-like agent with Adam and Eve, his 
interpretation of this passage is clearly not literal. It closely follows the model of 
incorporating "myths" - that is, myths-as-stories - into philosophical dialogues so 
expertly championed by Plato, the Neoplatonists, and, incidentally, also by Marx. 
259 Holz, "Idee," 463. 
260 Gen. 3 
261 Josh. 10:13 
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If the role of the Platonic forms is to illuminate the essence of phenomena, if 
the forms themselves are illuminated by the good, if, as Benjamin argues, the good is 
truth is God, that is, if God is that "epistemically original" but inscrutable something, then 
the metaphysical, religious, and theological in Benjamin's philosophy is simply a gesture 
to the epistemologically highest signifier, the metasemantic regulative function. 262 
Perhaps here we could re-phrase Anselm of Canterbury's famous maxim to the effect 
that, for Benjamin, "God is that without which nothing can be thought." This definition 
transcends the secular philosophical-political demarcations of the religious and the 
theological as distinct from other instantiations of the social. This definition of truth-as-
God also suggests that even when Benjamin does not explicitly use religious language in 
his writings, the underlying assumptions structuring his arguments remain "religious." 
As was argued in Chapter One, the "God-concept" is a black hole of meaning in 
that it remains mysterious while, simultaneously, exerting an enormous organizing 
influence on everything in its vicinity. The "God-concept" is that something which must 
be posited to exist, if meaning itself is to exist. It is that which defines everything in 
reference to itself, but which itself is groundless. 
Benjamin's invocation of God can be read as his realism, which is simultaneously 
metaphysical. Contrary to Kant and the Neokantians, Benjamin maintains that experience 
contains a metaphysical core. Experience itself is metaphysical. The "reformulation of 
'experience' as 'metaphysics' means that so-called experience is virtually included in 
metaphysical or dogmatic part of philosophy, into which the highest epistemological -
262 Holz, "ldee," 463. 
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that is, the critical - is transformed" (SWJ, 109; GS2, 169.)263 In equating truth with 
God, Benjamin repeats the central claim of all realist philosophies, including all 
theologies. Although any given theology is not necessarily realistic, it nonetheless is a 
type of philosophical realism in that it posits the existence of an ultimate actual state of 
affairs, or, at the epistemic level, it supposes an ultimate ground of meaning. This claim, 
however, can never be redeemed by that philosophy or theology itself, since it 
presupposes that which it attempts to explain. Ultimately, all realist claims to a true state 
of the world are metaphysical, and all realist epistemologies imply a reference to a 
fundamental signifier. Even philosophical materialism is metaphysical in its ontological 
claim that reality is in essence material. Benjamin's realism, however, is relational. The 
truth is found not in the object alone, not simply in the idea that exists beyond the subject, 
but "in-between" the subject and object. 
We have arrived at what I regard as Benjamin's sublime paradox. All realist 
philosophies must posit an epistemic ground in order to provide an anchor for the chain of 
signification. If, however, a philosophy is to avoid devolving into nihilism or skepticism, 
it must include the human position, the human subject as central, and, therefore, it cannot 
embrace the positivist insistence which maintains that this function is accomplished by 
the thesis that dead matter provides the ultimate ground of meaning. I argue that for 
Benjamin a humanist philosophy, one that centralizes the human subject must necessarily 
263 
"[ ••. ]die Umpriigung der 'Erfahrung' zu 'Metaphysik' bedeutet daft im 
metaphysischen oder dogmatischen Tei! der Philosophie, in den der oberste erkenntnis-
theoretische, d. i. der kritische Teil iibergeht, virtuell die sogenannte Erfaarung 
eingeschlossen ist." 
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place a "God-concept" at the centre of its epistemology, since, as was argued in 
Chapter One, "God" is simply the symbolic representation of the social. Benjamin, 
therefore, simply states explicitly that which is denied, or perhaps even suppressed, in 
many modern philosophies: underlying his very "critical" or "realist" tenets, is the 
metaphysical appeal to reality, and a truth in reference to a good. In terms of the form of 
the argument, this line of thought brings Benjamin within the orbit of a certain orthodox 
Kantianism, which requires of its readers a Pascalian "leap of faith." The last link in the 
chain of signification cannot be justified, it must simply be assumed. By equating God 
with truth, Benjamin suggests that this is precisely the underlying assumption in realist 
philosophies as well. That is to say that Benjamin is not arguing for an ontological 
reality, but rather positing the existence of this very reality on epistemic grounds. 
Thus, the task of the coming philosophy can be conceived as the discovery or 
creation of that concept of knowledge which, by relating experience exclusively to 
the transcendental consciousness, makes not only mechanical but also religious 
experience logically possible. This should definitely be taken to mean not that 
knowledge makes God possible but that it definitely does make the experience and 
doctrine of him possible in the first place (SWJ, 105; GS2, 168; emphasis added.)264 
264 
"So laftt sich also die Aufgabe der kommenden Philosophie /assen als die Auffindung 
oder Schaffung desjenigen Erkenntnisbegriffes der, indem er zugleich auch den 
Erfahrungsbegriff ausschlieBlich auf das transzendentale Bewufttsein bezieht, nicht allein 
mechanische sondern auch religiOse Erfahrung logisch ermoglicht. Damit soil durchaus 
nicht gesagt sein daft die Erkenntnis Gott, wohl aber durchaus daft sie die Erfahrung und 
Lehre von ihm allererst emroglicht." 
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Chapter Three - Images of Revelation and the Rescue 0f Divine Names 
Benjamin's insistence that truth "resists[ ... ] being projected into the field of knowledge," 
(Tragic Drama 29-30; GSJ, 209)265 places the philosopher in an embarrassing 
predicament. As was argued in Chapter Two, Benjamin equates truth with the "God-
concept." Since Benjamin maintains that truth-as-God references something which cannot 
be known, the philosopher seems forced to accept the sublime silence that Kierkegaard's 
Abraham suffered.266 Faced with the divine command to execute his son Isaac, Abraham 
could not articulate in human words the meaning or purpose of God's monstrous 
demand. 267 In Euthyphro Plato succinctly formulates the problematic at the heart of 
Abraham's impossible situation. On his way to the Athenian courthouse, Socrates asks 
Euthyphro whether a pious act is pious because it is loved by the gods, or whether it is, 
instead, loved by the gods because it is pious. Is it right for Abraham to kill Isaac because 
it is God's command or is it God's command because, in some unfathomable sense, it is 
right? Kierkegaard's Abraham is forced to accept the radical consequences of a rigorous 
monotheism, in which the horns of the Euthyphro-dilemma collapse into one another. If, 
265 
"Die Wahrheit, vergegenwartigt im Reigen der dargestellten ldeen, entgehtjeder wie 
immer gearteten Projektion in den Erkenntnisbereich." 
266 It is important here to follow Kierkegaard reading of the Akedha (the binding oflsaac) 
instead of referring directly to the biblical account. This need arises from the fact that the 
earliest Jews were most likely monolatrists, rather than strict monotheists. As will be 
seen presently, however, the emphasis on monotheism is of special significance. 
267 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. 
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as many Judeo-Christian exegetes of the Bible maintain, God is the condition for 
being, then the only thing that can be "said" about God is tautological, as Moses 
discovered when God identified himself as "I am that I am. "268 
Benjamin's reluctance to name the truth he strives to convey directly can be read 
in the context of the biblical commandment against making graven images, which in 
exegesis is a taboo on verbalizing the tetragrammaton, (YHWH);269 a taboo, incidentally, 
that Engels introduces into Marxian theory in the French introduction to Capital, when he 
advises against a positive depiction of a communist utopia. Traditionally, however, the 
command against making graven images expressed the pious belief that any adjective, 
image, and even a proper name reduces the ultimate and incomprehensible grandeur of 
the divinity. Defining God, speaking "His" name (YHWH), making a "likeness" of 
"Him," is an act of determination and, therefore, of limitation. Any limit, as Hegel 
demonstrated, presupposes a beyond. However, to define God as the condition of being, 
necessarily negates the possibility of maintaining that there is something beyond, since 
the only "thing" that could be beyond being is no-thing. That this line of reasoning 
represents an authoritative biblical tradition is demonstrated by Augustine, who follows a 
traditional line ofNeoplatonic thought when he suggests "nothing" as the solution to the 
problem of evil, a problem that, as Abraham's predicament suggests, is endemic in the 
268 Ex. 3:14 
269 Also see, Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School 
and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1973.) Jay makes a similar claim about the other members of the Frankfurt School 
suggesting that the Jewish background of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse is betrayed 
by their unwillingness to depict a communist utopia, preferring instead to focus on a 
critique of the present. 
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very logic of monotheism. In the biblical monotheistic tradition, where God is both 
the ultimate condition for being, and where being is deemed good,270 the question of the 
role of evil is significant: Evil both exists (God tells Abraham to kill his son) and at the 
same time cannot exist (because God and that which he creates is good.) Augustine 
concludes, therefore, that like a hole in a shirt, evil does not constitute a substance with 
qualities but is a lack, a negation of being itself. Interestingly, in the Tragic Drama, 
Benjamin follows Augustine's reasoning still further when he writes, "Knowledge of evil, 
therefore, has no object. There is no evil in the world" (Tragic Drama, 233; GSJ, 407.)271 
To speak of God is to determine God, and implies that there is something more that is not 
in some manner dependent on God. Such a claim, however, is incompatible with the 
logic of a consistent monotheism. In the language of the Bible, to define truth is to make 
a graven image; it is the worship of the golden calf. Faced with this paradox, Benjamin's 
philosopher like Kierkegaard's Abraham seems destined to remain silent. Fallowing this 
logic to its conclusion Tiedemann suggests that for Benjamin philosophy becomes a 
negative theology.272 
However, while Benjamin maintains that truth cannot be articulated, it can, he 
suggests be represented. He writes that one of the basic tasks of philosophy is "the 
270 Gen. 1 
271 
"Also hat das Wissen von dem Bosen gar keinen Gegenstand." 
272 Rolf Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), 57. 
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representation of ideas" (Tragic Drama, 34; GSJ, 214; emphasis added)273 and, "If 
representation is to stake its claim as the real methodology of the philosophical treatise 
then it must be the representation of ideas" (Tragic Drama, 29; GSJ, 209.)274 Caygill 
comments, "For Benjamin transcendental truth beyond the grasp of knowledge and 
inconceivable without theology is thus the object not of proofs but of a 'representation' 
that is an apprehension and exposition of meaning as does the phenomenological tradition 
from Husserl to Heidegger and beyond[ .... ]"275 For Benjamin, the idea emerges 
relationally. We recall that his method of metaschematizing, of creating thought-images, 
was deployed so as to discern homologies. The idea of a work of art "bodies forth" in the 
tension between art-work and critic, the idea of a text between commentary, or translation 
and original, and the idea of a historical moment in the relationship between a now and a 
past which it cites. The truth content of philosophy in general then, while inexpressible in 
the sense that it cannot be named directly, nonetheless, arises in a constellation produced 
through commentary. The model for a philosophy with a relational structure of truth is 
one closer to that of translation, art criticism and, importantly, biblical commentary, than 
it is to the mathematico-mechanical philosophy of the Neokantians, the positivists, or the 
Anglo-American analytic philosophers who follow Bertrand Russell's lead (Tragic 
Drama, 27; GSJ, 203). 
273 The full German sentence reads: "Und eben diese Vermittlerrolle mac ht sie tauglich 
zu der anderen, gleich urspunglichen Aufgabe der Philosophie, zur Darstellung der Ideen 
mit Mittel der Empirie." 
274 
"Wenn Darstellung als eigentliche Methode des philosophischen Traktates sich 
behaupten will, so muj3 sie Darstellung der Ide en sein." 
275 Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, 38. 
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The more clearly mathematics demonstrates that the total elimination of the 
problem of representation [ ... ] is the sign of genuine knowledge, the more 
conclusively does it reveal its renunciation of that area of truth towards which 
language is directed. (Tragic Drama, 27; GSJ, 203)276 
Benjamin, therefore, deliberately bestows the theological concept of doctrine or teaching 
(Lehre) on a philosophy capable of representing truth. 
In order to theorize Benjamin's philosophical method, his manner of representing 
the ideas, which he also maps onto the role of the art critic, political revolutionary, 
historian, and philosopher, it is necessary to relate his understanding of truth to his critical 
epistemological theory of rescue and to his philosophy of language. In essence, 
Benjamin's theory of language in relation to philosophy, revolutionary politics, art 
criticism and history, might be summarized as follows: commentary on an element of the 
social text produces a constellation - Benjamin will call it a dialectical-image 
(dialektisches Bild) or a thought-image (Denkbild) - which crystallizes the idea in a 
graphic form, the purpose of which is to gesture toward a truth structured relationally. 
"History does not decay into stories, but into pictures" [Nl 1,4].277 Benjamin's theory 
posits that a constellation as an image of the idea(s) has the power, by virtue of the faculty 
of remembrance, to shock a dreaming subject, or even a dreaming collective, out of the 
276 
"Wie deutlich es Mathematik be le gt, daft die ganzliche Elimination des 
Darstellungsproblems, als welche jede streng sachgemafie Didaktik sich gibt, das Signum 
echter Erkenntnis ist, gleich bundig stellt sich ihr Verzicht auf den Bereich der Wahrheit, 
den die Sprachen meinen, dar." 
277 
"Geschichte zerfallt in Bildern, nicht in Geschichten." 
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slavish condition of mythic experience into the apprehension of the really real, or 
truth, itself a theological category indexed by the concept of the Messiah. 
I- Rescue: Benjamin's Religious Method of Critique 
The clue to the subterranean connection between Benjamin's religiously inspired 
theory of rescue, his philosophy of language, and, what I identify as his phenomenology 
of experience of Capital, is given in the infamous "Epistemico-Critical Prologue," to his 
Tragic Drama. This passage is the nexus that connects seemingly disparate strands of 
Benjamin's thought, and as such, will serve as a reference point for much of the following 
analysis. Benjamin writes: 
Truth is not an intent which realizes itself in empirical reality; it is the power which 
determines the essence of this empirical reality. The state of being, beyond all 
phenomenality, to which alone this power belongs, is that of the name. This 
determines the manner in which ideas are given. But they are not so much given in 
a primordial language as in a primordial form of perception, in which words 
possess their own nobility as names, unimpaired by cognitive meaning. (Tragic 
Drama, 36; GSJ, 216; emphasis added)278 
278 
"Nicht als ein Meinen, welches durch die Empirie seine Bestimmungftinde, sondern 
als die das Wesen dieser Empirie erst prtigende Gewalt besteht die Wahrheit. Das al/er 
Phtinomenalittit entriickte Sein, dem allein diese Gewalt eignet, ist das des Namens. Es 
bestimmt die Gegebenheit der Jdeen. Gegeben aber sind sie nicht sowohl in einer 
Ursprache, denn in einem Urvernehmen, in we/chem die Worte ihren benennenden Adel 
unverloren an die erkennende Bedeutung besitzen." 
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I suggest that the first and last sentence in this quotation gesture to Benjamin's theory 
ofrescue.279 Since the theory of rescue is an important method of Benjamin's 
philosophical investigations, and since it also informs his theory of language and his 
phenomenology of experience, it will be useful to begin this analysis by tracing the broad 
outlines of the genealogy of this epistemic device. 
Kaul en notes that there are at least three distinct uses of the theory of rescue in 
Benjamin's work: (i) as an "epistemological" method deployed in opposition to the 
method of inquiry in scientistic philosophies, (ii) as an eschatological-historical concept, 
and (iii) as a category in his literary criticism. 280 The present inquiry will be concerned 
primarily with the first articulation, and, to some extent, the second; as a gnoseological 
device that is employed in opposition to positivist theory. The argument being developed 
is that the classical Greek (pagan) notion of rescue, which Benjamin translates into a 
biblical idiom, is the philosophical foundation for his theory of language and his method 
for reading the social. I agree with Kaul en when he suggests that the theory of rescue 
underlies many of Benjamin's key texts notably, Tragic Drama, the "Elective Affinities" 
essay, Berlin Childhood around 1900, the Arcades Project and even the "Theses on the 
Philosophy of History."281 Kaulen further suggests that Benjamin's Baudelaire study of 
279 Cf. Origen, "On First Principles," 204. The above passage from Benjamin's Tragic 
Drama seems to echo ideas already presented in Origen, when he Wirites, "[ ... ]an 
implication of the main argument sufficies to show that there are some things the meaning 
of which cannot in any way rightly be explained by words of a human language [ ... ] but 
are made plain by a purer intellectual apprehension rather than by any properties words 
have." 
28° Kaul en, "Rettung," 629. 
281 Ibid., 619. 
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the 1930s was an attempt at a "materialist" rescue of lyric poetry in the age of 
Capital. 282 The notion of rescue demonstrates how profoundly "religious" Benjamin's 
philosophy actually is. Benjamin's theory of the subject, his theory of the social, his 
method of analysis and his manner of presentation are all predicated on a religiously 
inspired philosophy. One might even be tempted to apply Zizek' s notion of a "materialist 
theology" to Benjamin's oeuvre.283 
Although the centrality of the theory of rescue in his philosophy was first 
recognized by Habermas, my exposition of the history of this notion is influenced 
primarily by the German philosopher of science, Jiirgen Mittelstrass, specifically, his 
1962 dissertation, Rettung Der Phanomene (Rescue of Phenomena.) According to 
Mittlestrass, it was the 61h century Neoplatonist Simplicius, who, in his commentary on 
Aristotle's Heaven and Earth, claimed that Plato had given his students the task of 
finding the regulating principle that could account for the erratic movements of the 
planets.284 The historical accuracy of Simplicius' account is highly suspect, and the 
actual origin of the concept remains contested. 285 The confusion about the origins of the 
notion is somewhat aggravated by the fact that the interest in the theory of rescue in the 
modern period was first registered by the Marburg Neokantians, who, as Mittlestrass 
complains, too eagerly accept Simplicius' rather uncritical account of the genealogy of 
the concept. Natorp, for example, assumes that rescue is already operative in the Platonic 
282 Ibid. 
283 See, Slavoj Zizek, "Towards a Materialist Theology," Angelaki 12, no. 1 (2007). 
284 Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene, 1, 150. 
285 Ibid., 150. 
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dialogues. However, as Mittlestrass convincingly demonstrates, while there is some 
evidence supporting Simplicius' and Natorp's accounts that Plato was at the origin of this 
theory, there is more evidence suggesting he was not. Regardless of who may actually 
have originated the theory, however, the general concern of the Platonists, states 
Simplicius, was the fact that according to Plato's philosophy, only the ideas, which are by 
definition perfect, express actual ontological being. The problem they faced was that the 
motion of the planets, observed within a geocentric astronomical paradigm, did not 
submit to any discernable pattern. The etymology of our English "planet," from the 
Greek planetai, "wandering star," echoes the ancient observation that some of the 
heavenly bodies roamed the sky without submitting to any discernable order. 
According to classical Greek cosmology, that of Plato's friend Eudoxus, for 
example, the planets occupy a realm of perfection, and should express this perfection 
through perfectly regular, that is, circular orbits. Plato struggles with the discrepancy 
between observed fact and theoretical expectations in the Timaeus, where he is forced to 
advance the unsatisfying hypothesis that even though the planets' motions are inscrutable, 
they must, nonetheless, be regulated by some higher order not discernable by mortals. 
The fact, therefore, that the planets did not seem to have perfect circular orbits, that their 
orbits could even be retrograde, presented a problem worth solving. Thus, according to 
Mittelstrass, saving astronomical phenomena, as interpreted by the Marburg Neokantians, 
was a proto-scientific task, if not already in the classical antiquity of Plato's day, then 
certainly in late antiquity. The object of rescue was to find the mathematical model, 
consisting exclusively of circles, with regular non-deviating motion, that could accurately 
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describe and predict the motion of the planets. 286 Rescuing phenomena meant trying 
to determine the underlying essence, the pure idea, that is to save the divine status of the 
supra-lunar bodies by reasoning that they submit to regular laws, despite the appearance 
of erratic, imperfect motion. This principle soon migrated from its birthplace in Greek 
astronomy to classical Greek epistemology. 287 The purpose of the theory in epistemology 
- as the Neokantians also make use of it - is to apply rules to phenomena in order that 
their truth, their reality, that is their essences can be "seen." This "seeing" is itself the 
rescue of phenomena, which are saved from the oblivion of non-recognition. "Seeing" is, 
of course, accomplished by the Platonic "mind's eye," the eye of wisdom, the eye of 
philosophy which "sees," i.e., it comprehends, or recognizes, an essence in the 
manifold.288 
For Cohen and Natorp, Plato is an early incarnation of the spirit of modem 
science. 289 With their assumption that Plato relied upon the theory of rescue, which 
attempts to discern the underlying essence in the appearances, they believed to have 
discovered the first tentative intellectual steps that would eventually lead to the modem 
western scientific worldview. The purpose of our inquiry is to trace the outlines of the 
genealogy of the notion of rescue, not to critique the Marbug Neokantians. It is, 
nonetheless, worth mentioning that, as Mittelstrass argues, it is dubious to attribute 
anything like a modem conception of science to Plato or his students. Despite the fact 
286 Ibid., 1. 
287 Ibid., 146 - 147. 
288 Cf. Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 5: "!dee ist der Wurzel nach auch mit dem 
Sehen verwant." My translation: "The idea is the root, which is also related to seeing." 
289 See, for example, Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 19-20. 
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that Greek philosophy shares with modern science the conspicuous feature that its 
methods and conclusions are subject to "peer review" as it were, there are far too many 
differences between Plato's philosophy and the scientific method to suppose that Plato 
stood at its origin.290 
It is in the above sense of rescue, by applying interpretive rules and principles that, 
notes Mittlestrass, the Marburg Neokantians adopted the theory to help solve the two-
world problem in Kant's philosophy, not, however, without important revisions, both to 
the classical conception of the theory of rescue, and to Kantianism itself. Mittlestrass 
contends that perhaps the Marburg school's most distinctive feature is in having merged 
Plato's realm of the forms, the Platonic ideas, with the Kantian ideas. This merger is the 
basis for their re-interpretation of rescue, the general outlines of which Benjamin also 
adopts. In this reading, the Kantian ideas take on a radically changed character, in that 
their role is to replace the epistemic function of Kant's noumenal realm, not, however, the 
ontological fact of a noumenal realm.291 The realm of the ideas for the Neokantians is the 
site where most of the epistemic work that comprises experience is accomplished. 
Whereas for Kant, it was the noumenal realm that was partly responsible for what could 
be experienced, the Neokantians are much more "idealist" in the sense that, while they do 
not deny the existence of an ontic realm beyond the subject, they regard the ideas as the 
primary faculty for generating experience and knowledge.292 The Neokantians' point of 
departure, explains Mittlestrass is Kant's own explication of Plato in the first Critique: 
290 Mittelstrass, Die Rettung der Phanomene. 
291 Ibid., 16. 
292 Ibid. 
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Plato made use of the expression Idea in such a way that we can readily see that 
he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the 
senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the understanding (with which 
Aristotle occupied himself), since nothing encountered in experience could ever be 
congruent to it. Ideas for him are archetypes of things themselves, and not, like the 
categories, merely the key to possible experiences. In his opinion they flowed from 
the highest reason, through which human reason partakes in them; our reason, 
however, now no longer finds itself in its original state, but must call back with toil 
the old, now very obscure ideas through a recollection (which is called 
philosophy. )293 
Mittlestrass suggests that in this passage in particular, the Neokantians found a new 
definition of the Kantian ideas, namely as experimental hypotheses necessary to 
understand phenomena. 294 In linking the Kantian idea with the Platonic idea and, in turn, 
relating both to the notion of an hypothesis capable, not only of explaining, but also of 
actually making phenomena "visible," the members of the Marburg school are making 
use of the theory of rescue. In this they actually seem to be following the philosophical 
spirit, if not the letter of Kant, since as Kant himself had suggested, it was the method of · 
the scientists, their manner of investigation, that allowed for such remarkable progress in 
their respective fields. In Galileo and Newton, both incidentally, Christian Neoplatonists, 
Kant discovered the need to approach nature with a preconceived notion as to how the 
293 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 370. 
294 Mittlestrass, Die Rettung der Phiinomene, 22. 
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world was organized. The philosopher was not to be a student of nature, but her 
judge, not one simply schooled by the teacher, but someone who questions, probes and 
tries to build a case. I cite a rather long passage from the Critique of Pure Reason as 
evidence that the Marburg school's reading has textual precedence in Kant. Kant writes, 
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or 
when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be 
equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed 
metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing 
something and then putting it back again, a light dawned on all those who study 
nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces 
according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its 
judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, 
rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in 
leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no 
previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet 
what reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must 
approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the 
agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, on the other hand, the 
experiments thought out in accordance with these principles - yet in order to be 
instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher 
wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the 
questions he puts to them. Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution in 
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its way of thinking to the inspiration that what reason would not be able to 
know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter (though not 
merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature. This is 
how natural science was first brought to the secure course of a science after groping 
about for so many centuries.295 
In this sense, questions in the form of experiments are posed with a view to demonstrating 
whether the hypothesis is in fact descriptive of reality. This insight, according to the 
Neokantians, legitimates the equation of the idea with the scientific hypothesis, a 
regulative principle capable of illuminating, that is, rescuing, the true essence of 
ph~nomena from the flux of the manifold. 296 
This is in fact how scientific laws, first posited as hypotheses actually function. 
Scientific laws are themselves not given in nature, but are preconceived rules that 
structure appearances. Although Newton could "observe" the law of gravity, it was not 
"visible" in nature in its pure unadulterated essence and could only been "seen" in the 
appearances of the phenomenal manifold because of his hypothesis that there exists a 
force, related to mass acting on bodies at an inverse proportion to their distance, which 
295 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xiii - B xiv. 
296 See for example, Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 7: "Das tiefste und das 
fruchtbarste methodische Mittel, mit dem die Astronomen des neuen We/bi/des arbeiten, 
ist die Hypothese. {. .. }es bleibt doch bei dem genialen Versttindnis, welches Kepler von 
der Platonischen !dee, als Hypothesis, besessen hat. Sie ist die Grund/age, vielmehr die 
Grundlegung, welche der lnstruktion einer }eden exakten untersuchung voraufgehen 
muj3." My translation, "The hypothesis is the deepest and most fruitful method 
[ methodische Mittel] with which the astronomers generated a new image of the world 
[Welbild.] [ ... ]it retains Kepler's ingenious forumlation that the Platonic idea as 
hypothesis possessed. It is the foundation, or better the founding which the instruction of 
every exact analysis must presuppose." 
190 
preceded and simultaneously explained his observations. Stars, says Cohen, are not 
in reality, they exist only in astronomy.297 However, by equating the Kantian idea with a 
scientifically inspired hypothesis, i.e., an interpretive or regulating principle the 
Neokantians suggested that this and not the noumenal Ding-an-sich is the true source of 
knowledge. 298 Cohen notes that thinking establishes the basis of being. 299 In essence, 
Cohen and Natorp argue that the solution to Kant's "methexis problem" is that the 
supposition of an unknowable world beyond the senses should be replaced by the ideal 
realm of Platonic forms, forms as ideas, that is forms as epistemic presuppositions 
necessary for making phenomena recognizable, since, according to their reading, all 
knowledge has it origins in the ideas and not in the noumenal unknown. 
Benjamin's theory of the constellation can therefore be recognized as another name 
for his theory of rescue. In the constellation, the referent (the idea), which is itself not 
fully determined by the empirical, seems to call forth (rescue) a certain set of stars 
(concept) from the night sky (the manifold.) By attributing narrative context the 
constellations become recognizable as constellations, and the night sky becomes an 
organized set of meanings. That is by "seeing" a Bull hunted by Orion, or "seeing" the 
herdsman Bo6tes follow the Great Bear constellations become meaningful 
"mythologically," that is to say socio-culturally, and in addition, the organized empirical 
manifold can provide information useful for farming and navigation. The idea is not 
297 I am indebted to Robert Gibbs for this insight. See, Robert Gibbs, "The Limits of 
Thought: Rosenzweig, Schelling, and Cohen," Zeitschrifl fur philosophische Forschung 
43, no. 4 (Oct. - Dec. 1989): 633. 
298 Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 16. 






simply an excess that comes after the empirical has been worked up into the concept, 
but itself determines the very essence of that phenomenon. The idea is the essence "in" 
the empirical, the phenomenon itself. 300 Benjamin summarizes this point with respect to 
both art and science, when he writes that 
[ ... ] in the domain of art do the ur-phenomena - as ideals - present themselves 
adequately to perception, whereas in science they are replaced by the idea, which is 
capable of illuminating the object of perception but never of transforming it in 
intuition. The ur-phenomena do not exist before art; they subsist within it. ( SWJ, 
148; GSJ, 315; emphasis added)301 
To be clear, however, the Marburg school is not positing some type of hyper-
subjective relativism in which any theory whatsoever, independent of the empirical 
world, generates from itself what is then experienced. 302 Although, to a degree they 
lobby for a return to a certain idealism, they remain orthodox Kantians in that the ideas 
must be related to the given, even if the essence of what is given is not otherwise 
300 Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, 226. 
301 
"[ ... ] im Bereich der Kunst allein die Urphanomene - als ldeale - sich der 
Anschauung darstellen, wahrend in der Wissenschaft die !dee sie vertritt, die den 
Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung zu bestrahlen, doch in der Anschauung nie zu wandeln 
vermag. Die Urphanomene liegen der Kunst nicht vor, sie stehen in ihr." 
302 Cf. Gibbs, "The Limits if Thought: Rosenzweig, Schelling, and Cohen,": 633. Gibbs 
notes that Cohen's problem amounts to discovering how one can derive a perceptual 
"something" from "nothing" since, "Cohen argues that there is no giyen manifold or 
influx of sensible intuition." Gibbs suggests that Cohen's answer is the "infentensimal" 
method, a philosophical re-approriation of Leibniz's calculus, which',incidentally also 
fascinated Benjamin in his youth. The scope of Gibb's argument is beyond the present 
analysis. However, I do not read Gibb's description of Cohen's theory as indicating a 
total subjective relativism, since even though the infentisimal "something" approaches 
zero, this does not result in allowing the subject to create any "something" out of the 
empirical "nothing." 
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recognizable. Newton, for example, did not imagine gravity without an empirical 
referent, but required the empirical to buttress his theory. And as Kant himself noted 
above, "what reason would not be able to know of itself [it] has to learn from nature, it 
has to seek in the latter (though not merely ascribe to it)" (emphasis added .)303 
Phenomena and ideas are co-determining forces. The ideas are empty unless they 
reference phenomena, but at the same time, the phenomena do not inextricably determine 
the ideas. While ideas and phenomena co-determine each other, the Neokantians are 
idealists in the sense that they give more epistemic authority to the ideas over phenomena. 
The Neokantians argue that the idea, while it must keep fidelity with the empirical, 
nonetheless does most of the epistemic work. Phenomena without recourse to the ideas 
do not have enough epistemic "substance" to be meaningful. If Kant had argued that 
concepts without intuitions are empty, perhaps the N eokantians could append a further 
maxim to the effect that intuitions and concepts without ideas remain confused. "Through 
their mediating role," notes Benjamin: 
concepts enable phenomena to participate in the existence of ideas. It is this same 
mediating role which fits them for the other equally basic task of philosophy, the 
representation of ideas. As the salvation of phenomena by means of ideas takes 
place, so too does the representation of ideas through the medium of empirical 
reality. For ideas are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an 
arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of these 
303 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xiv. 
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elements. (Tragic Drama, 34; GSJ, 214)304 
Wiesenthal perceptively notes, that structurally speaking, the Marburg school's 
association of the idea with the scientific experiment is the basis for Benjamin's 
incorporation of the methodological concept of the extreme. The extreme, as Wiesenthal 
explains, is the form experience takes in the Neokantians' scientific hypothesis transposed 
into a humanities or social scientific discourse, a methodological device which 
illuminates most clearly the truth in phenomena.305 Indeed, for Wiesenthal, Benjamin's 
extreme also shares conceptual affinities with Cassirer's "border-image" (Grenzgebilde), 
and Schmitt's "border-situation" (Grenzfall), in that all three assume that the normal or 
the average does not unlock the truth of phenomena. 306 Wiesenthal' s reference to 
Schmitt's Political-Theology is helpful for elucidating what Benjamin has in mind. 
Schmitt explains: 
The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the 
exception proves everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, 
which derives only from the exception. In the exception the power of real life 
breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition. 307 
304 
"Durch ihre Vermittlerrolle leihen die Begriffe den Phanomenen Anteil am Sein der 
!dee. Und eben diese Vermittlerrolle mach sie tauglich zu der anderen, gleich 
ursprunglichen Aufgabe der Philosophie, zur Darstellung der Ideen. Indem die Rettung 
der Phanomene vermittels der Ideensich vollzieht, vollzeiht sich die Darstellung der 
Ideen mit Mittel der Empirie. Denn nicht an sich selbst, sondern einzig und allein in 
einer Zuordnung dinglicher Elemente im Begriff stellen die Ideen sich dar." 
305 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 12 - 13. 
306 Ibid., 17, 149. 
307 Carl Schmitt, Political-Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. 
George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 15. 
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Schmitt's explanation also bears on the role of the experiment. The experiment 
functions by creating a highly artificial environment, an "exception" as it were, where 
extraneous causes are minimized to permit the real causal factors to shine forth more 
brightly. That is, the experiment is an extreme situation, the theoretical vacuum which is 
a presupposition in many physics calculations for example, and which would rarely, if 
ever, occur in nature. It is created precisely so that nature herself is revealed. As if citing 
Schmitt, Benjamin notes that, "those elements which it is the function of the concept to 
elicit from phenomena are most clearly evident at the extremes" (Tragic Drama, 35; GSJ, 
215.)308 "The empirical[ ... ] can be all the more profoundly understood the more clearly 
it is seen as an extreme" (Tragic Drama, 35; GSJ, 215.)309 It is in this sense that 
Benjamin understands the work of art as an experiment, an experiment as the extreme 
case meant to illuminate, that is rescue an aspect of truth. 310 
Another relation between the extreme and the idea is noted by Broker, who 
suggests that Benjamin regards works of art (and in a related context, philosophical 
systems) as pictorial representations of the ideas. 311 Broker's comments are helpful in 
illuminating the utopic dimension of Benjamin's aesthetic theory. In as much as 
Benjamin believes the recognition of truth can actually be provoked, it is in the encounter 
with true works of art. Broker's and Wiesenthal's insights also help shed light on the 
308 The full German sentence reads: "Und zwar liegen Jene Elemente, deren Auflosung 
aus den Phanomenen Aufgabe des Begriffes ist, in den Extremen am genauesten zutage." 
309 
"Das Empirische dagegen wird um so tiefer durchdrungen, je genauer es als ein 
Extremes eingesehen werden kann." 
310 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 13. 
311 Brocker, Die Grundlosigkeit der Wahrheit, 213. 
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seemingly curious and disparate themes that occupied Benjamin throughout his life: 
Baroque drama, the gambler, the collector, museums, trash, children's toys. These are 
threshold phenomena, which, because of their marginal character, their dwelling on the 
extreme, on the periphery of the social reveal an essence, a truth about the social that 
would otherwise remain hidden. 
Wiesenthal completes the circle of inquiry with respect to the methodological 
importance of rescue when she also notes that Benjamin's notion of the extreme could be 
seen as essentially synonymous with Cohen's notion of origin.312 Cohen, as she explains, 
always insisted that origin has nothing to do with genesis. While genesis is a temporal 
category, origin is a logical one. 313 It may not be surprising on this point, to note that 
Cohen's notion is actually inherited from the N eoplatonists. As Remes explains, origin 
for the Neoplatonists: 
[ ... ] happens by the necessity of the nature of the supreme cause and every cause 
following after it. The terminology of 'before,' 'after,' and 'sequence' is 
metaphorical; it is used to describe the metaphysical order of priority and 
posteriority, and hence not a production that would happen in temporal 
sequence. "314 
Similarly, Benjamin notes: 
Origin [Ursprung] although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, 
nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to describe 
312 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 22. 
313 Ibid., 25. 
314 Pauliina Remes, Neoplatonism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 46. 
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the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that 
which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. (Tragic Drama, 
45; GSJ, 226)315 
Wiesenthal suggests that here Benjamin transposes origin from the domain of logic to that 
ofhistory.316 Her suggestion seems supported by Benjamin when he writes, "The 
category of origin is not therefore, as Cohen holds, a purely logical one, but a historical 
one" (Tragic Drama, 46; GSJ, 226.)317 However, I suggest, that Benjamin does not 
intend to dismiss the logical side, when this concept is viewed in the context of his 
method. In his work, the notion of origin retains the logical status bequeathed by Cohen 
and the Neoplatonists, which is not, however, to deny its historical dimension. A brief 
analogy with Kant's idealism may be instructive here. In Kant's work, the transcendental 
subject is a-historical. However, Benjamin, like Adorno would suggest that the subject 
must be seen as being historically constructed. 318 This point is clearly articulated by 
Horkheimer when he notes that, "[ ... ] materialism, unlike idealism, always understands 
thinking to be the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time. It 
challenges every claim to the autonomy of thought. "319 Granting the historicity of the 
315 
"Ursprung, wiewohl durchaus historische Kategorie, hat mit Entstehung dennoch 
nichts gemein. Im Ursprung wird kein Werden des Entsprungenen, vielmehr dem Werden 
und Verge hen Entspringendes gemeint." 
316 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 25. 
317 
"Die Kategorie des Ursprungs ist also nicht, wie Cohen meint, eine reine logische, 
sondern historisch." 
318 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "Subject and Object," 500. 
319 Horkheimer, "Materialism and Metaphysics," in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, 
trans. Matthew J. 0' Connell and others (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 
2002), 34. 
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subject, does not, necessarily invalidate the notion of a transcendental subject, which 
remains transcendent for individual subjectivity. Similarly, the notion of origin can 
contain both a logical and historical moment, with the logical dimension being more 
relevant in terms of theorizing Benjamin's method in the abstract. 
The origin discovered in the experiment is the moment of recognition. This is not 
something that occurs before the experiment, but is that principle in the experiment which 
makes the essence of the phenomenal visible. Essence shines forth as origin within, not 
prior, to phenomena. As Benjamin again notes: 
Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the 
material involved in the process of genesis. That which is original is never revealed 
in the naked and manifest existence of the factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a 
dual insight. On the one hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration 
and reestablishment, but, on the other, and precisely because of this, as something 
imperfect and incomplete. (Tragic Drama, 45; GSJ, 226)320 
Interestingly, Benjamin's reliance on the theory ofrescue is structurally similar to 
the method Marx employs in Capital. I take this relationship to indicate that Benjamin is 
in some senses more of a Marxian theorist than some of his readers have been willing to 
320 
"Der Ursprung steht im Fluj3 des Werdens als Strudel und reij3t in seine Rhythmik das 
Entstehungsmaterial hinein. Im nackten offenkundigen Bestand des Faktischen gibt das 
Ursprungliche sich niemals zu erkennen und einzig einer Doppeleinsicht steht seine 
Rythmik offen. Sie will als Restauration, als Wiederherstellung einerseits, als eben darin 
Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes andererseits erkannt sein." 
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admit. 321 In the second half of the twentieth century, a group of Japanese political 
economists, foremost among them Kozo Uno and Thomas T. Seikin, founding members 
of what would later be called the "Uno School," noted that Marx theorized the concept 
"Capital" at three different "levels of abstraction": The "highest level" is Capital in its 
"pure" or abstracted form. The "middle level" is Capital as partly determined by counter-
tendencies. The "lowest level," is Capital as it actually exists in the concrete historical. 
The pure instantiation of Capital is how a theorist might imagine Capital, if the 
phenomenon could incarnate itself without having to conform to nor integrate any actual 
historical resistance. The pure level of Capital is Capital as Capital and nothing more. 
This pure form of Capital is what Marx develops in the commodity fetishism chapter of 
Volume One. 
At the other end of the spectrum of abstraction is the concept of Capital in its 
concrete instantiation. Here Capital confronts counter-tendencies, which may be alien to 
the logic of the concept, and which can prevent Capital from expressing its inner logic. 
When in Chapter Ten of the first volume, the "Working Day," Marx discusses the moral 
outrage over the mortality-rate of child labourers, he is theorizing the concept of Capital 
in a more concrete instantiation. Whereas there is no necessary internal contradiction in 
the concept of employing child labour, resistance from certain cultural and historical 
forces is registered by real workers, owners, and other actually existing members of 
society. The Uno-school adds a middle level between the pure form and the concrete 
321 See for example, T. J. Clark, "Should Benjamin have Read Marx?" boundary 2 30, no. 
1 (2003): 31-49. 
form of Capital, in which a certain amount of counter-tendencies and a certain 
amount of Capital-as-Capital comingle. 
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The pure form of Capital never actually exists in the concrete historical. However, 
the Uno-school maintains that a pure form needs to be established as a "useful fiction"; to 
allow Capital to be glimpsed in the concrete-historical. The strategy is to theorize how 
Capital would exist without any actual historical counter-tendencies in order to "see" the 
force of Capital when "contaminated" by elements of the social that can be deemed 
extraneous to the concept. The supposition that an abstract notion of Capital needs to be 
developed and posited so that the chaos of the manifold can be interpreted, structurally 
resembles the theory of rescue. 
Merleau-Ponty notes that at least on this question, Weber sees affinities between his 
own method of constructing "ideal types," and what the Uno-school later theorized as 
Marx's method in his economic works. Merleau-Ponty quotes Weber, who writes that 
Marxism is, "the most important instance of the construction of ideal types [ .... ]"322 
While on the question of reading Benjamin on religion, I have been lobbying for a 
paradigmatic shift away from Weber and towards Durkheim, methodologically, there are 
noteworthy structural affinities among Weber's construction of ideal types, Marx's 
method of abstract concept creation, and Benjamin's theory of the rescue of phenomena. 
All three posit that an essence in the manifold must be hypothesized in order to be "seen." 
Whereas for Marx and Weber, this method remains confined to the scope of social 
scientific inquiry, Benjamin suggests rescue as an epistemic model for the encounter with 
322 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, 25. 
the manifold as such. To discern the logic of Benjamin's suggestion that the theory 
of rescue is also descriptive of a phenomenological encounter, we must tum to his 
philosophy of language. 
II - A Return to Eden: From Rescue to Language, From Plato to Adam 
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Although many readers agree with Rochlitz who maintains that "Any effort to 
understand" Benjamin's "thought must begin with" "On Language as Such,"323 I follow 
Cayghill, who argues that this essay is best understood as a transitional work. Unlike 
Cayghill, however, who suggests that the centrality of language in Benjamin's thought is 
a misreading that should be replaced by the notion of colour, I, like Rochlitz, Scholem 
and many others, adhere to the thesis that language comprises a fundamental dimension 
of his philosophy. However, I do not believe that "On Language" represents the mature 
form of his theory. The essay does contain valuable insights, and suggestively points 
towards themes developed later in his oeuvre. "On Language," as I will use it, is helpful 
to determine more fully how the concepts of name, idea, God, truth, theology and 
revelation relate to each other and to the notion of rescue as theorized in the Tragic 
Drama, for example. However, I do not believe that the details of the arguments 
presented in "On Language" can be brought into accord with Benjamin's later theory, and 
where there is a conflict, I tend to side with the arguments found in his later texts. One 
example of Benjamin's still inchoate state of thought can be seen with respect to his 
theory of allegory, which is developed in opposition to 18th and 19th century aesthetic 
323 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 14. 
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theories of the symbol, is not yet fully articulated in "On Language," and as such, 
there is a certain looseness in his vocabulary that conflicts with later formulations. The 
language essay was written when Benjamin was only twenty-four years old, and it 
manifests all the oedipal hubris of a young scholar challenging the philosophical fathers 
of his tradition. Its bold pronouncements, like those in "On the Coming Philosophy," are 
forceful and blunt, but often simultaneously cryptic. I am tempted to agree with Derrida 
who complained that Benjamin's language essay is "overly enigmatic."324 
Benjamin begins "On Language" by suggesting that what linguistic theory defines 
as language is actually only a subset of actual language. "Every expression of human 
mental life," writes Benjamin: 
can be understood as a kind of language, and this understanding, in the manner of a 
true method, everywhere raises new questions. It is possible to talk about a 
language of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has nothing 
directly to do with those in 'Yhich German or English legal judgments are couched, 
about a language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians. 
Language in such contexts means the tendency inherent in the subjects concerned-
technology, art, justice, or religion - toward the communication of the contents of 
mind. To sum up: all communication of the contents of the mind is language, 
324 Jacques Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2007), 200. 
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communication in words being only a particular case of human language and of 
justice, poetry, or whatever underlying or founded on it. (SW 1, 62; GS2, 140)325 
It is necessary briefly to dwell on a problem with the English translation that will 
prove to have consequences for the remaining discussion. The English translators of 
Benjamin's Selected Writings have chosen to render the German "Geistiges Wesen" as 
"mental being." This choice echoes Edmund Jephcott's formulations in Reflections, in 
which he variously translates Geistiges Wesen as "mental meaning," "mental entity," or 
"mental being."326 The multiplicity of meanings of the German concept Geist is 
notoriously difficult express in English. No single English concept comes close to 
covering the same conceptual territory as does the German Geist. The translators are 
certainly correct that in some contexts "mental" is an adequate choice. Precedence for 
this choice can be found, for example, in the first English translations of Hegel's 
Phenomenology (of Mind.) However, the term "mental" places too great an emphasis on 
the cognitive or the psychological, while suppressing the German concept's other 
meanings. Geist can also refer to "spirit," "specter," "ghost," "consciousness," "psyche," 
325 
"Jede AujJerung menschlichen Geisteslebens kann als eine Art der Sprache aufgefafJt 
werden, und diese Aujfassung erschliefJt nach Art einer wahrhaften Methode uberall neue 
Fragestellungen. Man kann von einer Sprache der Musik und der Plastik reden, von 
einer Sprache der Justiz, die nichts mit denjenigen, in denen deutsche order englische 
Rechtsspruche abgefafJt sind, unmittelbar zu tun hat, von einer Sprache der Technik, die 
nicht die Fachsprache der Techniker ist. Sprache bedeutet in so/chem Zusammenhang 
das auf Mitteilung geistiger lnhalte gerichtete Prinzip in den betreffenden Gegenstanden: 
in Technik, Kunst, Justiz oder Religion. 1\.fit einem Wort: jede Mittei/ung geistiger 
lnhalte ist Sprache, wobei die A1itteilung durch das Wort nur ein besonderer Fall, der der 
mensch/ichen und der ihr zugrunde /iegenden oder auf ihr fundierten (Justiz, Poesie), 
ist." 
326 See for example, Walter Benjamin, Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 314. 
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"nous," and "intellect," to name the most common. Later translators of Hegel's 
Phenomenology chose "Spirit" in order to cope with the ambiguity of the German 
concept. The connection to Hegel's Phenomenology is not only philological, since 
following Adorno, Cayghill, and others, I maintain that there exists a certain 
phenomenological moment in Benjamin's philosophy, especially apparent in his 
philosophy of language, which is somewhat masked by the English translation. This 
phenomenological moment in his philosophy of language addresses a similar concern, 
regarding the incommunicability of the given, that Hegel discusses in his 
Phenomenology. However, this phenomenological moment is less visible in the English 
translations, where the need to reduce the ambiguity of Geist also reduces the interpretive 
breadth that the German concept allows. For example, translating"[ ... ] das geistige 
Wesen der Lampe[ ... ]" (GS2, 142) as"[ ... ] the mental entity of the Lamp[ ... ]" (SWJ, 
63) suggests an overly psychological reading that is not in the German implied with the 
same intensity. The German permits a phenomenological reading in which the lamp 
appears to being in the manner in which "language" is "spirit" appearing to "spirit," to 
loosely paraphrase Hegel. In order to maintain the openness and multivalent reference of 
the German concept, I have chosen to leave Geist un-translated in the following sections. 
As already indicated, Benjamin suggests that language is more than the 
articulation of signs referring to signifiers. 327 Such an interpretation would limit the 
327 See Brocker, "Sprache," 743: "Eine Sprache, die dem handlungstheoretischen 
Konzept Benjamins entsprechend unmittelbare Wirkung entfalten konnte, entzieht sich 
zwangsliiufig der elementaren Subjekt-Priidikat-Relation. Dies bedeutet zuniichst, daft 
Benjamin die Auffassung von Sprache als Zeichensystem zuruckweisen muft." My 
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faculty oflanguage to human beings. Structurally, Benjamin's critique echoes his 
critique of the Kantian two-world theory. For him, reality is not composed of atomistic 
objects that are then given referents by human beings in the sense of attributing ideal 
designators to objects in the world. 328 Instead, for Benjamin everything has a language. 
A lamp has a lamp language, a flower a flower language. It might even be more accurate 
to say that everything is language. All communication of the contents of Geist, Benjamin 
claims, is language. Reading this passage in conjunction with the Tragic Drama quote 
cited earlier, helps to elucidate Benjamin's expanded category oflanguage. If "names 
determine the manner in which ideas are given," (Tragic Drama, 36; SWJ, 216)329 and if 
"The name in the realm of language, has as its sole purpose and its incomparably high 
meaning that it is the innermost nature of language itself," (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144)330 if, 
indeed, "The name is that through which, and in which language communicates itself 
absolutely," (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144)331 and further, if ideas-as-names are not given in an Ur-
language, but in a "primordial form" of perception, a perception in which ideas-as-names 
are "unimpaired by cognitive meaning," then, what Benjamin terms language, is really 
closer to what might be called, mutatis mutandis, a phenomenology of encounter. His 
translation: "In order to unfold its immanent power, a language [Sprache] that 
corresponds to Benjamin's theoretical notion necessarily withdraws itself from an 
elementary subject-predicate relation. This means, first and foremost, that Benjamin must 
reject a notion of language as a system of signs." 
328 Broker, "Sprache," 749. 
329 
"Das al/er Phanomenalitat entriickte Sein, dem allein diese Gewalt eignet, ist das des 
Namens. Es bestimmt die Gegebenheit der Ideen. " 
330 
"Der Name hat im Bereich der Sprache einzig diesen Sinn und diese unvergleichlich 
hohe Bedeutung: daf3 er das innerste Wesen der !':,prache selbst ist." 
331 
"Der Name ist dasjenige, <lurch das sich nichts mehr, und in dem die Sprache selbst 
und absolut sich mitteilt." 
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philosophy of language seems to be a theory of the experiential encounter with the 
manifold at the level of a "primordial" perception. 
Thinking of language as a primordial encounter beyond the realm of cognitive 
meaning can help make sense of some of the more enigmatic statements in "On 
Language," such as, "All nature, insofar as it communicates itself, communicates itself in 
language and so finally in man" (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144.)332 That is, if human subjectivity is 
conceived as a medium along Hegelian lines, which Benjamin's texts on language seem 
to imply, a medium in which, not through which, language takes place, then all nature 
communicates itself to subjectivity in its state of being a Ding-an-sich and can be 
"named," that is encountered in its actuality. Benjamin's conception oflanguage "knows 
no means, no object, and no addressee of communication" (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144.)333 For 
Benjamin, ideas-as-names are the grammar and syntax of a phenomenology of 
expenence. 
Naming, however, does not encompass the encounter with the manifold as such, 
but is descriptive of a potential encounter, perhaps only an ideal encounter. To name is to 
stand in a correct relationship to truth. It is to be right with God. For Benjamin, the 
model of his notion of language as phenomenological encounter is found in the two 
creation stories of Genesis. "In a sense," writes Rochlitz, "the biblical text plays a role 
analogous to tragic texts and pre-Socratic thought in Nietzsche's philosophy: It is a 
332 
"Aile Natur, sofern sie sich mitteilt, teilt sich in der Sprache mit, also letzten Endes im 
Menschen." 
333 
"[ ... ] keinen Gegenstand und keinen Adressaten der Mitteilung." 
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primitive wisdom lost by modemity."334 Although Benjamin values the Bible as a 
source of Ur-wisdom, this does not mean that he reads Genesis as a pious biblical 
exegete. Benjamin reads Genesis as a philosopher, that is, gnoseologically. "If in what 
follows," he notes in "On Language,": 
the nature of language is considered on the basis of the first chapter of Genesis, the 
object is neither biblical interpretation nor subjection of the Bible to objective 
consideration as revealed truth, but the discovery of what emerges of itself from the 
biblical text with regards to the nature of language and the Bible is only initially 
indispensable for this purpose because the present argument broadly follows it in 
presupposing language as an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its manifestation, 
inexplicable and mystical (SWJ, 67; GS2, 147.)335 
God's act of creation through the word, and later Adam's act of naming are suggestive of 
how language can be conceived beyond sign-signifier relation. Taking the biblical 
creation stories as his model for a non-referential, indeed, a non-"linguistic" theory of 
language, has exegetical precedence. In his gloss on the first creation story Augustine 
asks, "But how did you [God] speak?"336 Augustine's answer to his own query is that, 
334 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 17. 
335 
"Wenn imfolgenden das Wesen der Sprache au/Grund der ersten Genesiskapitel 
betrachtet wird, so soil damit weder Bibelinterpretation als Zweck verfolgt noch auch die 
Bibel an dieser Stelle objektiv als ojfenbarte Wahrheit dem Nachdenken zugrunde gelegt 
werden, sondern das, was aus dem Bibeltext in Ansehung der Natur der Sprache selbst 
sich ergibt, soil aufgefunden werden; und die Bibel ist zunachst in dieser Absicht nur 
darum unersetzlich, weil diese Ausfuhrungen im Prinzipiellen ihr darin fol gen, daft in 
ihnen die Sprache als se,ine letzte, nur in ihrer Entfaltung zu betrachtende, unerkltirliche 
und mystische Wirklichkeit vorausgesetzt wird." 
336 Augustine, Confessions, 258. 
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"For your Word is not speech in which each part comes to an end when it has been 
spoken, giving place to the next, so that finally the whole may be uttered" (emphasis 
added.)337 For Augustine, God's language, let us call it the language of truth, is not a 
language according to Benjamin's description of "bourgeois" theory. God, in the first 
creation story, models the real purpose of language, which is not to describe, but to 
create. God's language is both creative and finished creation at once. 
In biblical exegeses, it has been suggested that the two creation stories, far from 
being contradictory accounts that a pious but essentially ignorant redactor mistakenly 
glued together as, for example, Nietzsche suggests, but rather already encapsulate the 
fundamental relationship that is the core theme of biblical literature: the relationship 
between God and humanity. In this reading, the first creation story is narrated from a 
"cosmo-centric" perspective, while the second represents creation from an 
anthropocentric (perhaps more accurately, androcentric) perspective. If God-as-truth 
represents the abstract determination of language as creative, it is Adam who represents 
the ideal oflanguage in its human dimension. As Benjamin notes, God's creation 
remains incomplete until "things receive their names from man, from whom in name 
language alone speaks" (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144.)338 For Benjamin, it is Adam, more so than 
Plato who is "the father of philosophy" (Tragic Drama, 37; GS2, 217,)339 since Adam is 
the model for humanity living in the presence of truth. "The task of philosophy," 
337 Ibid., 259. 
338 
"Gottes Schopfung vollendet sich, indem die Dinge ihren Namen vom Menschen 
erhalten, aus dem im Namen die Sprache allein spricht." 
339 The full German sentence reads: "In solcher Ha/tung aber steht zuletzt nicht Platon, 
sondern Adam, der Vater der Menschen als Vater der Philosophie, da." 
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Benjamin wrote Rang, "is to name the idea as Adam named nature[ ... ]" (SWJ, 389.) 
Adam, "in whom language itself speaks," is the being in whom the encounter with the 
manifold takes place in paradise, that is, it is divine, which is to say that it is true. 
Adam's act of naming means that he "sees," he comprehends the essence of the manifold. 
Essence, it will be recalled, however, is not in the object alone, but is constituted 
relationally with the subject. Rochlitz makes the connection to rescue explicit: 
Just as man in general saves things that are in themselves mute by naming them and 
thus includes them in Creation, the philosopher, as Benjamin conceives it, has the 
task of saving the mental being [Geist] of art and poetry by stripping away their 
thingness and bringing them back to the bosom of pure language. 340 
Benjamin's theory of language as a phenomenological encounter is in stark 
contrast to what he derides as "bourgeois" linguistic theory. His critique of "bourgeois" 
linguistics is simultaneously a critique of positivism and of the methods that inform 
analytic and positivist social theory more generally. A "bourgeois," theory of language 
"holds that the means of communication is the word, its object factual, and its addressee a 
human being" (SWJ, 65; GS2, 144.)341 The contrast between actual and bourgeois 
theories of language is elaborated in the essay by recounting the second creation story, 
which ends with the banishment of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. Eden, as 
Benjamin describes it, is a place in which the essence of the manifold is immediately 
accessible. "Adam's action of naming things is so far removed from play or caprice that 
340 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 14. 
341 
"[ ••. ]die burgerliche Auffassung der Sprache, [ ... ] besagt: Das Mittel der Mitteilung 
ist das Wort, ihr Gegenstand die Sache, ihr Adressat ein Mensch." 
209 
it actually confirms the state of paradise as a state in which there is no need to 
struggle with the communicative significance of words" (Tragic Drama, 37; GSJ, 216.)342 
"Satan,"343 who is here the stand-in for the bourgeoisie, tempts Adam and Eve with the 
fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. This tree can be regarded as a merism for 
all knowledge. Knowledge, as we recall from the previous chapter, is in its essence 
alienated from truth. That is, Satan extends the promise of analytic communicative 
language, based on distinction and judgment, the very type of language and knowledge 
which a rigorous monotheism must disallow with respect to "knowing," or "speaking of' 
God. With respect to knowledge, Benjamin suggests that "There is no evil in the world. 
It arises in man himself, with the desire for knowledge, or rather judgment" (Tragic 
Drama, 233; GSJ, 407.)344 Knowledge is possession. It differs radically from the 
structure of truth, which, because it is infinite, cannot be possessed. The elements of truth 
receive their own unique names, as Adam named the beasts. The name is that "linguistic" 
category which approximates the infinite nature of truth by being utterly unique. "[ ... ] 
the proper name is the word of God in human sounds" (SWJ, 69; GS2, 150.)345 Whereas 
the "word" of post-lapsarian speech, which is fallen language, imperfect language, 
bourgeois communicative language, always falls short of being able to articulate the 
342 
"Das adamistische Namengeben ist so weit entfernt Spiel and Willkur zu sein, daft 
vielmehr gerade in ihm der paradiesische Stand sich als solcher bestatigt, der mit der 
mitteilenden Bedeutung der Worte noch nicht zu ringen hatte." 
343 A re-reading of Genesis will show that the tempter is not in fact referred to as the 
devil, or Satan, but rather as the "shrewdest of all animals." 
344 
"Dies [ das Bose] ist nicht in der Welt. Es setzt sich mit der Lust am Wissen erst, 
vielmehr am Urteil, in dem Menschen selber." 
345 
"[ ... ] denn der Eigenname ist Wort Gottes in menschlichen Lauten." 
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infinity of a phenomenological encounter. In Benjamin's distinction between name 
and a post-lapsarian word there seems an instructive foreshadowing of Levinas' notion of 
the face. 
The essential problem with post-lapsarian language is noted by Peter Szondi, who 
writes: 
Benjamin seems to have shared Proust's view that the enumeration of objects in a 
description can never lead to truth and that truth first appears at the moment when 
the author takes two different objects and reveals their essence by linking them in a 
metaphor based on a common property. 346 
The Proustian critique that descriptive language cannot articulate the essence of an 
experiential encounter is already theorized in Hegel's Phenomenology, with which 
Benjamin's theory of divine and fallen language shares noteworthy correspondences. In 
the first section of the Phenomenology, Hegel demonstrates that naive consciousness -
one may be tempted to call it positivist, "bourgeois," or perhaps even "Satanic" 
consciousness - experiences a continuous negation when it attempts to express the self-
evident given-ness of the content of its encounter with the manifold. Like dry sand grains 
slipping through a fist desperately trying to hold on to them, Hegel shows that naive 
consciousness discovers it can never actually name the very given-ness that is the essence 
of its encounter. As he explains: 
346 Peter Szondi, "Walter Benjamin's City Portraits," in On Walter Benjamin: Critical 
Essays and Recollections, ed. Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 28. 
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The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this Here which, in 
fact, is not this Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and 
Left. The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc. 
The Here, which was supposed to have been pointed out, vanishes in other Heres, 
but these likewise vanish. What is pointed out, held fast, and abides, is a negative 
This, which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they should be, but, in 
being so taken, they supersede themselves; what abides is a simple complex of 
many Heres. The Here that is meant would be the point; but it is not: on the 
contrary, when it is pointed out as something that is, the pointing-out shows itself to 
be not an immediate knowing [of the point], but a movement from the Here that is 
meant through many Heres into the universal Here which is a simple plurality of 
Heres, just as the day is a simple plurality ofNows.347 
The words of a fallen humanity are words that cannot reach what they attempt to name. 
"[ ... ] the thing in itself has no word, being created from God's word and known in its 
name by the human word" (SWJ, 69; GS2, 150.)348 
There is an important distinction, however, between "God's word," "Adam's 
name," and the post-lapsarian word of the bourgeoisie. The name is given in the 
primordial perception, not in the snake's "language" of signs. The human word in its 
perfection, that is, in an ideal speech situation, to reformulate a Habermasian phrase, is 
Adam's ability to name, which does not take place at the verbal level, but is perceptual. 
347 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 64; (108.) 
348 
"[ ... ]die Sache an sich kein Wort hat, geschajfen ist sie aus Gottes Wort und erkannt 
in ihrem Namen nach dem Menschenwort." 
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His ability to name is no longer accessible "after" the introduction of knowledge-
oriented communication. Any attempt to name the essence of an encounter devolves into 
an endless description, where the object recedes as if in equal proportion to the number of 
adjectives appended to it. It remains an act of violence, which always end in failure. 
"The tree of knowledge did not stand in the garden of God in order to dispense 
information on good and evil but as an emblem of judgment over the questioner" (SWJ, 
72; GS2, 154.)349 Words of fallen humanity are inscribed within the domain of 
knowledge. For Benjamin, the inability of post-lapsarian language to approach truth is 
the basis for turning away from language understood in terms of "bourgeois" linguistics, 
where signs dominate the particularity of that which they signify.350 Benjamin turns 
instead to a relational model of philosophic representation, the template of which is given 
by the figure of the translator, art critic, philosopher-theologian, and biblical exegete. It is 
Hamann who provides for Benjamin the general trajectory for a theory of language and 
translation as related to the divine, when he writes that, 
To speak is to translate - from an angelic language into a human language that is, to 
translate thoughts into words - things into names - images into signs, which can be 
poetic or curiological, historic or symbolic or hieroglyphic - and philosophical or 
characteristic. 351 
349 
"Der Baum der Erkenntnis stand nicht wegen der Aufsch!Usse uber Gut und Bose, die 
er zu geben vermocht hatte, im Garten Gottes, sondern als Wahrzeichen des Gerichts 
iiber den Fragenden. 
350 See, Origen, "On First Principles," 204: "Therefore, everyone who is concerned with 
truth should be little concerned with names and words[ .... ]" 
351 Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, 66. 
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Benjamin's theory of art criticism helps shed light on his notion of translation as a 
method suited to engaging reality understood as structured by internal relations. De Man 
notes: 
The translation canonizes, freezes, an original and shows in the original a mobility, 
an instability, which at first one did not notice. The act of critical, theoretical 
reading performed by a critic like Friedrich Schlegel and performed by literary 
theory in general - by means of which the original work is not imitated or 
reproduced but is to some extent put in motion, de-canonized, questioned in a way 
which undoes its claim to canonical authority - is similar to what a translator 
performs. 352 
Benjamin's notion of a relational structure of truth echoes Schlegel's aesthetic theory, in 
which a work of art is thought to call out for its own critique. For Benjamin as for 
Schlegel, truth emerges in the relationship between two or more elements, specifically 
between a human subject and the object observed: art, history, politics, the social. The 
notion of "observe" in this context is perhaps too passive. For the dialectic to produce a 
constellation of truth, the work of art is not simply observed but critiqued. In Lutz R. 
Koepnick's description of Benjamin's notion of critique, we can hear echoes of the 
destructive role of the concept broached in Chapter Two. Koepnick explains, "the critic 
has to destroy the artwork's appearance if he or she desires access to its inner truth 
content; criticism entails the art of mortifying the work and its mythic totality, its appeal 
352 Paul De Man, '"Conclusions' Walter Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator' 
Messenger Lecture, Cornell University, March 4, 1983," Yale French Studies 69 (1985): 
35. 
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to beauty, in order to unearth the kernel of truth that is hidden underneath the work's 
material content."353 Wiesenthal suggests that Benjamin's notion of critique can also be 
understood in Kantian terms, as the reconstruction of the realm of ideas, which, she 
argues, he equates with the perfection inherent in the notion of creation in Genesis. The 
task of science (Wissenscha.ft) and philosophy is to re-establish the "eternal" perfection 
always already present within creation. 354 Here the notion of mystic and critic converge. 
As Rochlitz observes, "Criticism and translation are messianic functions in the process of 
history; they work to restore the purity of the name. "355 That is, much like the Kabbalist 
who is charged with restoring the shattered vessels of God's creation (tikkum olam), the 
critic attempts to restore the original unity in the realm of ideas that reflect eternal 
perfection. This messianic task is accomplished through the work of critique, which has a 
similar structure to translation and biblical commentary. 
Benjamin's theory of a philosophical method based on a relational ontology, for 
which translation is a paradigmatic model, is also formulated in the aforementioned 
distinction between symbol and allegory. Lukacs suggests the idea of translatability of 
Benjamin's distinction beyond the realm of aesthetic theory, when he writes that, 
"Benjamin's study[ ... ] starts from the idea that allegory and symbol express 
fundamentally divergent human responses to reality."356 For Benjamin, the symbol 
353 Lutz P. Koepnick, "The Spectacle, the Trauerspiel, and the Politics of Resolution: 
Benjamin Reading the Baroque Reading Weimar," Critical Inquiry 22, no. 2 (1996): 274. 
354 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 4 7 - 5 5. 
355 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 28. 
356 Georg Lukacs, "On Walter Benjamin," New Le.ft Review 1, no. 110 (July-August 
1978): 86. 
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gestures towards totality. It is a closed system, in which the signifier dominates the 
particularity of the signified. As Adorno argues, the total subsumption of the particular 
under the universal is an act of violence, that is, the particularity of the particular is 
destroyed in the movement of the symbol. This is also the movement of post-lapsarian 
speech, which according to bourgeois linguistic theory is taken to be the essence of 
language. 
As Szondi suggests, the allegorical, by contrast, opens up a space of uncertainty 
and plurality. In an allegorical reading, there is no one final answer, but rather an 
interplay between often mutually irreconcilable interpretations. "With every idea the 
moment of expression coincides with a veritable eruption of images, which gives rise to a 
chaotic mass of metaphors" (Tragic Drama, 173; GSJ, 349.)357 This situation leads to a 
semiotic freefall, in which, "Any person, any object, any relationship," writes Benjamin 
of allegory during the Baroque, "can mean absolutely anything else" (Tragic Drama, 175; 
GSJ, 351.)358 Benjamin traces the open-endedness of allegory to the fact that Baroque 
artists, especially painters and dramatists, tended to draw tropes from two culturally 
distinct semiotic sources, Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian. As a result, signification 
was equivocal, open-ended, and thus, in need of interpretation, since a given "sign" seen 
in the context of a Greco-Roman interpretive schema might mean something radically 
different, when viewed from a Judeo-Christian perspective. An example is the depiction 
357 
"Fur }eden Einfall trifft der Augenblick des Ausdrucks zusammen mit einer wahren 
Bilderuption, als deren Niederschlag die Menge der Metaphern chaotisch ausgestreut 
lie gt." 
358 
"Jede Person, jedwedes Ding, jedes Verhaltnis kann ein beliebiges anderes bedeuten." 
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of musical instruments in early modem European graphic art. While a certain 
instrument, such as the lute, might be the synecdoche for a given Greco-Roman hero or 
god - one might think of Orpheus or Pan in this regard - in the medieval and early 
modem Christian traditions, instruments tended to be equated with sin, with earthly 
frivolity and, therefore, with the devil. In Hieronymous Bosch's "Garden of Earthly 
Delights,"359 for example, hell is strewn with lutes and lyres. However, when the 
interpretive register of the painting is not as obvious as in the "Garden of Earthly 
Delights," the referent of the sign is in doubt. The interpretation cannot be final. An 
original work of art always invites a reinterpretation that could be diametrically opposed 
to the first. Allegory, then, suggests the manner in which the real is to be theorized. 
Elements of the social text are not fully determined signs that necessarily relate to certain 
sets of signification, but require constant re-reading and re-interpretation. 
Benjamin hints at the relationship between allegory and the theory of rescue, 
which is, like translation and biblical commentary, the template for his philosophical 
method. "[A ]n appreciation of the transience of things, and the concern to rescue them 
for eternity, is one of the strongest impulses in allegory" (Tragic Drama, 223; GSJ, 
397.)360 The open-endedness of allegory also sheds light on the status of the essence of 
the phenomenal which is to be rescued. The allegorical intention is "dialectical in 
character" (Tragic Drama, 166;GSJ, 342.)361 Levinas' suggestion that essence is 
359 Hieronymus Bosch, The Garden of Earthly Delights, EI Prado Museum. 
360 
"!st doch die Einsicht ins Vergiingliche der Dinge und Jene Sorge, sie ins Ewige zu 
retten, im Allegorischen eins der stiirksten Motive." 
361 
"[ ... ]Intention dialektischer Art." 
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determined by interest is instructive here.362 That is to say, in Benjamin's work, the 
essence of the manifold is not some ontological entity existing independently of the 
subject that, like in positivism, simply needs to be uncovered. Rather, subjectivity co-
determines what shines forth as essence. For example, Marx's interest lay in uncovering 
the hidden structures of Capital. It was this interest that determined what was brought 
into the foreground and what could be de-emphasized and left in the background. For 
Weber, by contrast, whose interest lay in exposing the ideational vectors that helped pave 
the way for Capital to take hold, the constellation of essences was quite different. The 
emphasis on essence in the discussion of Benjamin's method should not be taken to mean 
that he engages in a certain fundamental ontology, but rather that the truth of philosophy 
exists somewhere "in-between" the objective and subjective dimensions. "[To] some 
degree," writes Benjamin in a related context, "all great texts contain their potential 
translation between the lines; this is true above all of sacred writings. The interlinear 
version of the Scriptures is the prototype or ideal of all translation" (SWJ, 263; GS4, 
21. )363 This ideal of translation is also Benjamin's ideal for a method of reading the 
social as such. Since he argues that narrative, symbol and "sign"-language (that is, 
"bourgeois" referential language) determine one essence while excluding all others, that 
is, they foreground one set of interests while suppressing the rest, these modes of 
theorizing are as much tools for domination as they are modes of encountering the real. 
362 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being: or, Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 4. 
363 
"Denn in irgendeinem Grade enthalten alle groften Schriften, im hochsten aber die 
heiligen, zwischen den Zeilen ihre virtue/le 0-bersetzung. Die Jnterlinearversion des 
heiligen Text es ist das Urbild oder Ideal all er 0-bersetzung." 
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Like the symbol, and like post-lapsarian speech in general, narratives tend to 
dominate the particularity of the object in such a manner that the multiplicity of 
interpretations are occluded. Benjamin argues this point with respect to historical 
narratives which tend to be the stories of victors while those sacrificed on the "slaughter 
bench of history" rarely have their experiences included in the victor's canon. A certain 
nuance is required here to understand what Benjamin has in mind. He is certainly not 
opposed to textual interpretation. Biblical commentary, translation and art criticism, as I 
have suggested, are the templates for his philosophical approach. By his own admission, 
it was his conceit to become Germany's foremost literary critic in the Weimar period, and 
his commentaries on Kafka, Dostoyevsky, Proust, Poe and Baudelaire, obviously 
demonstrate that he was not "against" narrativity, whatever that might mean. However, 
as a template for historical, social or philosophical analysis, the movement of narrative, 
like that of the symbol, and communicative "sign"-language, is suspect. As any good 
orator knows, the essence of storytelling is found in bringing to the fore the essential 
elements of the narrative, while suppressing the nonessential. Determining what is 
nonessential, however, is a question of perspective, of interest, and always entails 
disregarding elements that from another perspective might be deemed relevant. For the 
conquerors, it is their victory and not the injustice they inflicted by their actions that tends 
to be regarded as essential and thus deemed valuable. For the vanquished, however, it 
may be quite the reverse. 
Benjamin, therefore, suggests that the template for a philosophy directed towards 
truth is found not in signs, nor bourgeois language, nor mathematical formulas, nor 
219 
narratives. For Benjamin truth crystallizes in images. "Only images in the mind 
vitalize the will" (SWJ, 466; GS4, 116.)364 The image, rather than the story, is what is 
aligned to the allegorical method, and therefore, also with the biblical naming dimension 
of non-communicative language. An excellent example of writing in images are the 
"Theses," generally, especially the first of the puppet and the dwarf cited in the 
introduction. The text is not a narrative as Aristotle defines it, as having a beginning, 
middle and end. Instead, the first thesis is really the description of an image. It has a 
certain static quality. There is no narrative movement. Its composition is closer to that of 
a painting than a story, in that conceptual oppositions are used like contrasting colours to 
structure the scene: The living dwarf in opposition to the inanimate puppet, theology in 
opposition to "historical materialism." 
It may be Goethe who provided Benjamin with the template for writing in 
"images," when, in Elective Affinities, he describes the strange bourgeois pastime of 
staging famous paintings with live people, the tableaux vivants. Benjamin, however, 
regarded the dialectical-image, or what I have previously referred to as the thought-
image, to be his own unique contribution to philosophy. Despite Goethe's precedence 
and despite Benjamin's insistence, the dialectical-image also seems to be at least 
somewhat indebted to Bergson's "memory-image." The connection to Bergson will 
prove useful, as he provides some theoretical insights that can help illuminate what 
amounts to Benjamin's method of philosophical presentation, as well as the organizing 
principle of much of his later work. The dialectical-image, as Benjamin developed it, was 
364 
"Lebendig nahrt den Willen nur das vorgestellte Bild." 
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received with skepticism and confusion by some of his contemporaries and later 
readers. The resistance is perhaps understandable. There is an inherent contradiction 
between the implied static quality of an image and the dynamic process of the dialectic. 
The essence of dialectic is motion, time and history; the essence of the image is its 
resistance to change. To speak of a dialectical-image, then, seems to make as much sense 
as to claim that someone stood still while walking. 
Adorno is perhaps the most vehement critic of Benjamin's invention. As 
Habermas explains, "Adorno does not see how legitimate it is to want to carry out the 
project for a primary history of modernity which aims at decodifying a semantics that has 
been buried and is threatened with forgetfulness - by hermeneutical means, through the 
interpretation of dialectical-images."365 Notwithstanding Adorno's objections, there is 
textual precedence for Benjamin's approach in Hegel's Phenomenology, which ends by 
referencing history as a gallery of images. "This Becoming presents a slow-moving 
succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of 
Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire 
wealth of its substance."366 Benjamin's reference to a dialectical-image should be read in 
conjunction with Schlegel' s aesthetic theory in which the exegete stands in a dialectical 
relationship to the real qua interpreter, which "crystallizes in an image." Here it may be 
helpful to refer to Bergson, who elucidates the logic of thinking in images, when he 
writes, that: 
365 Habermas, "Consciousness-Raising or Rescuing Critique," 115. 
366 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 492 (808.) 
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Representation is there, but always virtual - being neutralized at the very 
moment when it becomes actual, but the obligation to contim1e itself and to lose 
itself in something else. To obtain this conversion from the virtual to the actual, it 
would be necessary, not to throw more light on the object, but on the contrary, to 
obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the 
remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings, as a thing, should detach 
itself from these as a picture. 367 
Later Bergson notes that, "to perceive means to immobilize."368 And Ansgar Hillach 
helpfully suggests that the ambiguity inherent in the image and the conflicting 
I 
interpretations that result from it are the sustenance from which the dialectic draws its 
strength; these contradictions are what drives the exegete towards the goal of a higher 
sublation. 369 
I suggest that Benjamin's "pictorial" style of philosophical writing utilizes the 
same strategy that religious texts employ when attempting to articulate a truth that resists 
linguistic or mathematical formulations. I believe that it is Plato who provides Benjamin 
with the precedent for this strategy. Before proceeding, however, an important caveat 
needs to be born in mind. While I maintain that Plato can in some sense be regarded as a 
model for Benjamin's method of philosophical presentation, this claim only references 
the fact that both Benjamin and Plato suppose that truth cannot be directly articulated, 
367 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 36. 
368 Ibid., 208. 
369 Ansgar Hillach, "Dialektisches Bild," in Benjamins Begrif.fe, vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz 
and Erdmut Wizisla (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000). 
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that truth cannot simply be predicated. The difference between their thought is of 
course significant, evinced, for instance, in the differently valued status of the image in 
their philosophies. Benjamin's writing is "pictorial," while Plato disdained images. 
Benjamin is suspicious of narrative, while Plato uses elaborate stories to support his 
arguments. Nonetheless, while Plato and Benjamin disagree about how the non-linguistic, 
non-predicative, inexpressible nature of truth can best be represented, Plato does furnish 
Benjamin with the broad outlines of a strategy. 
Plato is not generally considered a religious philosopher, which is an anachronistic 
reading of his works that, I believe, mistakenly projects the modern religious-
philosophical divide back to a historical period when that distinction was not meaningful. 
Regardless of how "religious" we might deem his works to be, I claim that Plato provides 
Benjamin with the theoretical framework for how to write "religiously," that is to how to 
express truths that are to some extent metaphysical since they escape the confines of a 
verificationist discourse. Benjamin's method of presentation is the second moment of his 
theory of rescue. His philosophy and his manner of presentation, are themselves the 
attempted rescue of truths that have eluded positivist social theory. 
Evidence for the claim that Plato can in part be read as a model for Benjamin's 
method of philosophical presentation is found in Tragic Drama, where the Symposium is 
explicitly referenced. That it should be the Symposium of all the possible Platonic 
dialogues Benjamin cites is telling. Speth, for example, regards the inclusion of the 
Symposium as Benjamin's rebuke ofNatorp's overly logical interpretation of Plato's 
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theory of ideas. 370 Of special note in this regard is that Apollodorous, the narrator of 
the Symposium, is twice removed from the conversation he is reporting on. This removal 
can be regarded as Plato's poetic device gesturing to the distance of logos from truth. 
Like Benjamin, Plato's Socrates steadfastly refuses to give straightforward philosophical 
definitions, because, according to Brocker, Plato understood that truth was beyond the 
grasp of logos. 371 Instead, Socrates' answers are long dialogues in which an idea is 
represented, but not directly articulated. Analytic concepts such as triangle can usually be 
relatively easily defined. Defining ideas is more complex. Mittelstrasse notes that for the 
Marburg school, the reduction of the idea to a scientific hypothesis meant that the idea 
could be expressed in true sentences from which more true sentences could be derived. 372 
For Benjamin as for Plato, ideas cannot simply be predicated. The Republic for example, 
is an attempt to answer the question, "What is the form of Justice?" The dialogue does 
not propose a simple analytic definition of justice, but takes a long detour, which itself is 
the answer. 
A further indication that Plato can be deemed an important influence on 
Benjamin's method of philosophic presentation, becomes apparent when one takes into 
account the similar historical-philosophical context to which both Benjamin and Plato 
respond. In Plato, Benjamin discovers a "brother in arms," who faced many of the same 
challenges presented by modernity, notably the problems arising from a Weltanschauung 
in which science determines the final horizon of truth. Plato provides an exemplary 
370 Speth, Wahrheit und Asthetik, 231. 
371
- Broker, "Sprache," 755. 
372 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 23. 
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answer to the questions Benjamin is facing. Like Benjamin's struggle against the 
lack of meaning implied in the scientistic discourse embraced by positivists, Plato's 
system can be read as a response to the new Ionian physics which, he felt, undermined 
traditional Hellenistic values and led to a de-humanized rationalism. I follow Gregory 
Vlastos' reading, when he suggests that ·Plato's main enemies were the "modern 
scientists" whose mechanistic cosmology also gave rise to atheism. 373 Vlastos argues that 
for Plato, the "basic error" uniting such diverse pre-Socratic thinkers as Anaximander, 
Parmenides, Leucippus and Democritus, was the supposition that "nature is a self-
regulating system, and is not governed by the art of a divine mind. "374 That a "causal 
matrix" provides a full explanatory model of existence, led, Plato argued, to the relativist 
subjectivism and nihilism of the Sophists, for whom there was no fundamental truth, and 
who, therefore, felt no moral compunction with respect to the ends to which they applied· 
their rhetorical arts. To counter the nihilism and relativism of the Sophists, Plato 
developed his theory of the forms which reference an actual eternal reality, one that is, 
nonetheless, not directly observable in the phenomenal world. It is worth noting in the 
present context that Plato's Timaeus is a direct response to the absence of human meaning 
he attributed to the philosophies of the Ionian physicists. In Timaeus, Plato attempts to 
construct a philosophy of nature in which a creator god, the demiurge, is given pride of 
373 Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 158 -
159. 
374 Ibid., 159. 
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place and where meaning continues to reside in a world alive with "the world 
soul."375 Not surprisingly, Timaeus is also a seminal source for the Neoplatonic tradition, 
especially the Christian Neoplatonists searching for a basis for the unification of biblical 
theology and pagan philosophy. 
I suggest that Plato's rhetorical use of the poetic and the religio-mythic to express 
the inexpressible is essentially the same strategy employed by Benjamin when he 
incorporates the mythico-theological. Both are attempts to represent a realm of truth, 
specifically a realm of meaning, not incorporated within a mechanistically defined 
cosmos. The connection between poetry, myth and religion is to be found primarily in 
the fact that all three are modes of knowing that transgress a scientistic discourse. It will 
be recalled that in the pagan religious context of classical Greek antiquity, the poetic, 
especially the poetry of myth, was the privileged device by which to transmit and reaffirm 
the social taxonomy of the culture, its religious, ethical, normative self-identity. The 
paragon is Homer, whose Iliad and Odyssey played a role in ancient Greece similar to that 
of the Bible in the European middle ages. In this sense, the poetic, the mythic, and the 
religious, which I will refer to collectively as muthos - which must be kept distinct from 
Benjamin's understanding of the mythic - stand in opposition to the verificationist 
discourse of logos. Here I am following Luc Brisson who helpfully elaborates the 
distinction between logos and muthos as found in the Platonic dialogues: "The 
muthos/logos dichotomy can be interpreted not only as the opposition between falsifiable 
375 Plato, Timaeus, ed. Oskar Piest, trans. Francis M. Cornford (New York: Macmillian 
Publishing Company, 1959). 
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discourse and unfalsifiable discourse [ ... ] but also as the opposition between 
narrative discourse - or, more simply, a story - and argumentative discourse."376 
It is in the sense that muthos is both a story as well as a non-falsifiable discourse 
that I note a relationship between the poetic, the mythic and the content of the religious in 
Benjamin's work. Muthos comprise the content of many, perhaps most, religious texts, 
certainly those in the Judeo-Christian and European pagan traditions. The phrase, "Jesus 
wept," for example, need not be read, as many positivists are wont, as a falsifiable truth 
statement that could be corroborated with other texts of the same period to determine its 
historical veracity. Rather "Jesus wept," could just as well be evaluated as a "poetic" 
expression, which nonetheless points to a truth. As was suggested in Chapter One, a play, 
even one which depicts an entirely fictional set of characters in an entirely fictional place, 
can still articulate a truth not present at the literal level of the text. Unlike works of 
fiction, in which there may or may not be a deeper meaning implied, the very form of 
religious texts like the Bible present themselves as truth. Claiming that the Bible is the 
word of God means that it is true, in whatever sense that might be taken. The assertion 
that it is true is a far more radical claim than is found in the genre of fiction. That is to 
say, while the content of many religious texts is structured in much the same way as 
works of fiction, the form of the text implies that it is oriented towards an ultimate truth. 
This implies that the genre of religious writing cannot be easily contained within a 
376 Luc Brisson, Plato the Myth j\faker, ed. and trans. Gerard Naddaf (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 112. 
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logos/muthos dichotomy. Instead, religious texts, like many philosophical texts such 
as those by Plato, necessarily include both logos and muthos. 
At the same time, however; muthos in the sense of a non-verifiable discourse has 
be.en, perhaps justly, critiqued by philosophers, not least among them Plato, for making 
the false appear true. This aspect of Plato's philosophy is not to be denied. For Plato the 
good or the true can only be arrived at through dialectic. The dialogues are an attempt to 
demonstrate the superiority of the apprehension of truth over folly, notably of Plato's 
"idealism" over the relativism of the Sophists. In this more limited sense, the truth 
signaled by muthos is verifiable, since one's understanding of it can be shown, through 
reasoned argument to be sound or faulty. On the other hand the truth to which muthos 
orients is not of the same status as that of a scientifically verifiable statements of fact. 
The very ambiguity of the truly true is what makes muthos a necessity in the sense of a 
narrative, and it also entails that a trace of elusiveness which cannot be verified remains 
incorporated in the concept. 
That is not to say, however, as some readers have supposed, that Plato regards the 
inclusion of muthos as a non-verifiable discourse as illegitimate. Muthos is necessary as 
long as it remains informed by logos. Even if muthos cannot be justified by logos, this 
does not necessitate the supposition that Plato rejects muthos as narrative, which as his 
dialogues indicate he clearly does not. I suggest that there are (at least) two ways in 
which muthos is expressed in the Platonic dialogues which are structurally related to 
Benjamin's method of presentation. The first is the relatively self-evident inclusion of 
myths in the content of the dialogues that refer to Hellenistic paganism. I claim that the 
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inclusion of these myths, like the inclusion of religious language in Benjamin's social 
criticism, serves an epistemic function in that they articulate an aspect of reality not easily 
represented by a mathematico-scientistic discourse. The second, and related sense in 
which the muthos structures the dialogues, and Benjamin's works is in its very form. In 
Plato, but not in Benjamin, the dialogue is framed as an enacted encounter. Brisson 
explains that, "In order to imitate a reality which escapes all definitive description, we 
utilize a double imitation that substitutes for the first model another model which is 
accessible to the senses. "377 That is the status of muthos in Plato's works, a non-
sensuous reality that points to a deeper reality that cannot be otherwise articulated, similar 
to Zizek's assertion that a play is often "more real" than the real itself.378 
The supposed split between logos and muthos that the Republic is to have 
codified, does not exist. It is worth remembering that Plato did not, in fact, expel all the 
poets in the Republic. Only those poets of "mere entertainment," those who produced 
"immoral" poetry were thrown out, but a higher better poetry was nonetheless required 
for his perfect state. Plato did not reject poetry, nor the aesthetic modes of knowing. He 
shunned poetry not grounded by goodness and morality. Goodness and morality, or what 
amounts to the same thing in Plato, truth, cannot be known within the orbit of poetry 
itself, with muthos alone, but only by reasoned inquiry, through logos. Plato argued for a 
poetry, a myth, a religion, that is informed by logos, not a logos without a muthos. If 
Plato's Republic is read in conjunction with his other dialogues, the supposition that he 
377 Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 103. 
378 See for example, Slavoj Zizek, "The Matrix, or Two Sides of Perversion." 
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attempted to define a realm for reason, entirely unencumbered by the poetic, is 
unsustainable. In the Phaedrus for example, Socrates gives a lengthy description of what 
constitutes "good speaking," that is speech directed to truth. Good speech, as he defines 
it, results when myths and fables are used to point to a hidden reality. Also in Book II of 
the Republic, explaining the education of youth to Adeimantus, Socrates states, "Don't 
you realize [ ... ] that we start by telling children stories which are, by and large, untrue, 
though they contain elements of truth?"379 Contrary to the Nietzschean reading that Plato 
abhorred the poetic, the mythic, the narrative, the guiding thread through all his dialogues 
is the desire to establish a logos informed by muthos and conversely to ensure that muthos 
is reasoned, that it remains rooted in logos. Plato's philosophy is itself the paragon of the 
new moral and religious poetry, a didactic poetry meant to lead to a better, more 
meaningful existence.380 Plato saw himself as an improved Homer, his philosophy as the 
better poetry, and his epic hero Socrates as the new Achilles and Odysseus in one. The 
379 Plato, The Republic, 71 (II 377a.) 
380 See, Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. 
J. Hollingdale (New York, New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 154, and, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Spiers trans. Ronald 
Spiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). In the Genealogy of Morals, for 
example, Nietzsche states that, "Plato versus Homer, that is the complete, the genuine 
antagonism." As Nietzsche explains in The Birth of Tragedy, Plato introduced a schism 
between the Dionysian and the Apollonian drives, that is between the aesthetic, emotive 
and non-rational modes of knowing on the one hand the, and a cold, disinterested reason, 
embodied in the person of Socrates on the other. Nietzsche, of course, believes that Plato 
got it wrong, and therefore his Birth of Tragedy is a consistent attack on the separation of 
the Dionysian from Apollonian impulses. For Nietzsche, Socrates is closer to the 
positivists than to artists, enraptured by "science" and the power of reason. "Anyone who 
recalls the immediate effects produced by this restlessly advancing spirit of science will 
recognize at once how myth was destroyed by it, and how this destruction drove poetry 
from its natural, ideal soil, so that it became homeless from that point onwards" (82.) 
230 
young Benjamin sublates the dichotomy between logos and muthos in Plato when he 
notes in a preliminary study to his book on German baroque drama that, "Socrates: with 
this figure, Plato annihilates the old myth while adopting it" (SWJ, 52; GS2, 130.)381 
Like Plato, Benjamin frequently includes mythic and religious references in the 
content of his essays, and, like Plato, his style of writing, and its form, are both literature 
and philosophy at once. The texture of Benjamin's essays militates against any self-
evident philosophical-literary distinction. The reason for this literary approach, as I have 
already suggested, is to be found in the conviction shared by Plato, that truth is utterly 
transcendent, and, yet, must always be the guiding light of all philosophical inquiry. The 
problem for which Plato provides the solution is how to theorize and articulate a truth that 
resists theorization and articulation. The Arcades Project, to which we turn in the next 
chapter, is Benjamin's attempt to represent transcendent truths. However, as was 
suggested above, while Plato provides the general strategy, Benjamin diverges from it in 
his insistence that "textual images," and not narratives are most effective at articulating 
humanity's relation to the real. 
The creation of thought-images, or dialectical-images, then, is Benjamin's 
solution to the dilemma posed in the introduction to this chapter. Since, according to 
Benjamin, predicative language cannot articulate truth because it destroys the 
particularity of its object, the philosopher must proceed in a manner that permits truth to 
be retained. This is accomplished by engaging in modes of knowing that are allegorical, 
381 
"Sokrates: das ist die Gestalt, in der er den a/ten Mythos annihiliert und rezipiert 
hat." 
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open and multivalent. This method is the one most appropriate for an ontology of 
internal relations, where essences are relations, and not atomistic substances. It is 
Benjamin's Arcades Project that represents his ultimate experiment in this mode of 
writing. This work is Benjamin's attempted rescue of the vanishing truths of modernity's 
encounter with Capital. 
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Chapter Four - Provoking Apocatastasis: The Arcades Project 
The Arcades Project is Benjamin's Quixotic experiment in reading ~d writing history, 
one in which the themes discussed in the preceding chapters converge and find their 
expression. Regarded by some as an un-readable text, the Arcades Project was in some 
sense doomed to failure based solely on the logic of Benjamin's own philosophy. It is a 
text that tries to communicate the incommunicable. It strives to narrate the non-narrative 
dimensions of history and experience. The tension that marks Benjamin philosophy of 
"language" is also the central tension in the Arcades Project, namely that post-lapsarian 
"speech" is barred from expressing truth directly, while simultaneously being the only 
faculty capable of gesturing towards it. The Arcades Project is an attempt to circumvent 
language so as to fulfill it. Perhaps the Arcades Project can be regarded as an instance of 
Hamann' s divine translation, in which an attempt is made to smuggle truth out of Eden. 
If the Arcades Project is a grand act of translating the divine, if it is a theology of the 
social, then following Benjamin's own theory, it must fail at the very moment it succeeds. 
Perhaps, this is too simplistic a view. Benjamin conceived the Arcades Project as 
a "Copernican turn," in historiography. The towering mass of fragments that comprise 
the bulk of the work were meant to undermine the perspectives of domination which 
Benjamin saw encoded in the logic of hegemonic historical narratives. The Arcades 
Project embodies Benjamin's campaign to rescue the forgotten histories that the 
hegemonic History of the victor denies. It represents his endeavor to save for 
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remembrance the suffering of the oppressed by shattering the historical narratives that 
deny these voices their right to be heard. 
I think Beiner is correct when he argues in, "Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of 
History" that the "Theses on the Concept of History" supplies the Arcades with the 
necessary underlying epistemo-critical theory. 382 "Theses VI" is particularly instructive 
for what Benjamin has in mind: 
Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it "the way it really 
was." It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger. 
Historical materialism wishes to hold fast that image of the past which 
unexpectedly appears to the historical subject in a moment of danger. The danger 
threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it. For both, it is 
one and the same thing: the danger of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. Every 
age must strive anew to wrest tradition away from the conformism that is working · 
to overpower it. The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer; he comes as the 
victor over the Antichrist. The only historian capable of fanning the spark of hope 
in the past is the one who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe 
from the enemy if he is victorious. And this enemy has never ceased to be 
victorious. (SW4, 391; GSJ, 695)383 
382 Ronald Beiner, "Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of History," Political Theory 12, no. 3 
(Aug. 1984): 430. 
383 
"Vergangenes historisch artikulieren heiftt nicht, es erkennen 'wie es denn eigentlich 
gewesent ist. ' Es heiftt, sich einer Erinnerung bemachtigen, wie sie im Augenblick einer 
Gefahr aujblitzt. Dem historischen Materialismus geht es darum, ein Bild der 
Vergangenheit festzuhalten, wie es sich im Augenblick der Gefahr droht sowohl dem 
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Benjamin is the historian who is trying to appropriate memories as they flash up 
through a new manner of presenting history. His Arcades Project is the attempt to fan the 
sparks of hope against the Marxian class enemy, the capitalist ruling class, whose self-
justifying teleological narratives do not shy away from instrumentalizing even the dead. 
To accomplish his task, Benjamin does not simply attempt to incorporate missing content 
within the master narratives, but he radically re-conceptualizes the form of historical 
writing itself. 
Despite Benjamin's high hopes, however, the Arcades Projected did not manage 
to be any of the things he had wanted it to be. Perhaps, as Tiedemann suggests, part of 
the problem is the extremely high demand the text makes on its readers. 384 If Benjamin 
had wanted to effect a "Copernican tum" in historiography by smashing master narratives 
into fragments, the result remains inaccessible to precisely those readers who, from the 
perspective of a Marxian revolutionary politic, should be the beneficiaries of this strategy: 
the (European) working class. Marx's Capital provides an instructive contrast. Marx 
published the chapters of his analysis of Capital in weekly newspapers, which were 
Bestand der Tradition wie ihren Empfangern. Fur beide ist sie ein und dieselbe: sich 
zum Werkzeug der herrschenden Klasse herzugeben. In jeder Epoche muj3 versucht 
werden, die Oberlieferung von neuem dem Konformismus abzugewinnen, der im Begriff 
steht, sie zu uberwtiltigen. Der Messias kommt ja nicht nur als der Erloser; er kommt als 
der Oberwinder des Antichrist. Nur dem Geschichtsschreiber wohnt die Gabe bei, im 
Vergangenen den Funken der Hoffnung ansumachen, der davon durchdrungen ist: auch 
die Toten werden vor dem Feind, wenn er siegt, nicht sicher sein. Und dieser Feind hat 
zu siegen nicht aufgehort." 
384 Tiedemann, Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins, 147: "Wenn Das 
Passagenwerk als literarisches Projekt gescheitert ist, dann nicht zuletzt weil Theorie 
nicht unmittelbar - anstatt kraft iherer Modellfunktion -Anweisung auf Praxis werden 
kann." 
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accessible to the working class, in terms of costs and of content. Importantly, Marx's 
analysis, although dense, stays within the accepted conventions of a work of social 
analysis and critique. The reader can, if with some effort, comprehend Marx's thoughts 
on questions of value-production, exploitation, labor organization or health and safety 
reforms. Benjamin's text, by contrast, requires the reader to learn an entirely new way of 
reading. A manner of reading, already analyzed in the previous chapters, that takes for 
granted a thorough understanding of modem and ancient metaphysics, epistemology, 
revolutionary politics, and aesthetic theory. Even armed with this arcane and specialized 
knowledge, many readers have run afoul of Benjamin's intentions, as is demonstrated by 
some contemporary scholarly literature on the text. That is to say, while the Arcades 
Project can be "read," it calls for an approach fundamentally at odds with how most 
"normal" historical and social science texts are read. 
It is here, where the text fails, that it succeeds. Benjamin demands a manner of 
reading, which simultaneously amounts to a new manner of cultural interpretation. In his 
"Surrealism" essay, Benjamin asks, "Where are the conditions for revolution? In the 
changing of attitudes or of external circumstances? This is the cardinal question [ ... ] and 
cannot be glossed over" (SW2, 216; GS2, 308.)385 I suggest the Arcades Project answers 
this question with a definitive emphasis on '·'changing attitudes." In order to understand 
the text, Benjamin demands that his readers adopt a perspective fundamentally at odds 
385 The complete German passage reads: "Wo liegen die Voraussetzungen der 
Revolution? In der Anderung der Gesinnung oder der auj3eren Verhaltnisse? Das is die 
Kardinalfrage, die das Veraltnis von Politik und Moral bestimmt und keine Vertuschung 
zulaj3t." 
236 
with the hegemonic master-narrative position(s). Breaking with these views, 
however, is not easily accomplished. The social continuously re-enforces certain 
perspectives, while negating others. Marx summarizes the problem, when he writes in the 
German Ideology, that "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling 
ideas. "386 Even the exploited classes, therefore, can adopt the perspectives of their rulers 
without having to confront the contradiction between their perspectives and their 
objective historical position. Benjamin articulates this worry in the above cited "Theses 
VI" when he notes that the ever present danger, also in historiography, is "the danger of 
becoming a tool of the ruling classes" (SW4, 391; GSJ, 695.)387 Although Marx's 
arguments in the "Theses on Feuerbach," especially number three, suggest that particular 
perspectives can be overcome through the help of philosophy, which thereby becomes 
"revolutionary practice," this project is neither easy nor self-evident.388 As Hegel once 
claimed, philosophy is "[ ... ] the way of despair,"389 and Durkheim noted that the social 
makes itself felt most when one tries to resist it. 39° Coming to a new philosophical 
position, as Freud was all too aware, can be a painful and difficult psychological 
experience, especially if this position breaks with the conventions of normative modes of 
reading the social. 
386 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, The German Ideology (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1998), 67. 
387 
"[. . .} sich zum Werkzeug der herrschenden Klasse herzugeben." 
388 Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," 569-570. 
389 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 49 (78.) 
390 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, 63. 
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The new hermeneutical perspective Benjamin's Arcades Project expects the 
reader to adopt is simultaneously the re-orientation required to deconstruct the mythic 
dimensions of the social. The heuristic moment of the text is in stimulating the reader to 
undergo this re-orientation in order to make both "texts" legible, the Arcades Project and 
the social. If the former text becomes legible, it is because the reader has adopted the 
revolutionary perspective that Benjamin believes necessary to escape from the mythic 
spell that threatens to ensnare "even the dead," and doom the working class to re-establish 
the very structures f~om which it hopes to be liberated. 
It is perhaps unfair, then, to criticize Benjamin's text for asking too much of the 
reader, if this is the nature of contemporary reality. If a truly liberatory revolution needs 
subjects who see the world the way Benjamin believes they need to see it, and if 
Benjamin writes a text from this perspective and for this perspective, it is not the text 
itself that is the problem, but rather the objective historical conditions. The internal logic 
of the Arcades would suggest that if Benjamin's text is difficult to read, it is because the 
mythic spell that obscures the reality of exploitation in modernity is difficult to counter. 
Even when it seems as though the other shore has been reached, more often than not, it is 
not the true nature of reality that is encountered, but another illusion, another version of 
the mythic. The Arcades Project attempts to break the circular movement that threatens 
to ensnare thought, and this is what makes reading the text such a struggle. 
Mythic thought constantly re-captures any attempt to escape its grasp, much like a 
massive and dense planet's strong gravitational field constantly bends back upon itself 
those projectiles that attempt to leave its orbit. That is to say, even when thought believes 
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itself to have escaped the mythic dimension, more often than not it has simply traded 
one myth for another. Adorno and Horkheimer analyze this structure in their Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, in which they note that the rational faculty, namely, the very faculty 
meant to l~berate humanity from the mythic, has itself turned into an agent of the 
irrational. Similarly, this argumentative structure underlies Benjamin's critique of the 
Surrealists. He claims that the Surrealists believed they had awoken from the dream of 
myth, but in fact, they only dreamed they were awake. Politically, this same structure is 
repeated with "Benjamin's enemies," in the "Theses," among them the German Social 
Democrats (Sozaildemokratische Partei Deutsch/and, or SPD). As Benjamin's invective 
in "Thesis XI" makes clear, the Social Democrats unintentionally betrayed the working 
class whom they believed themselves to be representing. For Benjamin, the SPD became 
a "tool of the ruling classes," because they popularized the views of the ruling class and 
made these seem like views which could liberate the proletariat. Benjamin explains: 
The conformism which has marked the Social Democrats from the beginning 
attaches not only to their political tactics but to their economic v1iews as well. It is 
one reason for the eventual breakdown of their party. Nothing has so corrupted the 
German working class as the notion that it was moving with the current. It regarded 
technological development as the driving force of the stream with which it thought 
it was moving. From there it was but a step to the illusion that the factory work 
ostensibly furthering technological progress constituted a political achievement. 
The old Protestant work ethic was resurrected among German workers in 
secularized form. The Gotha Program already bears traces of this confusion, 
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defining labor as 'the source of all wealth and all culture.' Smelling a rat, Marx 
countered that 'the man who possesses no other property than his labor power' must 
of necessity become 'the slave of other men who have made themselves owners.' 
Yet the confusion spread, and soon thereafter Joseph Dietzgen proclaimed: 'The 
savior of modem times is called work. The ... perfecting ... of the labor process 
constitutes the wealth which can now do what no redeemer has even been able to 
accomplish.' This vulgar-Marxist conception of the nature of labor scarcely 
considers the question of how its products could ever benefit the workers when they 
are beyond the means of those workers. It recognizes only the progress in 
mastering nature, not the retrogression of society; it already displays the 
technocratic features that later emerge in fascism. (SW4, 393-94; GSJ, 698-99)391 
391 
"Der Konformismus, der von Anfang an in der Sozialdemokratie heimisch gewesen ist, 
haftet nicht nur an ihrer politischen Taktik, sondern auch an ihren okonomischen 
Vorstellungen. Er ist eine Ursache des spateren Zusammenbruchs. Es gibt nichts, was 
die deutsche Arbeiterschaft in dem Grade korrumpiert hat wie die Meinung sie schwimme 
mit dem Strom. Die technische Entwicklung gait ihr als das Gefalle des Stromes, mit dem 
sie zu schwimmen meinte. Vonda war es nur ein Schritt zu der Illusion, die Fabrikarbeit, 
die im Zuge des technischen Fortschritts gelegen sei, stelle eine politische Leistung dar. 
Die alte protestantische Werkmoral feierte in sakularisierter Gestalt bei den deutschen 
Arbeitern ihre Auferstehung. Das Gothaer Pgrogramm tragt bereits Spuren dieser 
Verwirrung an sich. Es definiert die Arbeit as 'die Quelle al/es Reichtums und al/er 
Kultur. ' Bases ahnend, entegnete Marx darauf, daft der Mensch, der kein anderes 
Eigentum besitze als seine Arbeitskraft, 'der Sklave der andern Menschen sein muf3, die 
sich zu Eigentumern ... gemacht haben. ' Unbeschadet dessen greift die Konfusion weiter 
um sich, und bald darauf verkundet Josef Dietzgen: 'Arbeit heif3t der Heiland der 
neueren Zeit ... In der ... Verbesserung ... der Arbeit ... besteht der Reichtum, der jetzt 
vollbringen kann, was bisher kein Er/Oser vollbracht hat. ' Dieser vulgarmarxistische 
Begriff von dem, was die Arbeit ist, halt sich bei der Frage nicht lange auf, wie ihr 
Produkt den Arbeitern selber anschlagt, solange sie nicht daruber verfugen konnen. Er 
will nur die Fortschritte der Naturbeherrschung, nicht die Ruckschritte der Gesellschaft 
wahr haben. Er weist schon die technokratischen Zuge auf, die spater im Faschismus 
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Whereas the Social Democratic party was meant to be a party for the working class 
with the aims of liberating it from drudgery and oppression, it succumbed instead to the 
myth of progress which resulted in condemning the working class to the very bondage 
from which it sought to escape. This structure is for Benjamin the central problematic of 
a capitalist modernity. To use the language of dreams again, how does one know if one 
has truly woken up, that is escaped the mythic dimensions of thought, or if, like the 
Surrealists, one is not simply dreaming that one is awake? What if the contemporary 
myth is precisely that there is no more myth? This is the presence of myth at the moment 
of its ostensible absence. To put the same point differently, the appearance of absence is 
the index of its presence. How is one to distinguish the myth of no myth, which is the 
presence of myth, from no myth, which is its actual absence? The dream, of course, is 
almost never registered as a dream by the dreamer. Only one who is awake knows the 
difference. Yet, waking up is already the end point the text strives to achieve. The 
question of the text is how to awaken a dreamer from within the dream. As Benjamin 
puts it, "What follows will be an experiment in the techniques of awakening. An attempt 
to become aware of the dialectical - the Copernican-turn of remembrance" [K 1, 1. ]392 
For Benjamin, the inability to escape the confines of mythic thought underwrites 
the failures of the Social Democratic party, of any actually existing socialism, as well as 
most other attempts to extricate the working class from bondage. That the Russian 
begegnen werden. Zu diesen gehort ein Begriff der Natur, der sich auf 
unheilverkundende Art von dem in den sozialistischen Utopien des Vormiirz abhebt." 
392 
"Was hi er im folgenden gegeben wird, ist ein Ver such zur Technik des Erwachens. 
Ein Versuch, der dialektischen, der kopernikanischen Wendung des Eingedenkens inne zu 
werden." · 
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Revolution of 1918 should eventually lead to Stalinism can thus be read as its very 
telos, and need not be regarded as an aberration from its intended course, caused by 
Stalin's superior and cynical political out maneuvering of Trotsky. The Russian 
Revolution did not emancipate the Russian peasants and workers, but re-instituted a 
totalitarian regime that incarnated the worst aspects of Czarism. The same could be said 
for every supposedly liberatory revolution that preceded and followed the Russian one. 
From the French Revolution which escalated into the Terror and finally the despotism of 
Napoleon, to the Maoist Red Army brigades of the 1960s, revolutions intended to liberate 
often ended by subjugating the very people in whose name the revolution was first carried 
out. That the SPD foreshadowed aspects of the fascism that would soon darken Germany 
demonstrates for Benjamin that mythic thought was not actually overcome, that the party 
of the working class did not really wake up from the dream. I believe that had Benjamin 
not taken his own life on the French-Spanish border in 1940, but had lived to see the 
establishment of the German Democratic Republic, he would have noticed, as many have 
since, the correspondences between that "socialist" state and the fascist one that preceded 
it. 
The power of the mythic, the dream, is that it employs precisely the very means 
that could lead out of the labyrinth of illusion. In this context, historical narratives can be 
read as being in the service of myth. The problem, for Benjamin, is that historians have 
primarily fought their ideological battles along the axis of content. One narrative is 
proffered as more "accurate" than another, as actually conveying "the way it really was." 
Politically conservative forces might for example, develop historical narratives that focus 
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on the aristocrats, on the rulers and other cultural elites as the "movers of history," 
while politically progressive voices may counter with narratives of "the people," who did 
the bidding of these rulers and, therefore, by extension did the actual labour necessary for 
the unfolding of historical events. The latter form of writing is the logic that underlies 
subaltern histories, and postcolonial theory in general. 
The paradigmatic example of this "idealist" versus "materialist" debate is, of 
course, demonstrated by Hegel and Marx's respective approaches to the world historical 
subject. Whereas Hegel believed he was witnessing the world historical spirit incarnate, 
as he was fleeing his Jena home in advance of the French troops, Marx would have turned 
Hegel's analysis around and focused instead on the troops, or the social relations that 
gave rise to troops, imperial wars, and nation states, as the real force of history. If 
Benjamin is correct, however, then the strategy of left-leaning historians and theorists, 
from Marx to Gramsci to Spivak, to counter the narratives of domination by providing a 
different subject of history, the working class for example, or the "subaltern," the post-
colonial subject, is beset by problems, since, for Benjamin, it is not only the content of the 
narrative that is mythic, but narration itself. The issue for Benjamin is not whether this or 
that historical narrative is more accurate than another, but the fundamental move in 
master narratives per se. By weaving together moments of possibility and attributing a 
certain telos to the unfolding of events, master-narratives position the reader as the 
necessary and expected end point. Hegel, and more recently Francis Fukuyama, for 
example, believed they had arrived at the end of history. 
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An analogy may be drawn between Benjamin's critique of historical 
narratives and that which found expression in modernist aesthetics. The radical break that 
defines painterly modernism, from Picasso's cubism to Rothko's or Pollock's abstract 
expressionism, is the supposition that figurative painting encoding definite perspectives, 
is illusory and "mythic," to re-appropriate Benjamin's concept. The issue is not whether 
it is more "radical," more "authentic," or more "realistic," to paint a worker as opposed to 
a prince, but rather that the very perspective built into classical European painting is itself 
the problem. This perspective is epitomized by the Italian High Renaissance and, as if to 
underscore Benjamin's point, perpetuated even in the socialist realism of the Soviet 
Union. Painting in the new style, one that does not encode the perspective of the King, 
which is generally the position one is forced to take in classical, representative, figurative 
painting, meant breaking not just from the content but also from the form of tradition. 
This is the same move Benjamin attempts with respect to writing history in the Arcades 
Project. 
The association with modernist aesthetics is not accidental. His critiques 
notwithstanding, Benjamin drew a great deal of inspiration from Andre Breton, "Louis 
Aragon, Philippe Soupault, Robert Desnos, Paul Eluard" (SW2, 207; GS2, 295) as well as 
Max Ernst and others. Benjamin met Aragon in 1930, witnessing first hand the fallout for 
the movement after the publication of Breton's The Surrealist Manifesto (SW2, 836.) The 
montage approach to writing, which is the method Benjamin employs in some of his most 
important texts, such as One-Way Street, the "Theses," "Central Park," and the Arcades 
Project is inspired by works such as Breton's Nadija. Breton and his fellow Surrealists 
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approached writing the way modernists painters approached graphic art. For them 
the narrative itself is implicated in the mythic dimension of thought and, therefore, needs 
to be radically altered. The problem, is that breaking with the narrative, i.e., the logical 
progression of ideas, is both jarring and confusing. Reading a collage as opposed to a 
narrative requires a fundamentally different engagement with the text akin to the different 
position the spectator is thrust into when standing in front of a Rothko painting, or when 
listening to a-tonal music. This is no longer the aesthetics of totalfries, which, at the level 
of the historical means no longer succumbing to meta-narratives, irrespective of whether 
these are products of the political left or right. This, at least, is the underlying move that 
defines the architectonics of the Arcades Project. 
Benjamin's Arcades Project, then, is an attempt to "brush history against the 
grain." He is trying to break with the very form of historical transmission, so that a new, 
revolutionary and liberatory spirit can come to the fore. As Beiner explains: 
historical materialism does not assume a reverential attitude to history, 
contemplating the flow of historical occurrences with the complacent assurance of 
continual progress. The latter approach to history is what Benjamin refers to as 
historicism, the political counter-part to which is the German Social Democratic 
[ ] 393 Party .... 
Whether the Arcades actually succeeds in transmitting the spirit of a history left un-
narrated, whether it manages to rescue modernity's forgotten fragments and to redeem 
them, whether it saves the dead from the "enemy," and whether it effects the radical 
393 Beiner, "Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of History," 426. 
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reorientation necessary for realizing truly liberatory potentials, must be determined 
from "within" the text itself. I believe it is an ungenerous reading to assume the text is a 
failure because it asks a lot of its readers. Rather, the text needs to be critiqued 
"internally," within the logic it sets forth and operates within. In what follows, I will 
trace the outlines of the history of a text that was never actually written, and then proceed 
to analyze the fragments which comprise the Arcades Project in terms of Benjamin's 
theory of the dialectical-image. The last section of this chapter will be devoted to 
pursuing some of the Benjaminian archetypes that relate to philosophical perspectives on 
the social, such as the rag picker, the flaneur, and the Parisian arcades themselves. 
I: The Arcades Project: The History of a Text not Written 
Benjamin worked sporadically for the last thirteen years of his life, between 1927 
and 1940, on the manuscript that was to become in the hands of Gretel and Theodor 
Adorno, as well as Adorno' s student Tiedemann, the Arcades Project. 394 Originally 
intended as a collaborative effort with Franz Hessel on a newspaper article about the 
Parisian arcades, the project quickly grew to become Benjamin's most pressing 
intellectual task.395 For all the significance attributed to this work, a text by Benjamin 
known as the Arcades Project does not really exist.396 What Benjamin entrusted to 
394 Rolf Tiedemann, "Dialectics at a Standtill," in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard 
Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 929. 
395 Tiedemann, "Dialectics at a Standtill," 930. 
396 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades 
Project (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991), ix. 
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Bataille in 1940, before fleeing from the advancing Wehrmacht, consisted of bound 
bundles of loosely organized newspaper clippings, pictures, quotes and notes. 397 Each 
bundle, or convolute as Adorno would later refer to them, and according to which the 
published text has been organized, corresponds thematically to a particular aspect of 
nineteenth century Parisian culture which Benjamin deemed worthy of further research. 
Topics such as 'Iron Construction', and 'Fashion', the psycho-physiognomy of character 
types like the 'Collector' and the 'Flaneur', and notable personages, including 
'Baudelaire', 'Fourier', and 'Marx' all betrayed telling features of modernity's true 
nature. They were allocated their own convolutes under which were included any 
assortment of fragmentary material, mostly newspaper clippings, which were, often only 
tenuously related to the general heading. Benjamin eventually amassed thousands of 
entries which now comprise the content of Arcades Project. If new subject matters 
became pressing, Benjamin would simply begin another convolute to incorporate them. 
However, the convolutes Benjamin had entrusted to Bataille were incomplete and 
disorganized. 398 Wohlfarth notes that in light of this, it is curious that Tiedemann chose to 
title the text Passagenwerk, "and not, as Benjamin himself called it, the Passagenarbeit 
or Passagenprojekt."399 What Benjamin left behind after his suicide at Portbou was the 
unfinished torso of his life's work. Had Benjamin had the opportunity to complete his 
opus, it might well have become, as Tiedemann suggests "a materialist philosophy of the 
397 Wolin, "Walter Benjamin's Failed Messianism: One-Way Street," 33. 
398 Tiedemann, "Dialectics at a Standtill," 953. 
399 Wohlfarth, "Re-Fusing Theology. Some First Responses to Walter Benjamin's 
Arcades Project," 5. Wolin, "Walter Benjamin's Failed Messianism: One-Way Street," 
37. 
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history of the nineteenth century ,"400 or the Copernican revolution in the writing of 
history. Perhaps, the "oppressive" amount of quotations, about which Tiedemann and 
Wolin among many other readers have complained, would have been mediated by more 
of Benjamin's own theory.401 Benjamin, however, did not have time finish his project. 
The fact that the Arcades Project exists as a published book today, even if as a 
work nonfinito, is in part due to the meticulous work of Theodor and Gretel Adorno, who 
first laboured over the manuscript after its re-discovery in the bowels of the Bibliotheque 
Nationale in Paris, where Bataille had hidden them.402 Indeed, the original manuscript, 
housed at the Walter Benjamin archive in B~rlin, still bear Gretel Adorno's first editorial 
marks. Primarily, however, the Arcades Project achieved its published form due to 
Tiedemann's Herculean (or perhaps Sisyphean) labour, devoting himself to the 
painstaking philological effort of deciphering Benjamin's legendarily difficult hand-
writing and compiling and organizing the scattered notes for publication.403 
While it is true of most texts that they are not the work of the author alone, the 
Arcades Project deserves special consideration. Between the time it left Benjamin's 
hands in 1940 and its first publication in 1982, the Arcades Project became something of 
a collaborative effort. In fact, some scholars have voiced unease about the "editorial 
monopoly" that The Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (Institut fur 
400 Tidemann, "Dialectics at a Standtill," 948. 
401 Ibid., 931. 
402 Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, 57. 
403 Wohlfarth, "Re-fusing Theology. Some First Reponsonses to Walter Benjamin's 
Arcades Project," 4. 
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Sozialforschung) is supposed to have exerted.404 Without the Institute, however, there 
would not be an Arcades Project today, either in published form or otherwise, as both 
Adorno and Horkheimer were instrumental in shaping not only the explicitly Marxian 
trajectory of the work, but also in procuring the grants which supported Benjamin during 
the critical phases of the project in the 1930s. That is to say that in the final analysis it is 
worth remembering that the Arcades in its published form bears the traces of minds other 
than Benjamin's. 
Since the Arcades Project was not completed by Benjamin, the reader is faced 
with fundamental interpretive questions. How should a text be read that was intended to 
be a revolutionary experiment in the writing of history, but which the author did not get 
close to finishing? And more importantly, can the ideas Benjamin wanted to transmit be 
grasped in the form the text took after his death? Luckily, Benjamin left a number of 
significant clues that allow the contemporary exegete to divine his intentions. First, the 
1935 and 1939 "Exposes," also published as separate essays under the title, "Paris, 
(the)405 Capital of the Nineteenth Century" summarizes Benjamin's plan for the Arcades 
Project and provides the reader with a close approximation of the interpretative frame. In 
addition to his other major works, the "Theses" among them, are also the "First 
Sketches" a conglomerate of working notes included in the English edition. These 
contain a trove of Benjamin's observations and annotations, invaluable for deciphering 
404 Ibid. 
405 The article in the titles distinguishes the two essays in terms of the publication date. In 
the English editions therefore, "Paris, the Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1935), and 
"Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century" (1939). 
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the text, and reveal the context for many of Benjamin's ideas, not given in the 
Arcades text proper. Clues about how to read the text also exist in the convolutes 
themselves. "Convolute K," and especially "Convolute N" which are dedicated to the 
method and theory of the Arcades are invaluable for affording insight into Benjamin's 
aims. Lastly, there are his correspondences with his friends and colleagues, which 
document Benjamin's developing conceptions for his work. However, these primary and 
to some extent secondary sources do not paint an unambiguous portrait of Benjamin's 
intentions. Alas, a great many of the references are contradictory or even incoherent.406 
The Arcades Project, is Benjamin's most daring undertaking and, at the same 
time, is his most spectacular failure. This text in particular, demonstrates why Benjamin 
has been received with such ambivalence by the scholarly community, especially by those 
outside of literary and aesthetic theory. Fragmentary, often arcane and in parts 
frustratingly ambiguous, the Arcades is open to being read as either Benjamin's tour de 
force or as an experiment in theory gone awry. The Arcades Project was not completed 
and one may wonder whether it ever could have been. Yet, notwithstanding these 
caveats, the existence of multiple editors, despite any "editorial monopoly" exercised by 
the Frankfurt School, and despite the fact that its style is devilishly difficult to penetrate, I 
believe that this work remains the most important text for understanding Benjamin's 
cultural theory. With the possible exception of the "Theses on the Concept of History," 
and his equally aphoristic One-Way Street, no other work by Benjamin so thoroughly 
406 Tidemann, "Dialectics at a Standtill," 929. 
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combines both theory and method.407 The Arcades is a highly self-reflexive and self-
referential work. It is an attempt to theorize a new approach to cultural and historical 
analysis and, at the same time, it is an exemplar and product of these approaches. 
The Arcades Project begins in medias res. It consists of thirty-six convolutes of 
varying lengths. Each convolute is a pastiche of primary source material - culled mostly 
from the Bibliotheque Nationale - haphazardly assembled and only occasionally 
interspersed with Benjamin's theoretical musings. The reader will search in vain for a 
narrative thread that connects either the material within each convolute, or the various 
convolutes to each other. Although the content of each convolute is ostensibly related to 
a general theme, this relationship is often only tenuous, giving the text a certain aura of 
arbitrariness. As has been suggested above, this is not to say that there is no conceptual 
structure that lends itself to a coherent interpretation. 408 Once the reader has discerned 
Benjamin's overall theory, each aphorism, quote, picture and note can be deciphered as a 
self-contained and complete monad of meaning. These monads or, as Benjamin termed 
them, dialectical-images, are the elementary units of Benjamin's method of presentation 
and stimulus for a historical awakening. 
It is in the sense of a political awakening to the true, that is, as I have argued, a 
Marxian interpretation of social and economic reality, that the reader is drawn into 
Benjamin's experiment of writing history as a participant and which lends the Arcades 
407 Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, 64. 
408 Ibid., 54. Also see also Benjamin, Correspondences, 490. 
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Project its pedagogic character.409 Benjamin casts the reader in the role of the flaneur 
who ambles through the textual Arcades as if through the Parisian arcades of the 
nineteenth century. The content of the arcades that the flaneur encounters on his stroll 
under the glass roofed passages - the innumerable consumer goods, the "wonders" that 
industrialization has made possible - correspond to the dialectical-images in the Arcades 
Project's convolutes. The dialectical-images, the monads, the ideas, have, so Benjamin, 
the potential to shock the reader out of the mythic spell cast by the appearances of 
Capital. For this to occur, the reader must adopt the perspective in which the truth of the 
now becomes illuminated. In order to grasp Benjamin's theory of the role of the 
dialectical-image in provoking an awakening to the exploitation of Capital, we tum to a 
discussion of the interpretive units that compose the Arcades Project. 
II: Monads as Ideas as Dialectical-Images 
The elemental philosophical unit of the Arcades Project is the dialectical-image, 
or, what Benjamin alternatively refers to as the thought-image. The dialectical-image, as 
it appears in this work, shows marks of the Leibnizan monad, the baroque emblem, the 
Platonic and Neoplatonic idea, the Romantic, the avant-garde and the Kabalistic 
fragment. In one sense, each of these philosophical, religious and artistic traditions 
converges in Benjamin's notion of the 4ialectical-image. Benjamin described his method 
in "Convolute N,": 
409 Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing, 292. 
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Method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely 
show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the 
rags, the refuse - these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to 
come into their own: by making use of them. [Nla,8]4 10 
In "Karl Kraus," Benjamin describes Kraus' method of citation that I believe equally well 
applies to himself. He writes, "In the quotation that both saves and punishes, language 
proves the matrix of justice. It summons the word by its name" (SW2, 454; GS2, 363).411 
Benjamin continues: 
In citation the two realms - of origin and destruction - justify themselves before 
language. And conversely, only where they interpenetrate - in citation - is 
language consummated. In it is mirrored the angelic tongue in which all words, 
startled from the idy Ilic context of meaning, have become mottoes in the book of 
Creation." (SW2, 454; GS2, 363)412 
Wolin comments here that, "When the method was successful - as, for example, 
in his great surrealist-inspired collection of aphorisms, One-Way-Street- the results were 
extraordinary. But when his anti-discursive bent was carried to an extreme, the dismal 
410 
"Methode dieser Arbeit: literarische Montage. !ch habe nichts zu sagen. Nur zeigen. 
!ch werde nichts Wertvolles entwenden und mir keine geistvollen Formulierungen 
aneignen. Aber die Lumpen, den Abfall: die will ich nicht inventarisieren sondern sie 
auf die einzig m6gliche Weise zu ihrem Rechte kommen !assen: sie ve1rwenden." 
411 
"Im rettenden und strafenden Zitat erweist die Sprache sich als die Mater der 
Gerechtigkeit. Es ruft das Wort beim Namen auf, bricht es zers!Orend aus dem 
Zusammenhang, eben damit aber ruft es dasselbe auch zuruck an seinen Ursprung." 
412 
"Vor der Sprache weisen sich beide Reiche - Ursprung so wie Zerst6rung- im Zitat-
ist sie vollendet. Es spiegelt sich in ihm die Engelsprache, in welcher a/le Worte, aus 
dem idyllischen Zusammenhang des Sinnes aufgest6rt, zu Matti in dem Buch der 
Schopfung geworden sind " 
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result could prove infuriating."413 The infuriating Benjamin, is for Wolin, the 
Benjamin of the Arcades. Wolin's assessment of the Arcades is ultimately an assessment 
of its fundamental philosophical unit, the dialectical-image. However, since the Arcades 
Project requires a fundamentally different exegesis than most works less fragmentary and 
disjointed in nature, and since this work, in particular, places significant emphasis on the 
reader's ability to theorize in the manner that Benjamin himself does, it is necessary to 
investigate the status of the dialectical-image as a method for constructing historical texts. 
In "Theses XVII," Benjamin writes that: 
The historical materialist approaches a historical object only where it confronts him 
as a monad. In this structure he recognizes the sign of a messianic arrest of 
happening, or (to put it differently) a revolutionary chance in the fight for the 
oppressed past. He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific era out of the 
homogeneous course of history; thus, he blasts a specific life out of the era, a 
specific work out of the lifework. (SW4, 396; GSJ, 703)414 
Contrary to how history tends to be conceived, Benjamin suggests the flow of time 
confronts the historian as a totality, the monad, and that its apprehension consists in 
413 Wolin, "Walter Benjamin's Failed Messianism: One-Way Street," 34. 
414 Der historische Materialist geht an einen geschichtlichen Gegenstand einzig und 
allein da heran, wo er ihm als Monade entgegentritt. In dieser Struktur erkennt er das 
Zeichen einer messianischen Stillstellung des Geschehens, anders gesagt, einer 
revolutionaren Chance im Kampfe fur die unterdruckte Vergangenheit. Er nimmt sie 
wahr, um eine bestimmte Epoche aus dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte 
herauszusprengen; so sprengt er ein bestimmtes Leben aus der Epoche, so ein bestimmtes 
Werk aus dem Lebenswerk." 
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arresting the movement of history, not in attempting to articulate its flow or in 
justifying its trajectory. 
A return to Leibniz, as Benjamin himself suggests in the "Theses" just quoted, 
furnishes the philosophical justification for Benjamin's strange formulation. In his 
Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz defines individual substances, the monad, as that 
which contains all predicates within itself, writing: 
Now it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things and 
that, when a proposition is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not 
explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually. That is what 
the philosophers call in-esse, when they say that the predicate is in the subject. 
Thus the subject term must always contain the predicate term, so that one who 
understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know that the predicate 
belongs to it.415 
Leibniz continues: 
Since this is so, we can say that the nature of an individual substance or of a 
complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to 
allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is 
attributed. 416 
The predicates of objects also include their temporal dimension. Imagined from God's-
eye-view, all possible pasts and futures are inscribed on the object and are at least 
415 G. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. Daniel Graber and Roger Ariew 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 8. 
416 Ibid. 
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virtually detectable. Leibniz continues: 
Thus when we consider carefully the connection of things, we can say that from all 
time in Alexander's soul there are vestiges of everything that has happened to him 
and marks of everything that will happen to him and even traces of everything that 
happens in the universe, even though God alone could recognize them all.417 
Leibniz's description re-imagines the temporal in essentially spatial terms. 
Temporality is effectively negated in "God's perspective." Past and future are eternally 
present in the object and mark it. For Leibniz, as for Kant, a notion of time is, 
epistemologically speaking, necessary for mortal creatures so that perceptions can be 
organized, even though, ontologically speaking there is something fundamentally un-real 
about this. While the historical object contains all its predication within itself, the human 
mind requires history for this to become apparent. 
[ ... ] God, seeing Alexander's individual notion or haeccity, sees in it at the same 
time the basis and reason for all the predicates which can be said truly of him, for 
example that he vanquished Darius and Porus; he even knows a priori (and not by 
experience) whether he died a natural death or whether he was poisoned, something 




Whereas for Leibniz the marks of the historical object are only fully readable by God 
and only virtually accessible to the historian, for Benjamin, the future and past 
temporalities seem to be buried in the details of the historical object. As with Benjamin's 
insistence on a relational ontology in contrast to the atomism of liberalism and positivism, 
the truth of history is one produced relationally. History is the present in relation to a 
past, in which that past becomes visible for what it was. 
Benjamin writes: 
History deals with connections and with arbitrarily elaborated causal chains. But 
since history affords an idea of the fundamental citability of its object, this object 
must present itself, in its ultimate form, as a moment of humanity. In this moment, 
time must be brought to a standstill. (SW4, 403; GSJ, 1233)419 
And later, 
(If one looks upon history as a text, then one can say of it what a recent author has 
said of literary texts - namely, that the past has left in them images comparable to 
those registered by a light-sensitive plate. 'The future alone possesses developers 
strong enough to reveal the image in all its details [ .... ] The historical method is a 
philological method based on the book of life. 'Read what was never written,' runs 
419 
"Die Geschichte hat es mit Zusammenhangen zu tun und mit beliebig ausgesponnenen 
Kausalketten. lndem sie aber von der grundsatzlichen Zitierbarkeit ihres Gegenstandes 
einen Begriff gibt, mu.ft derselbe in seiner hochsten Fassung sich als ein Augenblick der 
Menschheit darbieten. Die Zeit mu.ft in ihm stillgestellt sein." 
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a line in Hofmannsthal. The reader one should think of here is the true 
historian.) (SW4, 405; GSJ, 1238)420 
Benjamin suggests the image of unfolding a fan as one that is also descriptive of 
the potential for mining the endless content of dialectical, that is, historical images. In 
One-Way Street, Benjamin explains: 
[ ... ] the faculty of imagination is the gift of interpolating into the infinitely small, of 
inventing, for every intensity, an extensiveness to contain its new, compressed 
fullness - in short, of receiving each image as if it were that of the folded fan, which 
only in spreading draws breadth and flourishes, in its new expanse, the beloved 
features within it. (SWJ, 466; GS4, 117)421 
It is in the detail, therefore, that the virtual dimensions of the historical object become 
potentially legible. In contrast to normative notions of historiography, Benjamin regards 
the past and the future to be present within the object of history when viewed 
monadologically. Recognizing the historical object as a monad is to relate to the image of 
420 
"Will man die Geschichte als einen Text betrachten, dann gilt von ihr, was ein neuerer 
Autor von literarischen sagt: die Vergangenheit habe in ihnen Bilder niedergelegt, die 
man denen vergleichen konne, die von einer lichtempfindlichen Platte festgehalten 
werden. 'Nur die Zukunft hat Entwickler zur Verfugung, die stark genug sind, um das 
Bild mit alien Details zum Vorschein kommen zu !assen. [. . .] Die historische Methode 
ist eine philologische, der das Buch des Lebens zugrunde liegt. 'Was nie geschrieben 
wurde, lesen' heifit es bei Hofmansthal. Der Leser, an den hier zu denken ist, ist der 
wahre Historiker." 
421 
"[. .. } das Vermogen der Phantasie ist die Gabe, im unendlich Kleinen zu 
interpolieren, jeder Intensitiit als Extensivem ihre neue gedriingte Fulle zu erfinden, kurz, 
jedes Bild zu nehmen, als sei es das des zusammengelegten Fachers, das erst in der 
Entfaltung Atem holt und mit der neuen Breite die Zuge des geliebten Menschen in seinem 
Innern aujfuhrt." -
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the past relationally, in which the present and the past illuminate a truth: this is the 
"messianic arrest of happening," (messianischen Stilltsellung). It "blast a specific era out 
of the homogeneous course of history" (SW4, 396; GSJ, 703).422 
Contrary to Weber's assertions, for Benjamin, "homogenous empty time," a 
discussion of which he first broaches in the Tragic Drama, is the mythic time. Weber had 
argued that the consequence of the Protestant Reformation was to de-mystify the 
European social, including notions of temporality. Whereas Weber saw this change in the 
understanding of time as a sign of secularization, of de-spiritualization, Benjamin 
characteristically sees the opposite, namely, the persistence of a world view that shares 
conceptual affinities with Greek and Roman pagan imaginaries. Homogenous empty time 
shares some conceptual affinities with H.A.L Fischer's characterization, often attributed 
to Arnold J. Toynbee that "history is just one damn thing after another." It is the beat by 
which events are stamped out. It can also include a notion of the teleofogical, in that what 
comes after is explained by demonstrating necessary relationships with its causes. In this 
sense, Schottker notes that Benjamin's notion ofhomogenous empty time is also related 
to his critique of progress, in which the supposition of a natural telos in liberal ideology, 
by which the social world constantly improves as if by natural laws, leads to a disinterest 
in the now. 423 
In contrast, Benjamin's notion of now-time (Jetztzeit) in which all time is at least 
virtually recognizable in the "now" of the monad, breaks with the notion of time as a 
422 
"[. .• ] eine bestimmte Epoche aus dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte 
herauszusprengen [. .. .]" 
423 Schottker, "Erinnem," 293. 
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current simply marking the passage of events. Recourse to the operations of a 
religious calendar is useful here to elucidate the relational moment in Benjamin's theory 
of history. As Taylor helpfully notes, holy days, let us use those of the Jewish calendar, 
are in some sense temporally "closer" to the historical event than the profane day that 
preceded it, even though the holy day (holiday) falls chronologically speaking "later" in 
the year. Thus, Passover brings a faithful Jewish community closer to ancient Egypt. 
Through remembrance, through ritual, through prayer, those celebrating the Passover 
bring distant events back into a present that in some sense negates the linear logic of 
mechanical time or homogeneous empty time as that which simply marks the passing of 
events. 
The past also illuminates something about the present. A given Passover might 
have certain significance due to the current historical situation that it did not (seem to) 
posses previously. Passover celebrated in Berlin in the year following Kristallnacht, for 
example, might call forth a reading of the holy day that would not have been apparent 
earlier. This again changes the past itself. Present circumstances also refract the present 
back upon the original Passover. There is something to be discovered in the meaning of 
Passover, in the "original" historical event, as a result of the present circumstances that 
were not readily discemable at other historical junctures. When Hamann argues, for 
example, that his relationship to his contemporary philosophers is similar to that of 
Socrates to the Sophists, the image not only tells us something about Hamann's present, it 
simultaneously reveals something about Socrates' situation. The truth of history, for 
Benjamin, is constructed relationally, through the image, in which the image as monad 
brings forth a constellation of details that provide insight into reality. In this respect, 
Adorno's claim that"[ ... ] truth is a constellation of ideas that together constitute the 
divine name and these crystallize within the detail, their force field"424 can be read as 
establishing the underlying logic that informs the Arcades Project and Benjamin's 
preoccupation with the minutiae of modernity more generally. 
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Reading history monadologically, then, seems to allow for a "messianic arrest," in 
the sense that in the object, time can be glimpsed as present, and the detail as that special 
dimension in which the virtual futures and pasts of the object are secretly inscribed. 
"Exploding" the historical event out of empty time is the moment of recognition when it 
is seen as a constellation, referencing something that occurred perhaps eons ago, or 
something that is yet to happen, but which is legible in the present by the keen (that is, the 
historical materialist) observer. 
It is here that we attain a better grasp of the revelatory power of memory 
discussed in Chapter Two. We recall that according to Bergson, memory is the faculty 
that provides the "spirit" of a perceptual event; it changes a fleeting perceptual moment 
into a lived experience that has duration. It was also discussed that for Benjamin, one of 
the important insights provided by Bergson's theory was the distinction between 
contemplative and motoric memory. In relation to reading the real, Benjamin would 
counsel that the details contained in the idea, (or, the monad, or, the thought-image) need 
to be encountered with contemplative memory. As Schottker notes, Benjamin equates 
remembrance with awakening. By connecting memory and awakening, Benjamin 
424 Adorno, "Introduction to Benjamin's Schriften," 6. 
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changes the terms of the analysis from one limited to the past, to an event in the 
present. Memory of what has been, allows the reader of the social to see what is. 
Memory becomes the cornerstone of a new dialectic of history. 425 It is in the detail that 
the truth of modernity is hidden, and it requires a particular gaze to illuminate it. "The 
dialectical image can," writes Benjamin, "be defined as the involuntary memory of a 
redeemed humanity" (SW4, 403; GSJ, 1233).426 
III - Traces of Myth and the (Dis)appearance of Truth 
The fragments that comprise the Arcades Project are monads which present the 
reader with opportunities to gain insight into the true nature of the real. I am indebted to 
Wiesenthal for her insight that the dialectical-image is Benjamin's formulation for what 
in earlier works he termed the extreme. 427 The extreme, of course, is the idea in ontology, 
the act of rescue in "epistemology," the artwork in aesthetic theory, and the perceptual 
content of actual lived experience. The relation to epistemology and theology is also 
noted by Rochlitz, who suggests that the fragment is the "repetition of origin in language, 
an exercise in naming. "428 . The fragments are offered to the reader as one part of a 
dialectic in which a moment of truth could potentially be generated inter-textually, i.e., 
typologically, predicated on a critical, even a subversive reading. This structure is 
425 Schottker, "Erinnern," 279. 
426 
"Das dialektische Bild ist zu definieren als die unwillkurliche Erinnerung der er/Osten 
Menschheit." 
427 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 70. 
428 Rochlitz, The Disenchantment of Art, 38. 
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essentially that of Benjamin's Schlegel-inspired aesthetic theory, in which the textual 
monad, the thought-image, occupies the same position as a work of art in that it attains 
completion by being read. The truth generated by the dialectic of historical materialist 
cultural critic and textual monad of nineteenth century Parisian culture, represents a 
possible moment of recognition, which is synonymous with its rescue, and the messianic 
arrest of happening. 
But how, exactly is a truth about capitalist modernity to be recognized, rescued, 
and arrested in a newspaper fragment from the Bibliotheque Nationale? How are these 
supposed "monads" to propel the historian, the reader of the Arcades, the reader of the 
social toward any sort of recognition, especially toward a recognition that entails a certain 
revolutionary momentum? And what exactly is the truth that the Arcades Project tries to 
help the reader realize? To delve into these questions more deeply,. it will prove useful to 
introduce Benjamin's notion of the trace, especially with respect to myth. Since the 
mythic in Capital is especially readable in the fetish, we will tum first to that concept. 
Benjamin's social analysis is in some respects an attempt to grasp what it means 
for the concept of experience when the appearance of Capital, free market exchange and 
the accumulation of consumer goods devoid of any obvious signs of oppression, conflict 
with the essence of Capital, the exploitation of workers, given that these irreconcilable 
dimensions are created and experienced by the same subject, the worker or more 
generally, the working class. Marx noted that while consumption happens in the bright 
light of exchange, value-creation takes place behind the backs of workers. That is to say, 
that there is an oppressive dimension to Capital that is not readily discemable in the 
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phenomenal appearance of Capital's primary incarnation, the commodity. The 
language of essence and appearance is instructive here. The mythic dimension of Capital 
is its appearance. Its essence is the (under-)side of production. According to Marx, what 
defines Capital as Capital, and not some other type of economic organization is not the 
mere existence of markets and exchange, which have been present in various forms 
throughout much of recorded human history, but the mode of production peculiar to it. 
That is, the essence of Capital is value-creation, much of which in the 19th century was 
predicated on factory work. Moving from the realm of commodity display and 
consumption, to the realm of production means, for Benjamin, penetrating the mythic and 
discovering a theological reality: hell. Only when the reality of the situation is 
comprehended, namely, that modernity is not the mythic paradise suggested by 
advertisement, the prevalence of consumer goods, and the promises of more leisure time, 
but an actual hell, can a turn out of this state even be contemplated. If the theological 
reality of modernity is not brought into the foreground in analysis, if European Capital is 
not recognized as hellish, then any attempt to better the lot of the working class is, a 
priori, doomed to failure. This point is one that Marx failed to incorporate fully into his 
political projections. Benjamin and the members of the Frankfurt School were keenly 
aware that "worker revolutions" often meant nothing more than a change in authoritarian 
leadership, and not egalitarian changes to the relations of production. Being caught by 
the mythic spell of commodity fetishism seems a sign for Benjamin that the other side, 
the deleterious consequences of capitalist production and the hell this produces, remains 
hidden. 
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This is not to maintain that the fetish dimension was not fully recognized by 
Marx, who analyzed this point in his first chapter of Capital, a passage which Benjamin 
cites in full in the Arcades Project: 
A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing and easily understood. Its 
analysis shows that in reality it is a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical 
subtleties and theological niceties. So far as it is a value in use, there is nothing 
mysterious about it .... The form of wood is altered by making a table out of it; 
nevertheless, this table remains wood, an ordinary material thing. As soon as it 
steps forth as commodity, however, it is transformed into a material immaterial 
thing. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in the face of all other 
commodities, it stands on its head, and out of its wooden brain it evolves notions 
more whimsically than if it had suddenly begun to dance. [G l 3a,2]429 
I believe that this passage marks Benjamin's Marxian starting point, which informs a 
great deal of the analysis in the Arcades. The mythic spell of Capital, or the experience 
of being submerged in the appearances of Capital, is theorized in a double sense, both of 
which have already been alluded to. First, the myth of the commodity, its fetish value, is 
429 
"'Eine Ware erscheint auf den ersten Blick ein selbstverstandliches trivia/es Ding. 
lhre Analyse ergibt, daj3 sie ein sehr vertracktes Ding ist, vol/ metaphysischer 
Spitzfindigkeit und theologisher Mucken. Soweit sie Gebrauchswert [sic], ist nicht 
Mystisches an ihr ... Die Form des Holzes wird verandert, wenn man aus ihm einen Tisch 
macht; nichtsdestoweniger bleibt der Tisch Holz, ein ordinares sinnliches Ding. Aber 
sobald er als Ware auftritt, verwandelt er sich in ein sinnliches ubersinnliches Ding. Er 
steht nicht nur mit seinen Fuj3en auf dem Boden, sondern er stellt sich alien anderen 
Waren gegenuber auf den Kopf und entwickelt aus seinem HolzkopfGrillen, vie/ 
wunderlicher, als wenn er ausfreien Stilcken zu tanzen beganne." The original citation is 
found in Marx, Capital, 163. 
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found in its promise to fulfill a wish, usually an archaic one deeply embedded within 
the text of a culture's imaginary. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is mythic in 
the sense of being complicit in generating a circular temporality which condemns the 
working class to their bondage in a manner comparable to the bondage biblical 
theologians argued was endemic to the ancient Greek imaginary which regarded humans 
as inextricably bound to a pre-determined fate. For Benjamin, it is precisely the very new 
in modernity that wears the face of the "ever-same." "The essence of the mythical 
event," writes Benjamin in "Convolute D," "is return" [DlOa,4].430 The new is the old in 
the sense that Marx had discovered when he noted that exploitation takes place behind the 
backs of the workers. In the very newest commodity, in the newest fetishized item, the 
relations of production are reproduced, and if anything changes, it is often only the 
exploitative dimension that is intensified. The product may be new, but the modes of 
production, the relations of production, remain exploitative. 
The productive dimension, and, therefore, the exploitative dimension, is not 
directly encountered in the commodity, however. This appearance of not being the result 
of a specific set of productive relations is what allows the commodity to function as a 
cipher, that is what allows it, in a psycho-social sense, to function as a fetish. A letter by 
Adorno, cited by Benjamin in "Convolute N," states,"[ ... ] the alienated things are 
hollowed out and, as ciphers, they draw in meanings. Subjectivity takes possession of 
430 
"Die Essenz des mythischen Geschehens ist Wiederkehr." 
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them insofar as it invests them with intentions of desire and fear" [N5,2.]431 The 
alienated things are commodities, among other moments of the social, which in the 
context of actual lived experience, relate to the culture that consumes them as vessels that 
absorb the hopes and wishes of the public and reflects these back at those consumers. 
Since the commodity's history is not self-evidently inscribed upon its face, the cultural 
imaginary provides it with one drawn from the reservoir of myth. 
Both of these aspects of myth, both of the appearances of Capital, need to be 
recognized simultaneously, if the awakening Benjamin hopes to effect is to occur. It is 
the contradiction between the hopes that accrue around the fetish dimension of the 
commodity and the objective social relations to which commodity production necessarily 
condemns the working class in Capital that represents the gate through which the Messiah 
might come. The potential to recognize this theological reality exists at any and all 
moments. This is the "messianic view," which, instead of seeing the world as "empty" 
and "homogeneous," recognizes the potential for agency based on the apprehension of 
social reality. The commodity here can be transposed into a dialectical-image, if the 
observer remembers the real history of production, that is, if the observer stands in a 
relation to the object in which a truth about both the observer and the object are revealed 
in their relation. 
For Benjamin, the experience of living amongst the representations of Capital, in 
the psychic landscape of advertising, commodity display and commodity consumption is 
431 
"[ ••• ] Jndem an Dingen ihr Gebrauchswert abstirbt, werden die entfremdeten 
ausgeholt und ziehen als Chiffern Bedeutungen herbei. lhrer bemachtigt sich die 
Subjektivitat, indem sie lntentionen von Wunsch und Angst in sie einlegt." 
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akin to living reality as a dream. "Capitalism was a natural phenomenon with which 
a new dream-filled sleep came over Europe, and, through it, a reactivation of mythic 
forces" [Kla,8.]432 The concept of the dream in Benjamin's work includes both meanings 
it has in colloquial English and German. To dream means to experience a reality that is 
fundamentally unreal, and, it references a wish, a hope, a desire. For Benjamin, this 
wish-fulfilling aspect of the commodity is conspicuously present in modem technology. 
Perhaps counter to contemporary discourses, modem technology is the very site of the 
archaic. "Only a thoughtless observer," Benjamin writes in "Convolute N": 
can deny that correspondences come into play between the world of modem 
technology and the archaic symbol-world of mythology. Of course, initially the 
technologically new seems nothing more than that. But in the very next childhood 
memory, its traits are already altered. Every childhood achieves something great 
and irreplaceable for humanity. By the interest it takes in technological 
phenomena, by the curiosity its displays before any sort of invention or machinery, 
every childhood binds the accomplishments of technology to the old worlds of 
symbol. There is nothing in the realm of nature that from the outset would be 
exempt from such a bond. Only, it takes form not in the aura of novelty but in the 
aura of the habitual. In memory, childhood, and dream. [N2a, 1 ]433 
432 
"Der Kapitalismus war eine Naturerscheinung, mit der ein neuer Traumschlaf uber 
Europa kam und in ihm eine Reaktivierung der mythischen Krafte." 
433 Daft zwischen der Welt der modernen Technik und der archaischen Symbolwelt der 
Mythologie Korrespondenzen spielen, kann nur der gedankenlose Betrachter leugnen. 
Zunachst wirkt das technisch Neue freilich allein als solches. Aber schon in der nachsten 
kindlichen Erinnerung andert es seine Zuge. Jede Kindheit leistet etwas Groj3es, 
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In technology the dreams of previous generations are realized. However, being 
realized does not mean technology is any less an element of the dream. Instead, actual 
technological innovations represent a movement from one level of the dream to another: 
It is the movement from the dream, in the sense of an un-fulfilled wish, to one that is 
fulfilled, but is not experienced in _its reality. 
"Convolute G," entitled "Iron Construction," begins with a quote from Michelet 
that each epoch dreams the one to follow. Later in the Arcades, Benjamin adds a poetic 
description by Ferdinand Langle and Emile V anderbruch, which brilliantly depicts how 
the future tends to be imagined through the categories of the past: 
Yes, when all the world from Paris to China 
Pays heed to your doctrine, 0 divine Saint-Simon, 
The glorious Golden Age will be reborn. 
Rivers will flow with chocolate and tea, 
Sheep roasted whole will frisk on the plain, 
And sauteed pole will swim in the Seine. 
Fricasseed spinach will grow on the ground, 
Garnished with crushed fried croutons; 
The trees will bring forth apple compotes, 
And farmers will harvest boots and coats. 
Unersetzliches fiir die technischen Phiinomene, ihre Neugier fiir a/le Art von Erfindungen 
und Maschinerien die technischen Errungenschaften an die a/ten Symbolwelten. Es gibt 
nichts im Bereiche der Natur, das solcher Bindung von Hause aus entzogen ware. Nur 
bildet sie sich nicht in der Aura der Neuheit sondern in der der Gewohnung. In 
Erinnerung, Kindheit und Traum." 
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It will snow wine, it will rain chickens, 
And ducks cooked with turnips will fall from the sky434 
(Arcades, 171; GS5, 232)* 
If Benjamin is correct in holding that the inspiration for technological innovation is in 
I 
part derived from the archive of a culture's imaginary, then it seems plausible that this 
reading can be done in reverse. The appearance of modern technology can be seen as 
providing insight into the collective dreams of a people, and technological innovations 
furnish an opportunity for the cultural analyst to interpret these dreams. Benjamin 
provides the opening for this mass dream analysis when he suggests that what is internal 
for the individual, such as health and the unconscious, is externalized for the collective 
[Kl,5.] Manifestations of the social collective, architecture, museums, public spaces, 
commodities, and technological innovations, are manifestations of the collective 
unconscious. "Not architecture alone but all technology is, at certain stages, evidence of 
a collective dream" [F 1 a,2. ]435 Contrary to Weber's notion that the modern social is de-
mythologized, for Benjamin it represents the very site of the mythic, because it is here 
that the wishes of the past are coming to fruition. 
434 
"Oui, quand le monde entier, de Paris jusqu 'en Chine, I 0 divin Saint-Simon, sera 
dans ta doctrine, IL 'age d'or doit renaftre avec tout son eclat, I Lesfleuves rouleront du 
the, du chocolat; I Les moutons tout r6tis bondiront dans la plaine, I Et !es brochets au 
bleu nageront dans la Seine; I Les epinards viendront au monde fricasses, I Avec des 
croutonfrits tout autout concasses; I Et I 'on moissonnera des carricks et des bottes; 
II neigera du vin, ii pleuvra des poulets, I Et du ciel /es canards tomberont aux navets. " 
*This quote does not correspond to the pagination otherwise used in the Arcades Project 
and is therefore cited in the same manner as Benjamin's other works have been. 
435 
"Auch die Technik, nicht nur die Architektur, ist in gewissen Stadien Zeugnis eines 
Kollektivtraums." 
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The fetish dimension of the commodity has a short half-life, however. Since 
the essence of the commodity, at least its fetish essence, is shaped by the psychic 
character of the culture that consumes it, the fetish dimension is inherently unstable. The 
commodities, which function as ciphers that absorb and then project back at the consumer 
the promises of archaic dreams, sooner or later dissolve, and the commodity begins to 
take on the aura of trash. Yet, before becoming trash, the commodity presents a 
revelatory opportunity to the observer. In the constellation produced by the trace of what 
was once hoped for in the commodity, in conjunction with the reality of the commodity as 
just another piece of consumer culture, decaying and out of fashion, a moment of 
potential opens up, where the myth can be more readily apprehended than when it is 
shrouded in the hopes and desires of the collective. The reality that emerges is that the 
" 
archaic dream of freedom offered up in the commodity is predicated on bondage. This 
logic can be made more accessible by briefly referring to Aristotelian value-ethics. 
Aristotle was not the first to theorize that behind most desires lies the ultimate 
desire to be happy. Happiness is the final end that is not desired for any other reason but 
is an end-in-itself. The wishes archived in the cultural imaginary, the wish to fly, possess 
magical healing powers, have easy access to good food and drink, live without needing to 
work, and the like, are desires of a second order. These desires are desired for what they 
might provide those who posses them, the final end to be happy. Hobbes' famous 
passage from the Leviathan that life in a state of war is "solitary, nasty, brutish and short" 
could be easily expanded beyond the conditions of war to include the experiences most 
people of all epochs not born in the lap of luxury. Dreams of being free from the 
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harassing conditions of everyday life, mediated through the socio-historical 
categories available to these dreamers, is given in the description of the utopian condition 
by Langle and Vanderbruch cited above. Although the dreams of liberation from 
oppression and suffering take on the garb of fantastic imaginings, the underlying desire is 
Aristotle's ultimate end, happiness. It is less the ability to fly, to heal, or to conjure 
enormous meals than the final desire to be happy, healthy and free that is actually at play. 
This, however, is precisely the contradiction that inheres in the commodity. While the 
commodity actually bestows the magical powers previous epochs could only dream of, 
they provide them on the condition that the ultimate end, happiness, is not fulfilled. Like 
a mariner adrift on the ocean who dehydrates herself ever more when she tries to quench 
her thirst by drinking salt water, the commodity takes away more happiness than it 
provides. This contradiction, Benjamin believes, becomes temporarily legible in the 
commodity as the fetish luster dissipates and as the commodity moves on its psycho-
social journey from an object of wish-fulfillment to trash. On this path, there is a crucial 
moment, when both realities are present simultaneously, the presence of the pagan-mythic 
hope and the theological reality, the hell of exploitation upon which it is founded and 
which it simultaneously re-establishes. 
This is Benjamin's logic behind choosing the Parisian arcades as his model for a 
phenomenological investigation of the experience of Capital and the history of modernity. 
In their time, the Parisian arcades represented the height of modernity. They incarnated 
the dreams of a previous epoch and the hopes for a utopic future. Built with the new 
glass and steel construction materials, the arcades represented an incredible inversion of 
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norms that signaled the radical departure of modernity from previous epochs. The 
outside was made inside. The night was turned into day. Products from all four corners 
of the world were on display next to each other, their juxtaposition in the exhibition stalls 
as "natural" as various species of foliage growing in a forest. The arcades were also the 
fashionable places to be seen. They created the flaneur who could amble along the long 
passageways, endlessly "indoors," although not necessarily in shops. Benjamin explains 
the relation between the arcades and the dream world in "Convolute K": 
But just as the sleeper - in this respect like the madman - sets out on the 
macrocosmic journey through his own body, and the noises and feelings of his 
insides, such as blood pressure, intestinal churn, heartbeat, and muscle sensation 
(which for the waking and salubrious individual converge in a steady surge of 
health) generate, in the extravagantly heightened inner awareness of the sleeper, 
illusion or dream imagery which translates and accounts for them, so likewise for 
the dreaming collective, which, through the arcades, communes with its own 
insides. We must follow in its wake so as to expound the nineteenth century - in 
fashion and advertising, in buildings and politics - as the outcome of its dream 
visions. [Kl,4]436 
436 
"Wie nun der Schliifer aber - darin dem lrren gleich- durch seinen Leib die 
makrokosmische Reise antritt und die Geriiusche und Gefuhle des eignen lnnern, die dem 
Gesunden, Wachen sich zur Brandung der Gesundheit zusammenfugen, Blutdruck, 
Bewegungen der Eingeweide, Herzschlag und Muskelempfinden in seinen unerhort 
geschiirften innern Sinnen Wahn oder Traumbild, die sie ubersetzen und erkliiren, 
zeugen, so geht es auch dem triiumenden Kollektivum, das in Passagen in sein lnneres 
sich vertieft. Ihm milssen wir darin nachgehen, um das XIX Jahrundert in Mode und 
Reklame, Bauten und Politik als die Folge seiner Traumgeschichte zu deuten." 
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Following Benjamin's logic, if the arcades express the collective dreams of the 
culture from which they arose, and if they occupy a conspicuous place in the dream lives 
of the moderns, then the arcades can also be read as a dream element, as part of the 
(Durkheimian, not Jungian) collective unconscious. The arcades, however, are not read at 
the moment when they incarnate the wish, but rather when this fetish dimension is 
already waning. 
As Benjamin notes, by the time the last of the arcades was being constructed, the 
entire idea had decayed into utter kitsch. That moment of decay represents the liberatory 
potential, when the arcades could be recognized for what they had always been. The 
myth of the arcades gestured to the new abilities of modem technology, the power of 
industry, the liberties of the Parisian bourgeoisie. Yet, in reality, the arcades were never 
more than a momentary manifestation of the collective dream, supported by the 
continuous exploitation of the working class. Recognizing the arcades as a manifestation 
of modernity's dream means recognizing the mythic dimension of Capital, and seeing the 
actual as opposed to apparent history that underlies the commodities existence. This 
recognition, produced through the momentary constellation of the trace of the fetish in 
relation to the ascending sign of trash, allows, Benjamin hopes, for the Janus face of 
history to be apprehended. Does this recognition then represent the beginning of a truly 
revolutionary movement that is not reabsorbed into another mythic imaginary? Benjamin 
believes this to be so. Or at least, according to Benjamin's philosophy, this is what needs 
to occur if a truly liberatory movement is not to re-establish the very conditions of 
servitude that it aims to abolish. Unlike the German Social Democrats, or the 
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functionaries of any of the actually existing socialist state, and unlike the liberals, 
positivists, and vulgar-Marxists, who were all encumbered by mythic consciousness, the 
historical materialist is the one properly positioned to recognize the mythic dimension of 
Capital and, therefore, the only one capable of pulling the emergency brake on the train of 
"progress." 
IV - The Rescuing Gaze 
For Benjamin, the dialectical-~mage represents a revolutionary/messianic 
opportunity. However, since the essence of the object is constituted in relation with the 
observer, and since the object, the commodity, is a cipher, the moment ofrecognition is 
located in a change in the psychic relation to the object, in a change in the gaze. That is, 
in order to be in a position to recognize the crucial moment, the reader, the historian, the 
philosopher, the critic and the revolutionary, must adopt the proper historical materialist 
perspective. For Benjamin, this gaze is that of the melancholic, the mournful, the 
saturnine thinker. He explains: 
Mourning is the state of mind in which feeling revives the empty world in the form 
of a mask, and derives an enigmatic satisfaction in contemplating it. Every feeling 
is bound to an a priori object, and the representation of this object is its 
phenomenology. Accordingly the theory of mourning [ ... ] can only be developed 
in the description of that world which is revealed under the gaze of the melancholy 
man. For feelings, however vague they may seem when perceived by the self, 
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respond like a motorial reaction to a concretely structured world. (Tragic 
Drama 139; GSJ, 318)437 
Benjamin suggest that it is the melancholic who achieves the degree of self-alienation 
necessary to engage the world allegorically. 
The deadening of the emotions, and the ebbing away of the waves of life which are 
the source of these emotions in the body, can increase the distance between the self 
and the surrounding world to the point of alienation from the body. As soon as this 
symptom of depersonalization was seen as an intense degree of mournfulness, the 
concept of the pathological state, in which the most simple object appears to be a 
symbol of some enigmatic wisdom because it lacks any natural, creative 
relationship to us, was set in an incomparably productive context. (Tragic Drama, 
140; GSJ, 319)438 
There is a two-fold expression of the melancholic position. On the one hand, the 
melancholic is dull and slow. Perhaps for this reason, in the paradigmatic depiction of 
437 
"Trauer ist die Gesinnung, in der das Gefuhl die entleerte Welt maskenhaft neubelebt, 
um ein ratselhaftes Genugen an ihrem Anblick zu haben. Jedes Gefuhl ist gebunden an 
einen apriorischen Gegenstand und dessen Darstellung ist seine Phanomenologie. Die 
Theorie der Trauer [. .. } ist demnach nur der Beschreibungjener Welt, die unterm Blick 
des Melancholischen sich auftut, zu entrollen. Denn die Gefuhle, wie vage immer sie der 
Selbstwahrnehmung scheinen mogen, erwidern als motorisches Gebaren einem 
~egenstandlichen Aujbau der Welt." 
38 
"Die Ert6tung der Affekte, mit der die Lebenswellen verebben, aus denen sie sich im 
Leibe erheben, vermag die Distanz von der Umwelt bis zur Entfremdung vom eigenen 
Karper zu fuhren. lndem man dies Symptom der Depersonalisation als schweren Grad 
des Traurigseins erfaj3te, frat der Begriff von dieser pathologischen Verfassung, in 
welcher jedes unscheinbarste Ding, weil die naturliche und schajfende Beziehung zu ihm 
fehlt, as Chiffer einer ratselhaften Weisheit auftritt, in einen unvergleichlichfruchtbaren 
Zusammenhang." 
276 
sorrowful contemplation, Albrecht Diirer' s Melancholia I, 439 the dog and the stone, 
both emblems of sloth are in the foreground. On the other hand, the apathetic behaviour 
of the melancholic is associated with deep contemplation, of ever deepening penetration 
of the object. "The theory of melancholy has a very close connection with the doctrine of 
stellar influences. And of such influences only the most baleful, that of Saturn, could rule 
over the melancholy disposition" (Tragic Drama, 148; GSJ, 326.)440 However, while, 
"The astronomical explanation of this is obscure [ ... ]," it becomes less so if: 
the distance of the planet from the earth and consequently long duration of its orbit 
are no longer conceived in the negative sense of the Salerno doctors, but rather in a 
beneficent sense, with reference to the divine reason which assigns the menacing 
star to the remotest place, and if, on the other hand, the introspection of the 
melancholy man is understood with reference to Saturn which "as the highest planet 
and the one farthest from everyday life, the originator of all deep contemplation, 
calls the soul from externalities into the inner world, causes it to rise ever higher, 
finally endowing it with the utmost knowledge and with the gift of prophecy." 
(Tragic Drama, 149; GSJ, 326-327)441 
439 Albrecht Dilrer, Melancholia I, Staatliche Kunsthalle , Karlsruhe. 
440 
"Die Theorie der Melancholie steht in genauem Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von den 
Gestirneinfliissen. Und unter ihnen konnte nur der unheilvollste, jener des Saturn, der 
melancholischen Gemiitsart vorgesetzt sein." 
441 
"Hier ist die astronomische Deduktion dunkel. Anders wenn die Erdferne und die 
damit gegebene Zange Umlaufszeit des Planeten nicht mehr im bosen Sinne, dem die A'rzte 
von Sa/reno folgen, vielmehr mit einem Hinweis auf die gottliche Vernuft, die dem 
bedrohlichen Gestirn den fernsten Platz verordnet, in einem segensreichen aufgefaftt und 
andererseits der Tiefsinn des Betriibten aus Saturn begri.ffen wird, der, 'als hochster und 
dem taglichen Leben fernstehender Planet, als der Urheber jeder tiefen Kontemplation 
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The Melancholic (dis )position, then, is characterized by alienation, by 
contemplation, and deliberateness verging on the paralytic. It is the melancholic who has 
the gift of prophecy, especially of receiving prophetic dreams, and also the power of 
divination. However, this position is also one of madness. The affinity between the 
melancholic and certain forms of psychopathology is noted by Benjamin in the 
melancholic' s drive to uncover non-sensuous relationships, in the allegorical faculty. 
Like the schizophrenic, the allegorist engages in a certain type of "magical reading" by 
establishing relationships of meaning that disrupt normative interpretations of the world. 
Meaning is derived by discerning new relationships among objects which can all be read 
as signs in themselves. In this relationship, the notion of divination is of particular 
interest, since divination consists precisely in the act of culling meaning from objects that 
do not bear any obvious relationship to the human realm. The astrologer is perhaps the 
archetype of this method; one which shares important features with Benjamin's notions of 
translation and metaschematizing. 442 Indeed, divination is allegory of the social by 
another name. The melancholic position is the subjective state of the allegorist, who 
recognizes that everything is, at least potentially, readable. The allegorical position is one 
die Seele von Auj3erlichkeiten ins lnnere ruft, sie immer hoher steigen ltif3t und schliej3lich 
mit dem hochsten Wissen und prophetischen Gaben beschenkt. '" 
442 Michael Opitz, "Ahnlichkeit," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz and 
Erdmund Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 46 - 4 7: "Demnach setzt 
Obersetzen magisches Lesen voraus. Wie der Astrologe, der aus der Stellung der 
Planeten etwas herausliest, was nicht geschrieben steht, muf3 der Obersetzer das im 
Original lntendierte in eine andere Sprache ubertragen." 
part that comprises the gaze needed to discover the theological truth behind, or 
perhaps more precisely within the myth of modernity. 
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The "unit" of allegorical interpretation is the emblem. It is a synecdoche, a 
condensed reference, that gestures to a more elaborate meaning or narrative. In the 
mourning plays which Benjamin examines in the Tragic Drama, emblems appear as 
staging devises to indicate the relationship a given character has to the plot. For 
Benjamin, the baroque emblem re-appears in modernity as the commodity. Indeed, the 
fetish dimension of the commodity functions in essentially the same way as an emblem in 
a Baroque tragedy. In "Convolute J," Benjamin elaborates on the fetish character of the 
commodity, explaining that its meaning is its price: 
The "metaphysical subtleties" in which the commodity delights, according to Marx, 
are, above all, the subtleties of price formation. How the price of goods in each 
case is arrived at can never quite be foreseen, neither in the course of their 
production nor later when they enter the market. It is exactly the same with the 
object in its allegorical existence. At no point is it written in the stars that the 
allegorists' profundity will lead it to one meaning rather than another. And though 
it once may have acquired such a meaning, this can always be withdrawn in favor 
of a different meaning. The modes of meaning fluctuate almost as rapidly as the 
price of commodities. In fact, the meaning of the commodity is its price; it has, as 
commodity, no other meaning. Hence, the allegorist is in his element with 
commercial wares. As flaneur, he has empathized with the soul of the commodity; 
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as allegorist, he recognizes in the "price tag," with which the merchandise 
comes on the market, the object of his broodings - the meaning. [J80,2; J80a,1]443 
Benjamin is asking the reader of the Arcades to read the commodity as the baroque 
allegorist reads the emblem. Yet, this reading occurs in a double sense. 
We have seen that the Arcades as a text references the actual Parisian arcades. In 
these arcades, commodities were exhibited without regard for the history of their 
production. The displays of commodities brings them into an entir~ly haphazard 
relationships with one another. So too the Arcades text brings its fragments together 
without discemable connections. Headings for the convolutes, say, "Fashion" or "Dream 
House," offer only the most tentative organizational frame. Indeed, these headings give 
the reader about as much insight into the content of a given convolute as the name 
"Curiosity Shoppe" would give the passerby in the actual arcades insight into the contents 
of its wares. Similarly, if the text itself cites the indoor shops of Paris, the fragments 
which comprise the individual interpretive units of the Arcades cite the commodities 
themselves. The reader of the Arcades is being trained to read the commodities of the 
443 
"Die 'metaphysischen Spitzfindigkeiten, 'in denen sie sich nach Marx gefallt, sind vor 
allem die Spitzfindigkeiten der Preisgestaltung. Wie die Ware zum Preis kommt, das ltiftt 
sich nie ganz absehen, weder im Lauf ihrer Herstellung noch sptiter wenn sie sich auf 
dem Markt befindet. Ganz ebenso ergeht es dem Gegenstand in seiner allegorischen 
Existenz. Es ist ihm nicht an der Wiege gesungen worden, zu welcher Bedeutung der 
Tiefsinn des Allegorikers ihn befordern wird. Hat er aber solche Bedeutung einmal 
er ha/ten, so kann sie ihm jederseit gegen eine andere Bedeutung enttogen werden. Die 
Moden der Bedeutungen wechselten fast so schnell wie der Preis fur die Waren wechselt. 
In der Tat heiftt die Bedeutung der Ware: Preis; eine andere hat sie, als Ware, nicht. 
Darum ist der Allegoriker mit der Ware in seinem Element. Als flaneur hat er in die 
Warenseele sich eingefuhlt; als Allegoriker erkent er im 'Preisetikett, 'mit dem die Ware 
den Markt betritt, den Gegenstand seiner Grube lei - die Bedeutung - wieder." 
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modem European social by reading the fragments of the text allegorically. New 
interpretations of the social continuously present themselves to the attentive (that is, 
melancholic historical materialist) observer since the commodities of modernity are thrust 
into new relations through new juxtapositions, not determined beforehand by the logic of 
their production but rather by a fetishistic logic. 
As Wiesenthal notes, the "epistemological" significance of allegory for Benjamin 
is in setting phenomena free from the relations in which they have existed since the 
biblical Fall. The allegorical method consists of a certain kombinatoric, in which 
phenomena as ideas as images are shuffled into new relationships.444 Benjamin relates 
the allegorical method to the heraldic device of the rebus. Like the elements that 
compose the rebus, these monadic images, the commodities, are abstracted from the 
"false unity" in which they often appear. This, we recall, is the work of the concept, 
which has both an analytic and a synthetic function. As Linder explains in his article 
"Allegorie," for something to be the object of allegorical contemplation, it must be de-
contextualized, fragmented and isolated.445 "Phenomena," Benjamin reminds us, "do not 
[ ... ] enter the realm of ideas whole, in their crude empirical state, adulterated by 
appearances, but only in their basic elements, redeemed" (Tragic Drama, 33; GSJ, 
213.)446 Wiesenthal makes the connection between allegory and the rebus explicit, noting 
444 Wisenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 135. 
445 Burkhardt Lindner, "Allegorie," in Benjamins Begriffe, vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz and 
Erdmund Wizisla (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 67. 
446 
"Die Phanomene gehen aber nicht integral in ihrem rohen empirischen Bestande, dem 
der Schein sich beimischt, sondern in ihren Elementen allein, gerettet, in das Reich der 
ldeen ein." 
that, for Benjamin, allegory is expression in the same manner as language is 
expression. The principle behind image combination is similar to the method of word 
b. . 447 com mation. 
There are other instructive instances of redoubling that occur throughout the 
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Arcades text. As suggested above, trash has a certain critical potential inscribed upon it 
that becomes legible as the fetish character of the commodity wanes. This makes the 
figure of the rag-picker a significant trope, one that references the author himself. 
Benjamin is the textual rag-picker, collecting forgotten, seemingly useless pieces of 
Capital's debris in order to re-function them for his own purposes. In collecting precisely 
the refuse of modernity, Benjamin is strategically collecting those elements where the 
trace of the new and the trace of the old collide to expose a truth previously hidden. 
If Benjamin is the rag-picker, the reader, as was suggested above, is cast as the 
flaneur, strolling through the arcades with a certain, critical distance. The flaneur is the 
melancholic by another name, an allegorist, in that he is not fully engaged with the 
mercantile dimension of the arcades, but rather views the fetish content as if from above. 
He strolls by windows, looks at the other shoppers, but feels apart from the crowed. The 
flaneur par excellence for Benjamin was Baudelaire, who as a subject of the Arcades 
Project comprises its largest section. Baudelaire represents the position the reader needs 
to take vis-a-vis the Arcades as a text, and commodity fetishism in the world of capitalist 
modernity. As Benjamin reads him, Baudelaire was an allegorist and a theologian of 
modernity. 
447 Wiesenthal, Zur Wissenschaftstheorie Walter Benjamins, 106. 
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If Benjamin is the rag-picker and the reader a Baudelaire-like flaneur, 
Benjamin also includes two archetypes that function as antipodes to the correct way of 
reading the real, the gambler and the collector. The gambler is under the influence of a 
mythic temporality. He lives the boredom of homogeneous empty time. Time, for the 
gambler, knows no messianic opportunity of awakening. It is the time of factory work, of 
liberal and positivist beliefs in natural social progress. Boredom marks the gamblers 
psychic existence as it does that of the melancholic, but unlike the latter, the gambler 
attempts to use this state to produce an infernal "satisfaction." Instead of recognizing the 
revolutionary potential that inheres in each moment, the gambler turns homogeneous 
empty time into a narcotic. That is to say, Benjamin recognizes the similarity between 
games of chance and factory work, as intimated in my previous chapter. The factory 
work of pulling the levers of a machine is duplicated in the gambling halls, where pulling 
levers on a slot machine, or turning the roulette wheel, make the few seconds of waiting 
for the outcome, as close to anything like a true liberatory release as they will ever 
achieve. 
The other antipode in the Arcades is the collector, who unlike the gambler is not 
so much trapped by the fetish dimension of the commodity as by the liberal philosophical 
malady of constructing universalisms and totalities. For the collector, the commodity's 
use-value is its fetish-value. This point alone suggests why Benjamin maintains that the 
collector, "lives a piece of the dream life" [Hla,5.]448 However, the activity of collecting 
, itself also bears traces of the mythic. Detaching the commodity from its use-value allows 
448 
"[. .. ] lebt der Sammler [ ... } ein Stuck des Traumlebens." 
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it to "enter into the closest conceivable relation to things of the same kind" 
[Hla,2.]449 This is the logic of mimesis, which is the underlying logic of the mythic. In 
establishing relations of sameness at the level of the fetish, the collector strives for a 
certain "completeness." This desire too is indicative of the "mythic consciousness" of the 
collector. It echoes critiques of totalities in philosophy, suggested, for example, by 
Adorno in Negative Dialectics. Like Baudelaire, and like the flaneur, the collector too is 
an allegorist, albeit a mythic allegorist, who, like the Surrealists, only dreams of waking 
up. The collector is the "interpreter of fate," a fundamentally mythic category. For 
Benjamin following the Augustinian tradition, the opposite of fate is the freedom 
promised in the biblical tradition; freedom is theological. Whereas the collector 
represents the allegorist trapped by the mythic, the Baudelairian allegorists is one whose 
readings are informed by the theological. 
As Benjamin argues - see my discussion in Chapter Three - the Baroque 
allegorists faced the threat of a semiotic descent into meaninglessness that resulted from 
the fact that any sign could be potentially related to any signifier. Benjamin follows the 
Baroque allegorists in positing theology as the underlying assurance of a "really-real" 
beyond the illusion of myth, which assures meaning can be culled from the confusion of . 
signs. That is to say that the allegorist of commodity fetishism is tethered to a certain 
exegesis. There is a definite interpretive trajectory. Benjamin writes, "Melancholy 
betrays the world for the sake of knowledge. But in its tenacious self-absorption it 
embraces dead objects in its contemplation, in order to redeem them" (Tragic Drama, 
449 
"[ .. .} um in die denkbar engste Beziehung zu seinesgleichen zu treten." 
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157; 334.)450 The purpose of allegory is redemptive. Its goal is to glimpse the truth 
of the fetish within the fetish. The redemption of the object is its rescue from oblivion 
and rescue occurs through attention and remembrance. 
V - A Baudelairan Theology of Hell 
Benjamin speaks about modernity as hell in a number of senses. Capitalist 
modernity is the time of hell, it is the place of hell, and its cultural manifestations, such as 
paper money, are the emblems of hell. First, it is important to note that throughout the 
Arcades, Benjamin reiterates his central points variously in religious, aesthetic, political 
(esp. Marxian) and psychoanalytic discourses. Hell is the theological expression of what 
in the psychoanalytic idiom is the unconscious state, plagued by irrational and threatening 
dreams as opposed to a lucid, conscious waking life. The justification for this translation 
between theoretical paradigms is not only given in his theory of translation. With respect 
to the psychoanalytic it is based on Benjamin taking rather literally his assertion that what 
is internal for the individual is external for the collective [Kl ,5.] 
For Benjamin there is a parallel between a personal Freudian psychological 
topography and the architectural and spatial forms of the city. Hell in a psychoanalytic 
idiom is the unconscious, but the hell of the collective is physically located in specific 
areas of the city. Benjamin elaborates: 
450 
"Die Melancholie verriit die Welt um des Wissens willen. Aber ihre ausdauernde 
Versunkenheit nimmt die to ten Dinge in ihre Kontemplation auf, um sie zu retten." 
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One knew of places in ancient Greece where the way led down into the 
underworld. Our waking existence likewise is a land which, at certain hidden 
points, leads down into the underworld - a land full of inconspicuous places from 
which dreams arise. All day long, suspecting nothing, we pass them by, but no 
sooner has sleep come than we are eagerly groping our way back to lose ourselves 
in the dark corridors. By day, the labyrinth of urban dwellings resembles 
consciousness the arcades (which are galleries leading into the city's past) issue 
unremarked onto the streets. At night, however, under the enormous mass of 
houses, their denser darkness protrudes like a threat, and the nocturnal pedestrian 
hurries past - unless, that is, we have emboldened him to turn into the narrow lane. 
[Cla,2]451 
While this description of the city as reflecting dimensions of a Freudian psychology 
seems to remain a metaphor, the continuation of this passage demonstrates that Benjamin 
takes these descriptions somewhat literally. 
But another system of galleries runs underground through Paris: the Metro, where at 
dusk glowing red lights point the way into the underworld of names [ .... ] they have 
451 
"Man zeigte im a/ten Griechenland Stellen, an denen es in die Unterwelt hinabging. 
Auch unser waches Dasein ist ein Land, in dem es an verborgenen Stellen in die 
Unterwelt hinabgeht, vol! unscheinbarer Orter, wo die Traume miinden. Alie Tage gehen 
wir nichtsahnend an ihnen voriiber, kaum aber kommt der Schlaf, so fasten wir mit 
geschwinden Griffen zu ihnen zuriick und verlieren uns in den dunk/en Giingen. Das 
Hiiuserlabyrinth der Stiidte gleicht am hellen Tage dem Bewufttsein; die Passagen (das 
sind die Galerien, die in ihr vergangenes Dase in fiihren) miinden tagsiiber unbemerkt in 
die Straften Nachts unter den dunk/en Hausermassen aber tritt ihr kompakteres Dunkel 
erschreckend heraus und der spate Passant hastet an ihnen voriiber, es sei denn, daft wir 
ihn zur Reise durch die schmale Gasse ermuntert haben." 
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all thrown off the humiliating fetters of street or square, and here in the 
lightning-scored, whistle-resounding darkness are transformed into misshapen 
sewer gods, catacomb fairies. This labyrinth harbors in its interior not one but a 
dozen blind raging bulls, into whose jaws not one Theban virgin once a year but 
thousands of anemic young dressmakers and drowsy clerks every morning must 
hurl themselves. [Cla,2]452 
Hell, for Benjamin, can be spatially located in the modern capitalist city. Indeed, it is 
often these nether regions that capitalist production takes place. Even if the factories are 
not necessarily located underground, there is a certain demarcation which separates the 
darkened spaces of production from the bright day light of industrial consumption. 
As was suggested above in relation to the discussion of the fetish dimensions of 
the commodity, the hell of modernity is also marked by a circular temporality. So as not 
to cause any undue confusion: hell is modernity seen in its truth. Hell is what the 
historical materialist sees, while the mythic is modernity's hell as experienced by those 
who are still asleep. There exists, therefore, a necessary conflation of the language of 
myth and theology that relates to the position of the analyst vis-a-vis the social. The time 
of hell is endless repetition. In this, Benjamin sees Nietzsche's eternal return of the same 
452 
"Aber ein anderes System von Galerien, die unterirdisch durch Paris sich hinziehen: 
die Metro, wo am Abend rot die Lichter aufg!Uhen, die den Weg in den Hades der Namen 
zeigen. [. .. Sie] haven die schmachvollen Kett en der rue, der place von sich abgeworfen, 
sind hier im blitzdurchzuckten, pfzffdurchgellten Dunkel zu ungestalten Kloakengottern, 
Katakombenfeen geworden. Dies Labyrinth beherbergt in seinem Innern nicht einen 
sondern Dutzende blinder, rasender Stiere, in deren Rachen nicht jarlich eine 
thebanische Jungfrau, sondern allmorgentlich tausende bleichsuchtiger Midinetten, 
unausgeschlafener Kommis sich werfen mussen." 
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as an almost prophetic condemnation of modernity. Unlike Nietzsche's demon, the 
thought of whom is to inspire modems to engage life more rigorously since it may need to 
be repeated in exactly the same way to eternity, the eternal return for Benjamin is simply 
a description of the conditions of the oppressed classes who labour under the god of 
Capital. The sign of this circular temporality is boredom. Benjamin establishes the 
connection between hell, the mythic, the psychoanalytic and a Marxian politic, when he 
writes that, "Boredom- as index to participation in the sleep of the collective"453 [D3,7], 
or when he quotes Michelet, "There were 'true hells of boredom' in the spinning and 
weaving mills: 'Ever, ever, ever, is the unvarying word thundering in your ears from the 
automatic equipment which shakes even the floor. One can never get used to it"454 
[D4,5.] 
The hell of modernity, then, is spatially behind or below the public spaces of the 
city. Its temporarily is marked by a continuous repetition and return. It is the time of 
assembly line factory work, where each day bleeds into another, and each movement is 
the same as the one before. This repetition is also manifested in the fact that the broader 
social relations of oppression are not mitigated by future events. Subjectively, this state is 
marked by a certain ennui, a boredom, which again gestures towards the dream-like 
quality of modernity, the phenomenological experience of life lived under the spell of 
Capital's myth. In all of this, which Marx also noted, and which establishes an important 
453 
"Langeweile - als Index fur Teilnahme am Schlaf des Kollektivs." 
454 
"[ •. . ]forme une description, pleine d'intelligence etde pitie, de la condition, vers 
1840, des premiers manceuvres specialises. Voici 'I 'en/er de I 'ennui' dans /es tissages: 
'Toujours, toujours, toujours, c 'est le mot invariable que tonne a notre Oreille le 
roulement automatique dont tremblent !es planches. 'Jamais I 'on ne s y habitue." 
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relationship with Durkheim's notion of the religious, the alienation of workers also 
leads to a mythic experience of the social, in that humanly created forces, such as the 
economy, take on independent and threatening objective guises, like gods of the ancient 
pantheon. This is the overwhelming experience of a mythic engagement with Capital, the 
experience to which Capital predisposes its subject. Since value-creation takes place 
behind the backs of the workers, there is a sense in which these relations of production 
are not seen as relations among people but, as Marx noted, as relations among things. 
Things, objective forces, economic "laws," then, are what determine human life the way 
pagan gods determined the lives of the ancients. 
Throughout "Convolute J," Benjamin associates Baudelaire with Satan. He 
includes a passage from Albert Thibaudet with reference to Baudelaire, which reads, 
"He's just a Satan with a furnished apartment, a Beelzebub of the dinner table"455 
[J13a,5.] In another quote, the same author is somewhat more cautious, noting that, "The 
philosophical and literary Catholicism ... of Baudelaire had need of an intermediate 
position ... where it could take up its abode between God and the Devil"456 [13,1.] Later, 
Benjamin finds another quote for the allegorical poet of modernity: "He would have 
nothing to do with women if he were not hoping that, through them, he could offend God 
and make the angels weep" [Jl 7a,l.]457 Benjamin characterizes Baudelaire's work as an 
455 
"Ce n 'est qu 'un Satan hotel garni, un Belzebuth de table d'h6te." 
456 
"Le catholicisme ... philosophique et litteraire de Baudelaire avait besoin d 'un lieu 
intermediare ... ou se loger entre Dieu et le diable." 
457 
"ll laisserait !es femmes bien tranquilles s 'ii n 'esperait point, par leur moyen, offenser 
Dieu et faire pleurer !es anges. " 
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"apocalyptic reverie" [J47a,3.]458 Although the Satanic might not generally be 
associated with theology, Benjamin astutely notes that, "We may call it theological, 
insofar as hell is a subject of theology" [D5a,6. ]459 
The association of the archetype of modem allegorical reading as incarnating the 
gaze of Satan is not simply hyperbole, but is consistent with the figure of the Devil in 
orthodox readings of the second creation narrative in Genesis. After all, it was the snake 
who convinced the "first humans" to betray "the world for the sake of knowledge." 
Unlike the earlier reading of Genesis examined in Chapter Two with respect to 
Benjamin's theory oflanguage, where the Devil's temptation leads to the solipsism or 
relativism to which the positivists are condemned, the allegorist's engagement with the 
realm of knowledge is for the eventual purpose of redemption. Even this reading of Satan 
in the Fall of humanity can be integrated within an admittedly heterodox interpretation of 
the second Genesis creation story. 
This heterodox reading stems from questions regarding God's omniscience. The 
central theological issue can be stated as follows: Why did God include the snake in the 
garden, if he knew that this would be the eventual source of the Fall of humanity and its 
continuous suffering? If God's omnipotence and omniscience is affirmed, then the 
Manichean answer that there exists a force equal but opposite to that of God, the Devil, 
cannot be tolerated. However, another solution suggests itself: perhaps the snake 
represents a necessary station on the path to redemption. If the Genesis narrative is read 
458 
"[ ... ] apokalyptischen Traumerei [ ... ]" 
459 
"Sofern die Holle ein theologischer Gegenstand ist, kann man sie in der Tat eine 
theologische nennen." 
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in conjunction with the first creation story, as well as in relation to the entire biblical 
narrative, it can be argued that the Fall of humanity is necessary in order to enable the 
journey back. The origin is the goal, but the goal is changed by the journey; it is no 
longer the same place one left.460 The entire biblical text can be read as the continual 
development of the themes of exile and return. Perhaps exile is necessary, and perhaps 
the snake is God's agent in the garden. Benjamin's own description of the allegorist 
emphasizes this moment of exile in the concept of alienation. As he notes, only in the 
melancholic, who experiences a particularly intense form of alienation, does the 
allegorical faculty become truly operative. The temptation of Adam and Eve is not 
simply the temptation to groundless empirical knowledge, but also, and at the same time, 
the condition for the long journey home. 
Benjamin's Baudelaire incarnates a satanic gaze, which reveals the hellish aspects 
of the modern social. "Baudelaire, in contrast," quotes Benjamin, "~ctually incarnated 
modern man - the man of the nineteenth century- in the prison of hell" [J42,1.]461 
Earlier in this convolute, Benjamin notes a convergence between "the modern and the 
demonic,"462 [J4a,4] and then goes on to speak of the, "Fleurs du ma/," as "the Inferno of 
the nineteenth century. But Baudelaire's despair carries him infinitely beyond the wrath 
460 See, Gershom Scholem, "Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea," in The 
Messianic Idea in Judaism (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 13. 
461 
"Lui, Baudelaire, ii ecroua reellement dans la prison d'enfer l'homme moderne, 
l 'homme du dixneuvieme siecle." 
462 
"Konjunktion des Modernen und des Dtimonischen [ .... ]" 
291 
of Dante" [Jl 1,4.]463 Baudelaire's satanic gaze sinks the appearances of the modem 
into a chthonic underworld where its true appearance as mythic, demonic, and dreamlike 
can be registered. The task of the allegorist, however, is to redeem these forms, to rescue 
phenomena from its false appearance and integrating them into the realm of ideas. 
463 
"Les fleurs du mal sont l' enfer du XIX siecle. Mais le desespoir de Baudelaire 
/' emporte infiniment sur la co/ere de Dante." 
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Conclusion - Towards A Political-Theology of the "Secular" Social 
What follows is no longer bound directly to Benjamin's texts but represents a speculative 
attempt to develop aspects of his strategy for reading the "secular" social as religious. To 
borrow a phrase from Benjamin, what is presented below is only a "sketchy indication" of 
possible directions for further research, rather than a thorough analysis. The following is 
not an attempt to establish that the social remains religious, but is an exploration of what 
emerges from an analysis that takes this position as its starting point. Since this is only a 
sketch, the concepts relied upon are necessarily somewhat inexact. In One-Way Street, 
Benjamin provides a metaphor about reading that, mutatis mutandis, can also serve as a 
metaphor for the change in perspective adopted in this presentation: 
The power of a country road when one is walking along it is different from the 
power it has when one is flying over it by airplane. In the same way, the power of a 
text when it is read is different from the power it has when it is copied out. The 
airplane passenger sees only how the road pushes through the landscape, how it 
unfolds according to the same laws as the terrain surrounding it. Only he who 
walks the road on foot learns of the power it commands, and of how, from the very 
scenery that for the flier is only the unfurled plain, it calls forth distances, 
belvederes, clearings, prospects at each of its turns like a commander deploying 
solders at a front. (SWl, 447-48; GS4, 90)464 
464 
"Die Kraft der Landstrafie ist eine andere, ob einer sie geht oder im Aeroplan darii.ber 
hinfliegt. So ist auch die Kraft eines Textes eine andere, ob einer ihn liest oder 
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Up to now, we have been walking through Benjamin's texts, inspecting the details. 
Now I propose to take flight, and examine the distant intellectual terrain that stretches out 
before us. By examining this vista from "on high," as it were, our concepts are no longer 
precise, but incorporate great swaths of content that would need to be differentiated in a 
more rigorous analysis. 
The various ways that the "secular" social remains related to the religious have 
been noted by many theorists besides Benjamin. One line of inquiry is represented by 
Schmitt and Agamben, who construct genealogies that locate the origin of modem 
western political concepts in Christian theologies. A different historical argument is 
proffered by Weber, who, as we have seen, claims that the "spirit" of modem Capital 
shares deep affinities with the "spirit" of earlier European protestant "sects." Another 
trajectory is pursued by Durkheim and the neo-Durkheimians. Employing a functionalist 
paradigm, they maintain that contemporary western "secular" institutions evince 
important correspondences with the underlying purpose served by religion. As described 
in Chapter One, their arguments amount to claiming that religion has not vacated the 
public sphere. Lefort opens a further line of inquiry, one which seems to combine both 
the historical and the sociological, arguing that the political, even the "secular," should 
really be thought of in terms of the "theological-political." Sorel, whom many see as 
abschreibt. Wer fliegt, sieht nur, wie sich die Straj3e durch die Landschaft schiebt, ihm 
rollt sie nach den gleichen Gesetzen ab wie das Terrain, das herum liegt. Nur wer die 
Straj3e geht, erfahrt von ihrer Herrschaft und wie aus eben jenem Gelande, das fur den 
Flieger nur die aufgerollte Ebene ist, sie Fernen, Belvederes, Lichtungen, Prospekte mit 
jeder ihrer Wendungen so herauskommandiert, wie der Ruf des Befehlshabers Soldaten 
aus seiner Front." 
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having had a significant influence on Benjamin's ideas, suggests a more strategic use 
of the religious, lobbying for the creation of a political "myth" of the left. 465 All these 
research agendas are united in their rejection of what I have termed the strong version of 
the secularization-thesis, and, in what follows, I assume, for the sake of argument, that 
these theories are proven. 
Here, I aim to move beyond simply reaffirming that the religious remains 
constitutive of the social. Instead, I mean to take a cue from essays such as Benjamin's 
radio addresses and de-emphasize the positivist moment in the description of the social. 
Specifically, I propose we utilize religious concepts to highlight the religious dimension 
of the social, specifically, the political. The reading being suggested here is subversive. 
It is to read a text against itself in the manner Benjamin suggested brushing history 
against the grain. Indeed, Rawls notes that Durkheim employed this strategy with respect 
to the European philosophical tradition: instead of reading philosophers as philosophers, 
Durkheim approached philosophy as modem folklore. Similarly, I propose to re-imagine 
the "secular" political as a theocracy. The fact that the "secular" political does not, prima 
facie, present itself as a theocracy is irrelevant for our purpose. 
The attempt to re-image the political as a theocracy will be indicated by noting the 
continued influence of the pagan concept of sacrifice in contemporary neo-liberal 
465 See, Boer, "The Perpetual Allure of the Bible for Marxism," for a review of some key 
figures in the Marxian tradition attempting to merge theology and critical theory. Also 
see, John Roberts "The 'Returns to Religion': Messianism, Christianity and the 
Revolutionary Tradition. Part I: 'Wakefulness to the Future,"' Historical Materialism 16 
(2008): 59-84; John Roberts, "The 'Returns to Religion': Messianism, Christianity and 
the Revolutionary Tradition. Part II: The Pauline Tradition," Historical Materialism l 6 
(2008): 77-103. 
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political discourses.466 My claim is that contemporary western democratic discourses 
rely on a religious logic for their rhetorical force. The point is not simply the fact that 
these discourses are steeped in religious concepts. Rather, I suggest that these concepts 
remain socially powerful because they are derived from a religious relation to the real; or, 
in Benjamin's idiom, a mythic relation. It is this relation, more than the discourse itself 
that is at issue in the present analysis. These discourses "tap into" or "speak to" a 
religious imaginary that persists in the contemporary "secular" social. I claim that if we 
metaschematize along Benjaminian and Hammanian lines, we can submit that the mythic 
imaginary is found in the fact that secular democratic parties are subjectively experienced 
as fulfilling the same general role that ancient pagan priests did with respect to their cult. 
Let us review the principal strand of the argument that the modem social can be 
read religiously. Benjamin suggests that Capital can be thought of as a religion. 
According to him, if Capital is a religion, it is a mythic one, characterized by a circular 
temporality, psychic bondage, and gods that determine the fate of humanity. Support for 
Benjamin's theory can be found in Marx, Durkheim, and to a lesser extent in Weber. 
Marx noted that the alienation, characteristic of Capital, results in labour being perceived 
as an objective natural force, instead of being recognized as one generated by human 
beings. However, upon closer examination, the notion of "natural" as it appears in 
contemporary political discourses is not equivalent to the notion of nature in Newtonian 
466 See, Frank Pearce, "Obligatory Sacrifice and Imperial Projects," in State Crime in the 
Global Age, ed. William J. Chambliss, Raymond Michalowski and Ronald C. Kramer 
(Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2010). I am indebted to Pearce for the insight regarding 
the overlap between the concept of sacrifice in pagan religions and contemporary political 
discourses. 
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p~ysics. Instead, it edges nearer to the understanding of nature that could be posited 
in a non-scientific "religious" imaginary. Whereas natural laws, in a Newtonian sense, 
are descriptions of immutable physical processes, the "natural laws" of the social seem 
amenable to the petitions of human beings. 
The historical analyses of Weber, Schmitt, Agamben and others, not fully 
explored in the previous chapters, indicate that the concrete manifestation of the religious 
is to some extent determined by the social text from which the phenomenon arises. That 
is, with their insights, we move from Durkheim's highly abstract and generalized 
determination of the religious, to a more concrete level, to the socio-historical incarnation 
of the religion of Capital in contemporary western neo-liberal societies. Weber's 
examination of the spirit of Capital indicates that the putatively secular imaginaries, 
which eventually emerged in European modernity, were couched in the world views of 
Protestant theologies. The new does not spring forth, fully formed, and armed, like 
Athena from the head of Zeus, but is interwoven with the social text from which it 
originates. That is to say, as Capital re-shaped Europe's religious imaginary, the 
ideational framework remained essentially Christo-pagan. The religion of Capital is 
European, perhaps the first genuine world religion to have emerged from that region. It 
draws its content from both biblical and pagan sources. Durkheim noted that when 
cultures attain a sufficient degree of internal differentiation, natural and social forces in 
the collective imaginary become represented by anthropomorphized gods. If we accept 
that Weber and the other architects of politico-religious genealogies showed that the new 
remains bound to the old, perhaps we can bestow the biblical name Mammon on the 
dominant "objective" force in modernity: Mammon the god of Capital. 
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From our previous analysis, we recall Durkheim's insight that gods tend to be 
worshipped indirectly, through an intermediary object: the fetish. Rawls seems to echo 
aspects of Benjamin's thesis by combining elements of Durkheim's and Weber's theories, 
noting that perhaps the history of European modernity resulted in elevating money, or 
better, "value" to the level of a contemporary fetish. Value is the abstract force 
represented by the fetish, which is the social representation of a supernatural power. 
Value is the highest metaphysical instant in capitalist culture. The metaphysical power of 
value is demonstrated in its seemingly magical ability to transubstantiate everything into a 
manifestation of itself. The form of value is formless. Value, like Zeus, can assume any 
guise it desires. 
Since the market, an expression of Mammon, is not directly under human control, 
but does appear susceptible to humanity's wishes, sacrifices are made to lobby the god. 
A sacrifice can be defined as: 
[A]n act or acts by which a sacrificer gives up something it values to a superior 
sacred other, sometimes through a ritual officiated by a sacrificer, in the hope of 
creating for itself and sometimes for designated others a right relation with the 
superior other and possibly to receive other benefits that the latter can bestow.467 
The sacrifices to Mammon are in kind. The god of value is offered value so as to 
ensure the production of value. As Durkheim noted, this is the essential logic of all 
467 Pearce, "Obligatory Sacrifice and Imperial Projects," 49. 
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sacrifice. The totemic god is provided with an instance of the totem in order to 
ensure the continuation of the community. Food is offered so as to ensure the production 
of more food in the future. To translate this back into the "secular" discourse of political 
economy, the market requires the correct social conditions to flourish. If a community is 
to become rich, it must, according to the formula of value for value, sacrifice one form of 
wealth to receive another. Sacrifice is contractual. Something is offered so that 
something else is received. If something of great value is needed, some equivalent object 
must be found for sacrifice. Often the value of the sacrificial object can be determined by 
the degree of privation suffered by the community when the object is lost. The more the 
community requires the sacrificial object for its survival, the more valuable it is deemed 
to be. 
Historically, most cults, especially in a social that is internally differentiated, have 
priests who are charged with reading the signs and officiating the sacrifices intended to 
placate or lobby the gods. The language of the gods is ambiguous and competing 
interpretations of the signs are always possible. This fact accounts for the existence of 
competing priestly classes.468 The mood of the gods is thought to be discernible in the 
operations of the social and natural domain. Order will not prevail, if the gods are angry. 
We recall, for example, that Thebes was beset by plague because of "religious pollution," 
and that the calamities which putatively befell ancient Egypt were the result of having 
enslaved God's chosen people. If an injustice has been committed, because a taboo has 
468 Cf. Tausig, "History as Sourcery." Here Taussig's suggestion becomes that social 
scientists have a function analogous to sooth-sayers and augers of the ancient world, 
whose basic concern was to interpret correctly what the gods wanted. 
been broken, rituals, often including sacrifices, must be carried out to re-establish 
order. It is incumbent upon the moral community to remain in a positive relationship 
with the gods, and if this relationship is disrupted, to repair it as soon as possible. 
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I claim that this description of sacrifice as a central category for re-establishing a 
lost cosmic order, for creating beneficial conditions for the comm1unity, remains operative 
in neo-liberal political discourse. We can see that, in some respects, political parties in 
western democracies have taken over the role formerly executed by pagan priests with 
respect to reading the signs and officiating the sacrifices. Support for this admittedly 
unusual assertion can be found in Schmitt's political theology. Schmitt famously asserted 
that, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception. "469 That is, the sovereign occupies a 
liminal position with respect to law. This border-position is homologous to that of the 
biblical God with respect to creation. I maintain that it is possible to generalize Schmitt's 
claim beyond the European theological context. The association of political power with 
the sacred is perhaps the underlying logic of most, if not all, political power. If Schmitt's 
decisionist formula allows us to determine the place of power, I submit that 
simultaneously it allows us to localize the place of the sacred. 
In representative democracies it is "the people" who are sovereign, at least 
theoretically. "The people," do not, however, govern directly, but their will is meant to be 
executed by political parties speaking on their behalf. In these democracies, it is the 
ruling party, especially its symbolic figurehead, which assumes the status of the 
sovereign. Therefore, it is the party and its leader which approach the sacred centre of the 
469 Schmitt, Political-Theology, 5. 
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social. They occupy the liminal position homologous to that of the god-head. 
Notwithstanding the existence of various fringe parties that sometimes garner a few 
percentages of the popular vote, most contemporary European and North American 
countries are defined by two main interpretations of the market, or two essential 
interpretations of Mammon's signs. That is, there exist two main priestly classes, which 
can call for the state of exception. The ruling party can, on behalf of "the people," create 
a situation in which normal operations are suspended for the good of the political system 
as a whole. The sovereign is both "inside" and "outside" the law because he is at once 
able to suspend it, and, in that very act, confirms it. We recall from our previous 
discussion that for Schmitt the exception establishes the rule. I suggest, then, that the 
sacrificial moment can be seen as one embodiment of the state of exception. The 
sacrifice is a sacred event, called for when exceptional circumstances have arisen. 
What happens if a sacrifice has been made and the desired result is not attained? 
Durkheim tells us that in such an event the ritual is not discarded as ineffective: the 
structure of belief is resistant to empirical evidence suggesting a contrary interpretation of 
the facts. This is because the underlying purpose of the religious is to bind the 
community together, and the symbolic system is merely a retrospective justification of 
this primary function. Discarding a culture's entire symbolic system is generally deemed 
far too radical a solution to a problem that can be accounted for within the symbolic 
system. That is, if a desired result is not attained through sacrifice, the fault is usually 
found with the sacrifice, the sacrificee, or the sacrificer, and not with the symbolic system 
that calls for the sacrifice in the first place. 
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As defined above, a sacrifice always entails privation. When food is scarce, it 
is often food that is sacrificed. If rain is wanting then water may well be the offering. 
Human sacrifice is the paradigmatic example of a loss to the community. In 
contemporary discourses, public education, public sector salaries, health care benefits, 
and taxes on big companies are offered on the sacrificial altar, in the hopes that the god 
will show his favor. How far can this logic be taken, however, before the community 
itself is destroyed? Again, according to Durkheim the religious exists because it provides 
the necessary centrifugal force that keeps a community together, and this force is exerted 
through ritual. What if, by way of example, water is scarce, the community sacrifices 
something of value, perhaps water, in the hopes of getting rain, but rain does not come? 
How much more can be sacrificed? We recall from Levi-Strauss' work that there need 
not be doctrinal agreement for a community to be considered a unity. What is essential is 
that all members of the community participate in the cult. Consensus regarding what the 
god's signs mean is not necessary. In contemporary western politics we have, to use the 
language of Zizek, a "reactionary-conservative" reading of the intentions of Mammon, as 
well as a "progressivist-liberal" reading. 
The reactionary-conservative priestly faction, more recently labeled "market 
fundamentalists," tend to argue that worsening economic forecasts can only be countered 
by greater sacrifices of value. The objective historical conditions, for example that the 
economy is worsening, are signs that Mammon is not pleased. The problem, according to 
this group, is that the sacrifices so far have not been thorough enough. Some of the 
sacrificial offerings have been put aside for the use by the community, instead of being 
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offered to Mammon, and this, they claim, is the reason he did not send what is 
needed. The progressive-liberal priestly group counters the argument that while sacrifices 
to Mammon are necessary, all obligatory sacrifices have already been made. What 
remains should be retained by the existing community for its maintenance, so that in the 
future, it can make additional sacrifices. This group tends to argue that the signs have 
been misread, and that there are indications that Mammon is already placated. 
Both priestly classes share the assumption that Mammon can only be satisfied 
through sacrifice, differing only regarding the extent of the sacrifice. If we again 
metaschematize, we may agree with Benjamin that there is indeed another group 
occupying a position in contemporary politics similar to that of the early Roman 
Christians of the common era before Constantine. These radicals, like the early 
Christians, tend to come from subaltern social classes. They are generally ignored by the 
official priestly discourses, if not mocked or persecuted. The problem faced by this third 
group, both in the late Roman imperium and in contemporary politics, is that their 
discourse exists beyond the horizon of the official cult. Their doctrinal position is to end 
all sacrifices, smash the idols and create a theological relationship to the only true God. 
If "reactionaries" and "progressives" represent the two official priestly classes, the 
third, subaltern group, is composed of Anarchists and Marxists. According to them, 
Mammon is not a god, but a human creation, an idol. Relating to this idol as if it exists 
independently of human actions and making sacrifices to it in order to extract a reciprocal 
response simply means condemning humanity to ever more severe cycles of bondage. In 
Benjamin's idiom, this approach to the social generates mythic temporality. Unlike the 
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pagan god Mammon, the biblical God is not a god with attributes. It represents the 
infinity of the human essence. The logic of the biblical taboo on making graven images 
gestures towards this infinity. In Lefort's language, the symbolic centre of a true 
democracy remains empty. In this vision of the social, gods effectively vacate the 
ideational landscape. 
The logic that dominates the conservative-reactionary position is repeated to a 
lesser degree in the progressivist-liberal one, namely that sacrifice is the only solution to 
the problem of human suffering. No matter what the objective historical conditions, 
sacrifices of value are the only options for a community devoted to Mammon. According 
to Durkheim, the essential moment of the ritual is that it generates a sense of community. 
It does not placate a god who has an ontological existence independent from the 
community. In this sense, the priestly heretics could be understood as calling for the end 
of false sacrifices, because these are not necessary for sustaining the community. The 
community can only survive by focusing on rituals that establish the community, not ones 
that endanger the community through excessive privation. In a sense, then, the heretics 
are calling for an Enlightenment-awakening from the bondages of superstition. As 
Benjamin argues, as long as agency is felt to reside outside the community, in a god, there 
can be no freedom. Only when this god is recognized as the infinity at the centre of 
humanity, is humanity in a position to create a social based in freedom. 
The association of Marxists and Anarchists with Christians of the pre-Constantine 
empire highlights a sublime lexical irony. The Roman pagans first applied the term 
atheist to Christians. Following the logic just sketched, there is a certain coherence to this 
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charge, since these Christian "atheists" did not accept the existence of pagan gods, 
while their. biblical God could not be represented. It is as if he does not exist. In this 
sense the "atheism" of the Marxists and Anarchists, can be read as the fulfillment of 
biblical logic, of taking the Judeo-Christian message to its ultimate and necessary 
conclusion. As Benjamin seems to imply, only Marxists and Anarchists are the really 
religious, while the putatively "secular" priests are simply pagan heretics, mistaken in 
their religious views. In Benjamin's work, Marxism is not the rejection of Christianity 
and the biblical tradition, but its fulfillment. Put differently, theology is the animating 
"spirit" of Marxism. It is the dwarf pulling the strings of an essentially inanimate 
political casing. 
With this brief description of the logic of pagan sacrifice in contemporary political 
discourse, we discover just one dimension of the social that secular theory denies and 
suppresses. We can read "backwards" from the narratives of contemporary politics to the 
Ur-phenomenon that underlies them. 
If Benjamin represents a problem for contemporary atheist Marxian readers 
because he blatantly includes religious language in his analysis of the social, I maintain 
that his work can be read simultaneously as the solution to the very problem his 
philosophy seems to pose. 
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